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FOREWORD
The following volume consists of research that The
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
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meetings.
Funding for the project came from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York. Both of the corporation’s
key project managers, Stephen Del Rosso and Patricia
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always supportive. NPEC’s project coordinator,
Tamara Mitchell, and the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) staff helped prepare the book manuscript.
Without Ms. Mitchell’s help and that of Ms. Marianne
Cowling and Ms. Rita Rummel of SSI, the book would
not have been possible. Finally, to the project’s authors
and participants who contributed their time, ideas, and
hard work, a special thanks is due.

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI
Executive Director
The Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center
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PART I:
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER 1
ASSESSING THE IAEA’S ABILITY
TO VERIFY THE NPT
A Report of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
Nuclear Safeguards System

Henry D. Sokolski
OVERVIEW
Ask how effective International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards are in blocking
proliferation, and you are sure to get a set of predictable
reactions. Those skeptical of the system will complain
that IAEA inspections are too sketchy to ferret out
nuclear misbehavior (e.g., North Korea, Iraq, and
Iran) and that in the rare cases when such violators
are found out (almost always by national intelligence
agencies), the IAEA’s board of governors is loath to
act. IAEA supporters have a rather opposite view.
The IAEA, they point out, actually found Pyongyang,
Baghdad, and Tehran in non-compliance with their
IAEA safeguards agreements and reported this to the
United Nations (UN) Security Council. International
inspectors, moreover, were the only ones correctly
to assess the status of Saddam’s strategic weapons
programs. The problem is not to be found in Vienna or
in the IAEA’s inspections system but in Washington’s
unwillingness to listen. In the future, the United States,
they argue, should rely more, not less, on the IAEA to
sort out Iran’s nuclear activities and to disable North
Korea’s nuclear weapons complex.
These two views could hardly be more opposed.
There is at least one point, though, upon which both
3

sides agree: If possible, it would be useful to enhance
the IAEA’s ability to detect and prevent nuclear
diversions. This would not only reduce the current
risk of nuclear proliferation, it would make the further
expansion of nuclear power much less risky.
The question is what is possible? To date, little has
been attempted to answer this basic question. Periodic
reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the IAEA have highlighted budgetary,
personnel, and and administrative challenges that are
immediately facing the agency.1 There also has been
a 2-year internal IAEA review of how existing IAEA
safeguards procedures might be improved.2 None
of these assessments, however, has tackled the more
fundamental question of how well the IAEA is actually
doing in achieving its nuclear material accountancy
mission. Precisely what nuclear activities and
materials can the IAEA monitor to detect a diversion
early enough to prevent it? What inherent limits does
the IAEA nuclear inspections system face? In light of
these limits, what new initiatives should the IAEA
Department of Safeguards attempt and, even more
important, stay clear of? What additional authority and
technical capabilities might the IAEA secure to help
achieve its nuclear material accountancy goals? In the
end, what is or should be protected as being “peaceful”
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or
the IAEA charter? What is the proper balance between
expanding the use of nuclear energy and making sure
it is not diverted to make bombs?
None of these questions admits to quick or easy
answers. All, however, are increasingly timely. Will
IAEA safeguards be able keep Iran from using their
nuclear programs to make bombs? What of IAEA’s
inspectors’ abilities to ferret out all of North Korea’s
nuclear activities? Will the safeguards being proposed
4

for India effectively prevent U.S. and foreign nuclear
cooperation from assisting New Delhi’s nuclear
weapons program?
Then, there is the long-term problem of nuclear
power’s possible expansion. Since 2005, more than
fifteen countries have announced a desire to acquire
large reactors of their own by 2020 (this is on top of the
31 nations that already operate such reactors).3 Nine
of these states—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—
are located in the war-torn region of the Middle East.
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen seem unlikely
to achieve their stated goal. But the others, with U.S.,
Chinese, French and Russian nuclear cooperation, may
well succeed. What is clear is that most are interested
in developing a nuclear program capable of more than
merely boiling water to run turbines that generate
electricity. At least four have made it clear that they
are interested in hedging their security bets with a
nuclear weapons-option. For these states, developing
purportedly peaceful nuclear energy is the weapon of
choice. Will the IAEA, which is pledged to keep these
programs peaceful, be able to do so?
In anticipation of these nuclear challenges, the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
began in 2005 to consult with officials from the IAEA,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the United
Arab Emirates, Germany, and France, as well as outside
experts on the effectiveness of the IAEA’s safeguards
system and how best to improve it. NPEC went on
to commission 13 studies on a variety of safeguardsrelated issues. These analyses were reviewed and
discussed at a series of private conferences with senior
level officials and outside experts held in Washington,
Paris, and London.4
5

A key conclusion of these meetings and research was
that the IAEA is already falling behind in achieving its
material accountancy mission and risks slipping further
unless members of the IAEA board independently and
in concert take remedial actions in the next 2 to 5 years.
The most important of these measures can be organized
around seven basic recommendations:
1. Resist calls to read the NPT as recognizing the
per se right to any and all nuclear technology, no
matter how unsafeguardable or uneconomic such
technology might be. The current, permissive, mistaken
interpretation of the NPT is that all states have a
sovereign per se right to any and all nuclear technology
and materials, including nuclear fuel making and
nuclear weapons usable materials, so long as they
are declared to the IAEA, occasionally inspected,
and have some conceivable civilian application. This
interpretation, if not overturned, will guarantee a
world full of nuclear weapons-ready states. With
only a few more such states, the IAEA’s ability to
detect military diversions in a timely fashion will be
marginal at best. For this reason, as well as a series of
legal, historical, and technical reasons, it is essential
that members of the IAEA Board of Governors make
the IAEA’s ability to detect military nuclear diversions
in a timely fashion and the economic viability of any
nuclear project to be two clear criteria for what is
peaceful and protected under the NPT. Nuclear power
also should only be considered to be peaceful and
beneficial if it makes at least as much economic sense
as its nonnuclear alternatives. Thirty years ago, the
United States stipulated that in Title V of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (see Title V, The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-242) Sections
501-503) that the U.S. executive branch should create a
series of international technical cooperative programs
6

to promote the use of non-nuclear and non-petroleum
renewable energy sources. The law also required the
executive branch to conduct country-specific energy
assessments and to report annually on the progress of
U.S. and international efforts to employ such energy
sources abroad. Unfortunately, since the law’s passage,
the White House and the U.S. Departments of Energy
and State have yet to comply with any of the legal
requirements of this title.
Specific Recommendations:
A. The United States and like-minded nations
should stipulate in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review
Conference that future civilian nuclear energy projects
should only enjoy the protection of the NPT if they
are:
		 (1) able to be monitored in non-nuclear-weapon
states so as to afford timely warning of military
diversions as stipulated by the NPT and the IAEA’s
own official criteria for what effective safeguards
require; and,
		 (2) economically viable enough to be financed
without nuclear-specific government subsidies.
B. The U.S. Government should begin full
implementation of Section V of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and urge its closest allies
to cooperate in achieving its stated goals.
2. Distinguish between what actually can be
effectively safeguarded, and what can, at best, only be
monitored. Currently, the IAEA is unable to provide
timely warning of diversions from nuclear fuelmaking plants (enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel
processing plants utilizing nuclear materials directly
useable to make bombs). For some of these plants, the
agency loses track of many nuclear weapons-worth of
material every year. Meanwhile, the IAEA is unable
7

to prevent the overnight conversion of centrifuge
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants into
nuclear bomb-material factories. As the number of
these facilities increases, the ability of the agency to
fulfill its material accountancy mission dangerously
erodes. The IAEA has yet to concede these points by
admitting that although it can monitor these dangerous
nuclear activities, it cannot actually do so in a manner
that can assure timely detection of a possible military
diversion—the key to an inspection procedure being a
safeguard against military diversions. In addition, the
IAEA’s original criteria for how much nuclear material
is needed to make one bomb (a “significant quantity”),
for how much time is required to convert various
materials into bombs (“conversion time”), and what
the IAEA’s own inspection goals should consequently
be (“timeliness detection goals”) were set over 30 years
ago and need updating.
Specific Recommendations:
A. Require the IAEA Department of Safeguards
to distinguish between those nuclear activities and
materials for which timely detection of military
diversions is actually possible and those for which it is
not possible. This could be encouraged by having the
nuclear weapons state members of the IAEA do their
own individual, national analyses of these questions
and make their findings public.
B. In light of the nuclear inspections experience of
the last 15 years with North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Egypt,
Taiwan, Libya, and South Korea, members of the
IAEA Board of Governors should be encouraged to
undertake their own national reassessment of what
the IAEA’s current significant quantities criteria,
conversion times, and timely detection goals should
be. These reassessments would be driven by what the
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IAEA would need to assure timely detection of military
diversions—i.e., time sufficient to allow states to
intervene to block the possible high-jacking of civilian
facilities and materials to make bombs. On the basis of
these analyses, the IAEA Board of Governors should
instruct the IAEA Department of Safeguards to report
back to the Board regarding desirable revisions to the
agency’s criteria for what nuclear safeguards over
different nuclear materials and activities should be.
C. Call for increased monitoring of those nuclear
facilities for which such timely detection is not yet
possible (e.g., nuclear bulk-handling facilities where
nuclear fuel is made and processed and on-line
fueled reactors, such as heavy water reactors, where
keeping track of the fuel going in an out of the plant is
particularly taxing). Such increased monitoring should
be designed at least to increase the prospect of detecting
diversions after they have occurred. The IAEA should
make clear that timely detection of diversions (i.e.,
detection of diversions before they are completed) from
such facilities is not yet possible. Finally, the IAEA
should make the plant operators and owners pay for
this additional monitoring. This additional cost should
be considered a normal cost of conducting these
activities.
D. Avoid involving the IAEA in the verification
of a military fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). As
currently proposed, a FMCT assumes that the timely
detection of diversions from declared nuclear fuelmaking plants is possible when, in fact, it clearly is
not.
E. Call for physical security measures at those
facilities where timely detection is not possible that are
equivalent to the most stringent standards currently
employed in nuclear-weapons facilities in the United
9

States, Britain, Russia, China, and France. Again, the
cost of such additional security measures should be
born by the owner or operator.
3. Reestablish material accountancy as the IAEA’s
top safeguards mission by pacing the size and growth
in the agency’s safeguards budget against the size
and growth of the number of significant quantities of
special material and bulk handling facilities that the
agency must account for and inspect (see Figure 1, p. 20
below). As noted above, the amounts of special nuclear material under IAEA safeguards that go unaccounted for is large and increasing every year. These
increases are most worrisome in non-weapons states
that are now making nuclear fuel (e.g., Iran, Japan, the
Netherlands, Germany, and Brazil). Unfortunately,
the IAEA refuses to report anything but aggregate
information about these materials: There are no
national breakdowns that are publicly available for
the different types of nuclear fuels being safeguarded
in each country nor a run down of the materials that
have gone unaccounted for country-by-country. As
already noted, the IAEA is technically unable to meet
its own timely detection goals for the safeguarding
of plants producing and processing separated
plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and mixed oxide
fuels. Candor and encouraging restraint is all that can
currently be offered to address this safeguards gap. In
addition, at most of the sites that it must safeguard, the
IAEA lacks the near-real time monitoring capabilities
necessary to determine if the agency’s own monitoring
cameras and other sensors (which are left unattended
for 90 or more days) are actually turned on. As such,
a proliferator could divert entire fuel rods containing
one or more significant quantities of lightly enriched
10

uranium and nuclear weapons-usable plutonium
without the agency finding out either at all or in a
timely fashion. Unlike the safeguards gap associated
with nuclear fuel producing and processing plants,
though, this gap can technically be fixed by installing
near-real time surveillance systems that allow IAEA
inspectors in Vienna to receive information from the
remote sensors it has deployed without being on site.
Certainly before the IAEA takes on additional dubious
or extremely challenging missions, such as monitoring
fissile production cut-offs or searching for nuclear
weapons-related activities, it must arrest this growing
gap between the amounts of nuclear materials it must
safeguard and its technical ability to do so.
Specific Recommendations:
A. Pay greater attention to what the IAEA can
clearly do better—count fresh and spent fuel rods—by
quickly increasing and optimizing its remote near-real
time monitoring capabilities for all of its monitoring
systems, and increasing the number of full-time,
qualified nuclear inspectors necessary to conduct onsite inspections.
B. Require the IAEA Department of Safeguards
to report annually to the public on its safeguards
budget and identify not only the number of manhours dedicated to onsite inspections and the number
of significant quantities under the IAEA’s safeguards
charge, but also the amount of direct-use materials
(materials that can be quickly turned into bomb
fuel) under its charge by type for which the agency
could not achieve its own timeliness detection goals, the
amount of direct-use materials for which the agency
could achieve its own timeliness detection goals; the
number and location of facilities under near-real time
surveillance; the amount of money dedicated to wide11

area surveillance; and the amount of money dedicated
to IAEA safeguards research and development. In each
case, the IAEA should present national breakdowns of
each total.
C. In addition, each member state of the IAEA
Board of Governors should routinely conduct its own
national analysis of what it believes the proper ways to
the address the problems noted above are and publicly
identify and explain what it thinks the agency’s
top safeguards priority should be to improve these
numbers.
4. Focus greater attention on useful safeguards
activities that are necessary, but have yet to be
fully developed. To assure that the IAEA’s material
accountancy assets do not risk becoming cannibalized
for other urgent missions that might arise (e.g.,
inspections for India if the U.S.-India nuclear deal
should go forward, more intrusive inspections for
Iran, and North Korea, etc.), it would be useful for the
agency to develop stand-by wide-area surveillance
teams for the imposition of sudden inspections
requirements. The agency might also usefully do more
to account for source materials in processed form, as
it was information regarding the shipment of such
material from China that originally tipped off the IAEA
to suspicious nuclear activities in Iran. The agency also
needs fully to fund and properly staff its sampling
analysis facilities and its efforts to secure overhead
imagery of the sites that it must inspect. Finally, the
agency needs to do more to establish what its own
safeguards research and development requirements
might be.
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Specific Recommendations:
A. Members of the IAEA Board of Governors
should assess on their own what might be required to
conduct wide-area surveillance inspections of Iran and
North Korea (i.e., what such inspections would cost to
stand up and maintain in terms of dollars and staff),
and ask the IAEA Board of Governors to task the IAEA
Department of Safeguards to do likewise.
B. The IAEA Board of Governors should ask its
members for supplemental contributions to stand up
and maintain such surveillance units so that they can
be tapped at any time without affecting the IAEA’s
routine safeguards operations. To the extent possible,
the supplemental contributions should be based on a
formula tied to the costs of generating nuclear electricity
in each member state (as called for by recommendation
5 detailed below).
C. Similar studies should be conducted and
supplemental assessments made in support of IAEA
efforts to improve the agency’s ability to account for
nuclear source material and to fund nuclear sampling
analyses and of inspections-related overhead imagery
and analysis.
5. Complement the existing UN formula for raising
IAEA funding with a user-fee for safeguards paid for by
each nuclear operator. The IAEA’s director general has
repeatedly noted how small the agency’s safeguards
budget is, but has yet to propose how to increase it.
As a stop-gap measure, the United States, European
Union (EU), and Japan have been giving token
amounts of voluntary, “supplemental” contributions
to the agency. Currently, the UN formula used to
raise IAEA funds has nations that possess no power
reactors, such as Italy, paying more than nations, such
13

as South Korea, that possess 20 such plants. Countries
including the United States, Canada, Brazil, Japan,
and India, meanwhile, are taxing the IAEA safeguards
system (or soon will be) with nuclear fuel-making and
bulk-handling facilities and on-line fueled reactors
that are much more challenging to monitor than other
nuclear plants. Although the IAEA inspects the nuclear
reactors and facilities of nuclear-weapon state members
of the NPT far less than they inspect those of the nonnuclear-weapon states, the nuclear-weapon NPT states
arguably have the most to gain from IAEA efforts to
prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Both
the insufficiency of the IAEA safeguards spending and
the inequity of the way funds are currently raised for
this function suggest the need to complement existing
country assessments with a safeguards surcharge that
is based on the costs of generating nuclear energy in
each country. This surcharge is needed to assure the
IAEA’s budget not only grows significantly above its
current level (which is too low by one or two orders
of magnitude), but also to keep up with the possible
expansion of nuclear power.
Specific Recommendations:
A. The United States, EU and Japan each should
base all of their current supplemental contributions
to the IAEA safeguards budget on a national formula
based on a specific percentage of nuclear generating
costs as it relates to the number of kilowatt hours that
their civilian reactors generate per year.
B. The United States, EU, and Japan should,
then, negotiate among themselves on what an
agreed safeguards surcharge formula should be and
encourage others to follow suit so that revenues from
such a fee would become mandatory for each country
contributing to the IAEA and would go exclusively to
14

support the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. The
UN formula, meanwhile, would be used to support the
IAEA’s non-safeguarding activities.
C. The IAEA Board of Governors should instruct
the agency’s Department of Safeguards to identify
those nuclear facilities (e.g., on-line fueled reactors and
nuclear fuel making plants) that require the greatest
amount of resources to inspect or pose the greatest
difficulty in meeting the agency’s own timely detection
criteria. The IAEA Board of Governors should then ask
those countries possessing these identified facilities
to pay an additional amount to the IAEA Department
of Safeguards to cover the additional costs associated
with their inspection. To the extent possible, the
IAEA should encourage nations having to pay such
additional fees to collect them from the customers or
owners or operators of these facilities.
6. Establish default actions against various levels
of IAEA safeguards agreement non-compliance.
Currently, any proliferator that violates its IAEA
comprehensive safeguards agreement knows that the
deck is stacked against the IAEA Board of Governors
reaching a consensus to (1) find them in non-compliance,
and (2) take any disciplinary action. The key reason
why is simple: The current burden of proof regarding
any non-compliance issue is on the IAEA staff and
the Board of Governors rather than on the suspect
proliferator. In the absence of political consensus in
the IAEA Board of Governors, the proliferator can be
assured that no non-compliance finding will be made,
much less any disciplinary action taken. This set of
operating assumptions needs to be reversed. The best
way to assure this is to establish a set of country-neutral
rules regarding non-compliance that will go into effect
15

automatically upon the Board of Governors’ inability to
reach a consensus on (1) whether or not a given party is
in full compliance with its comprehensive safeguards
agreement, and (2) what action to take in the event that
a party is found to be in non-compliance.
Specific Recommendations:
A. The United States, EU, and other like-minded
nations should announce—independent of Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) consensus—that they will
suspend transfers of controlled nuclear goods from
their jurisdiction to any country that the IAEA Board
of Governors has been unable to find in full compliance
with its safeguards obligations and urge the IAEA Board
of Governors and the NSG to agree to do the same.
Under such a regime, the IAEA Board of Governors
would be forced to suspend nuclear cooperation from
any IAEA member to the suspected state until the
Board could unanimously determine that the suspect
state was in full compliance.
B. The United States, EU, and other like-minded
nations should call on the UN Security Council
(UNSC) to pass resolutions prohibiting states found in
non-compliance by the IAEA Board of Governors from
making nuclear fuel for a decade, and requiring these
states to submit to intrusive wide-area surveillance
to establish that they are completely out of the bombmaking business.
C. The United States, individual EU member states,
and other like-minded nations should take national
actions to sanction states that withdraw from the NPT
while in violation of the treaty and call on the UNSC,
IAEA and the NSG to pass a country-neutral sanctions
resolution that tracks these sanctions measures.
D. At a minimum, the United States and like-minded
states should adopt national laws and executive orders
16

to establish what sanctions they would be willing to
impose against any non-nuclear-weapon state that
tests a nuclear device and call on the UNSC to pass a
country-neutral sanctions resolution that tracks these
national sanctions. The sanctions could be lifted after
the testing state has disarmed and demonstrated to
the IAEA Board of Governors that they are out of the
bomb making business.
7. Plan on meeting future safeguards requirements
on the assumption that the most popular innovations—
integrated safeguards, “proliferation-resistant” fuelcycles, and international fuel assurances—may not
achieve their stated goals or, worse, may undermine
them. Perhaps the three most popular safeguards
innovations—integrated safeguards under the
Additional Protocol, proliferation-resistant fuel-cycles
under America’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP), and international fuel assurances that can be
afforded through fuel banks and regional fuel-making
centers—are also the most unexamined. Recent analyses
conducted by outside think-tanks (including the
Council on Foreign Relations, Princeton University’s
International Panel on Fissile Materials, the Keystone
Center, and the U.S. National Laboratories), in fact,
conclude that each of these innovations could prove to
be ineffectual or even self-defeating. GNEP’s proposed
proliferation-resistant fuel-cycles, for example, do not
appear to be very proliferation resistant especially with
respect to state-based proliferation and could easily
increase the use and availability of nuclear weaponsusable fuels worldwide. Fuel banks and fuel making
centers, if they make fuel available at “affordable” or
“reasonable” prices, could easily end up subsidizing
nuclear power development in regions where such
17

activity would not be economical or safe. Fuel-making
centers also could end up spreading nuclear-fuel making
technology. Finally, integrated safeguards, which
reduce the number of inspections per safeguarded
facility, could easily become a crutch for the IAEA to
evade its material accountancy responsibilities.
Specific Recommendation: The U.S. Government
should create a board of outside experts to serve as a
quality-assurance panel to spot the potential downsides
of any nonproliferation initiative. This group would be
created by and report to Congress on the potential selfdefeating consequences of any proposed government
“nonproliferation” initiative might have prior to
Congress authorizing or appropriating to support it.
Some of these recommendations are easy to act upon;
others are not. IAEA member states, though, should
begin to act on them now. Certainly, it would be a
mistake to wait to see if civilian nuclear energy will
expand (a proposition whose demonstration may
require another decade or more). The reason why is
simple: Even if nuclear power does not expand, the
amount of nuclear weapons-usable materials that
the IAEA must prevent from being diverted to make
bombs is already very large and growing.
SOME NEGATIVE TRENDS
On a number of counts, the IAEA safeguards system
appears to be getting better. After more than a decade of
no real growth, annual funding for nuclear inspections
finally was increased in real terms from $89 million in
2003 to $102 million in 2004 and to $108 million in 2007.
Deployment of advanced remote monitoring equipment is on the rise and implementation of new, more
18

intrusive inspections authority under the Additional
Protocol is moving forward. In the future, nuclear
power might expand, but most of this expansion will
take place in nuclear weapons states or countries that
are so trustworthy that it could be argued that few, if
any, additional nuclear inspections may be needed.
As for additional safeguards requirements—e.g.,
inspections in India, North Korea, or Iran—they might
well be met with additional contributions when and if
they arise. From this perspective, current safeguards
budgeting and planning could be viewed as being
adequate to the task for years to come.5
It could, that is, until other, less positive trends
are considered. Of these, perhaps the most important
concerns the number of significant quantities of nuclear
material that the IAEA must safeguard to prevent from
being diverted and directly fashioned into bombs. This
number is not only growing, but at a rate far faster than
that of the IAEA’s safeguards budget. The amount of
separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(nuclear fuels that can be fashioned into bombs in a
matter of hours or days) that the IAEA inspects, for
example, has grown more than six-fold between 1984
and 2004 while the agency’s safeguards budget has
barely doubled (see the Figure 1 below).
Meanwhile, the number of nuclear fuel fabrication
and fuel making plants (facilities that are by far the
easiest to divert nuclear material from) has grown in
the last 2 decades from a mere handful to 65. Then,
there is the number of other plants containing special
nuclear material that the IAEA must safeguard: It has
roughly tripled to more than 900 facilities today.6
These trends have forced the IAEA to work their
inspections staff much harder. Over the last 20 years,
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•

From 1984 to 2004, IAEA
safeguards spending
roughly $105 m in
constant ’04 dollars.

•

Amounts of HEU
and separated Pu,
meanwhile, grew nearly
6-fold -- enough to make
12,000 to 21,000 crude
nuclear weapons

HEU: Highly enriched uranium
Pu: Plutonium

Figure 1. IAEA Safeguards Spending vs. Mounting
Weapons Usable Material Stockpiles.
the number of days IAEA inspectors have been in the
field has nearly doubled from 60 to 70 days to 125 to 150.7
This doubling has not only cost more money, it is one
of the reasons (along with unreasonable employment
and contracting rules) for a hollowing out of IAEA’s
experienced inspections staff. This hollowing out is
expected to become acute. As noted by the U.S. GAO,
about 50 percent or 30 out of 75 of the IAEA’s senior
safeguards staff are expected to retire by 2011.8
One way to address this inspections crunch is to
have the IAEA simply inspect less. This could be done
legally by implementing the Additional Protocol.
In fact, limiting the number of routine safeguards
inspections is one of the incentives the IAEA currently
offers countries to sign up to the Additional Protocol.
Once a country has ratified the Additional Protocol and
the IAEA has established that there “is no indication of
undeclared nuclear material activities for the state as a
whole,” the agency can reduce the number of routine
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nuclear inspections it makes of that country’s nuclear
materials and facilities significantly.9
The trouble with taking this approach, though, is
that initially it actually increases the amount of staff time
and resources that the IAEA would have to spend to
safeguard a given country. It turns out that determining
whether or not a country has no undeclared nuclear
materials activities takes considerable safeguards
staff resources.10 Over the entire lifetime of a nuclear
facility (i.e., 20 to 50 years), then, applying integrated
safeguards might reduce the total amount of staff time
needed to safeguard a particular set of nuclear plants
slightly but in the first few years, more, not less staff
time and safeguards resources would be consumed.11
Also, the Additional Protocol authorizes the IAEA
to conduct wide area surveillance inspections. These
would be extremely useful in the case of Iran or North
Korea. They also would require significant additional
safeguards staff and funding (by one estimate done for
NPEC by a seasoned former IAEA inspector, perhaps a
plus up in funding constituting as much as 30 percent
of the IAEA’s entire current safeguards budget).12 So
far, the IAEA has done nothing to establish such an
inspections capability.
Finally, relying heavily on integrated safeguards
may be unsound in principle. As already noted, they
require the IAEA to determine that the country in
question has no undeclared nuclear material. Yet,
the IAEA’s safeguards staff itself has admitted that it
cannot yet be relied upon to discover covert nuclear
fuel making facilities in the hardest cases (e.g., Iran).
Also, reducing the frequency of on-site inspections
increases the risks that a member state might divert
materials to make bombs without the IAEA finding
out until it is too late.
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In a detailed study completed for NPEC late in
2004 on the proliferation risks associated with light
water reactors, several scenarios were presented
under which fresh and spent nuclear fuel rods might
be diverted to make nuclear weapons fuel in covert
reprocessing or enrichment plants in a matter of days
or weeks without tipping off IAEA inspectors.13 These
scenarios were subsequently validated independently
by key officials working within the IAEA’s Standing
Advisory Group on Safeguards, the U.S. Department
of State, Los Alamos National Laboratory.14
That a country could evade IAEA inspectors in
diverting entire fuel rods is disquieting. One would
assume that the current crop of IAEA remote nuclear
monitoring equipment could be counted upon entirely
to warn against such diversions. In fact, they cannot.15
Most of the currently deployed remote sensors do
not allow the IAEA even to know day to day if these
systems are on. This is a serious shortcoming. Over
the last 6 years, the agency has learned of camera
“blackouts” that lasted for “more than 30 hours” on
12 separate occasions. What is worse, it only learned
of these blackouts after inspectors went to the sites
and downloaded the camera recordings as they are
required to do every 90 days.16
Under new proposed “integrated safeguards”
procedures, such “downloading,” moreover, would
occur as infrequently as every 12 months—a period
within which a state could conceivably make a nuclear
weapon unbeknownst to the IAEA.17 The IAEA staff
recently proposed to correct this inspections gap
by accelerating implementation of near real-time
monitoring using satellite communication connections.
This effort, though, is still being implemented at an
excruciatingly slow pace due to a lack of funds.18
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STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
The current gap in the IAEA’s near-real time
monitoring capabilities may be worrisome but it, at
least, can be addressed assuming additional safeguards
funding is made available. Far more intractable is the
IAEA’s inability to detect diversions in a timely manner
from nuclear fuel making plants. As already noted,
NPEC’s earlier study on the proliferation dangers
associated with light water reactors highlighted the
relative ease with which states might build covert
reprocessing plants or divert fresh civilian fuel to
accelerate undeclared uranium enrichment efforts.
Additional NPEC-commissioned research detailed
just how poorly IAEA safeguards have performed at
nuclear fuel plants in Europe and Japan. In his study,
“Can Nuclear Fuel Production in Iran and Elsewhere
Be Safeguarded against Diversion,”19 Dr. Edwin Lyman
highlights several examples. At a fuel fabrication plant
at Tokai-mura in Japan making mixed-oxide (MOX)
fuel out of powdered uranium and nuclear weapons
usable separated plutonium, the IAEA could not
account for 69 kilograms of plutonium. This is enough
to make at least nine nuclear weapons (assuming the
IAEA’s eight kilograms per weapon estimate) or twice
that figure (assuming the U.S. Department of Energy’s
more accurate four kilograms per crude nuclear
weapon figure). Only after 2 years, the expenditure of
$100 million, and the disassembling of the plant could
the operator claim that he could account for all but 10
kilograms (i.e., one to two bombs’ worth).20
Dr. Lyman details a similarly disturbing incident
involving MOX scrap in Japan where at least one
bomb’s worth of weapons-usable plutonium went
missing and another accounting discrepancy at a
Japanese reprocessing plant at which the IAEA lost
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track of between 59 and 206 kilograms of bomb-usable
plutonium (but only was able to determine this years
after the material initially went unaccounted for). Add
to these discoveries the many bombs’ worth of material
unaccounted for (MUF) annually at reprocessing plants
in France and the United Kingdom (where the IAEA
has employed its very latest near-real time monitoring
techniques), and there’s cause for alarm.21
The picture relating to safeguarding centrifuge
enrichment plants is not much brighter.Even at plants
where IAEA monitoring and inspectors are on site,
there will be times in between inspections during which
remote monitoring might be defeated. There also is the
constant problem of the operator giving false design,
production, or capacity figures.22
In any case, the times between a decision to divert
and having enough material to make a crude bomb
(assuming the IAEA’s high estimate of 25 kilograms of
highly enriched uranium being required to make one
weapon) are so short, even an immediate detection
of the diversion, which is by no means assured,
would generally come too late to afford enough time
to prevent bombs from being made. In the case of a
small commercial sized plant, a bomb’s worth could be
made in as little as 18 hours to 12 days (depending on
whether natural or slightly enriched uranium is used
as feed).23
SAFEGUARDS ASSUMPTIONS
Exacerbating this safeguards gap is the IAEA’s
overly generous view of how much material must
be diverted to make a bomb (referred to by the IAEA
as a “significant quantity”) and how long it might
take to convert this material into a nuclear weapon
(known as the “conversion time”). Most of these IAEA
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estimates were made over 30 years ago. To reassess
their accuracy, NPEC commissioned Thomas Cochran,
chief nuclear scientist at the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC). His analysis and conclusions were
revealing. The IAEA estimates it would take eight
kilograms of separated plutonium and 25 kilograms of
highly enriched uranium to make a crude bomb. These
estimates were found to be too high by a minimum of
25 percent and a maximum of 800 percent, depending
on the weapons expertise employed and the yield
desired (see Figure 2 below).24
Weapon-Grade Plutonium (kg)
Yield
(kt)

Highly-Enriched Uranium (kg)

Technical Capability
Low Medium High

Technical Capability
Low
Medium
High

1

3

1.5

1

8

4

2.5

5

4

2.5

1.5

11

6

3.5

10

5

3

2

13

7

4

20

6

3.5

3

16

9

5

Values rounded to the nearest 0.5 kilogram.

Figure 2. NRDC Estimate of the Approximate Fissile
Material Requirements for Pure Fission Nuclear
Weapons.
When presented with these figures, senior IAEA
safeguards staff did not dispute them. Instead they
argued that the “exact” amount of diverted nuclear
material needed to make a crude bomb was not that
important. Instead, what mattered most was the IAEA’s
ability to detect microscopic amounts of weaponsusable materials since securing such environmental
samples was the thing most likely to put an inspected
party in the international spotlight.25
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The potential downside of taking this approach,
however, is significant. It is these estimates, along
with the agency’s projections of how long it takes
a proliferator to convert uranium and plutonium
materials into bombs (i.e., conversion times), that the
IAEA uses to determine how often it should conduct
its inspections of different nuclear facilities. If these
estimates are too high, the frequency of inspections
needed to detect military diversions risks is egregiously
low. Certainly, what the IAEA defines as desirable
“detection times”—the maximum time that may
elapse between the diversion of a significant quantity
of nuclear material and the likely detection of that
diversion—should correspond (according to the IAEA’s
own guidelines) to the agency’s estimated conversion
times. If they don’t, IAEA-inspected countries could
count on being able divert a crude weapon’s worth of
nuclear material and fashioning it into a bomb before
the IAEA could either detect the diversion or have any
chance of taking appropriate action to block bomb
making.
This worry seems quite real when one considers
how high the IAEA’s 30-year old significant quantity
estimates appear to be and one then looks at how
generous the IAEA’s estimated conversion times are
(see Figure 3 below).
Using the history of the Manhattan Project as a
benchmark, the IAEA’s first set of estimates regarding
the amount of time (7 to 10 days) needed to convert
separated plutonium (Pu) or highly enriched uranium
(HEU) or 233U metal were judged by Dr. Cochran to be
the correct order of time. The key reason why is that
in 1945, the plutonium and enriched uranium for the
first American bombs had to be shipped thousands
of miles from where they were produced to where
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Beginning Material Form
Pu, HEU, or

233

Conversion Time

U metal

Order of days (7-10)

PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure Pu
compounds: HEU or 233U oxide or other pure
U compounds; MOX or other nonirradiated
pure mixtures containing Pu, U (233U +235U>20
percent); Pu, Heu, and/or 233U in scrap or other
miscellaneous impure compounds

Order of weeks (1-3)*

Pu, HEU, or 233U in irradiated fuel

Order of months (1-3)

U containing <20 percent 235U and 233U; Th

Order of months (3-12)

*This range is not determined by any single factor, but the pure
Pu and U compounds will tend to be at the lower end of the range
and the mixtures and scrap at the higher end.

Figure 3. Estimated Material Conversion Times for
Finished Pu or U Metal Weapons Components.26
the material was fashioned into nuclear weapons.
This transport took several days. If a country making
nuclear weapons did not have to ship these distances,
the conversion time could be much shorter. However,
the conversion times could still be on the order of a day
or more.
The IAEA’s estimates of how long it would take (1
to 3 weeks) to convert fresh plutonium-uranium fuels
(known as mixed oxide fuels or MOX) do not fare
as well. Here, Dr. Cochran points out that it would
take no more than a week and possibly as little as a
few days to convert these materials into metal bomb
components. Instead of a matter of weeks, he concludes
that the correct conversion time should be measured in
a matter of days.
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As for the IAEA’s conversion time estimates of 1
to 3 months for plutonium, HEU, or 233U contained in
irradiated spent reactor fuel, these were also judged
to be accurate only if the country possessing these
materials did not have a covert or declared reprocessing
or enrichment plant. If the country in question did, then
it could possibly convert the spent fuel into bombs in a
matter of weeks rather than months.
Finally, Dr. Cochran agreed with the IAEA’s low
end estimated conversion time of 3 months for low
enriched uranium but, with the increased international
availability of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
technology, found the IAEA’s high end estimate of 12
months to be totally unwarranted. In fact, as already
noted, a country might well be able to convert low
enriched uranium into a bomb in a matter of weeks or
less.27
The policy ramifications of these overly generous
IAEA estimates are significant. They directly impact
what the IAEA’s detection goals should be. In three
cases—the conversion of low enriched uranium; the
conversion of plutonium, HEU, and 233U metal; and
of these materials in spent fuel—the order of time
associated with the IAEA estimates is correct. In another
three cases, however—the conversion of plutonium,
HEU and 233U in MOX; and of these materials in spent
fuel; and of low enriched uranium if the inspected
country has covert or declared nuclear fuel making
facilities—the IAEA’s estimates are egregiously high.
IAEA conversion times are measured in months when
they should be measured in weeks, and in weeks when
they should be measured in days.
As a result, the IAEA‘s timeliness detection goals
in many cases are dangerously high. More important,
the agency’s current detection goals give the mistaken
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impression that the IAEA can detect military diversions
before they result in bombs or even early enough to
prevent the diversion from succeeding when this clearly
is not the case. Dr. Cochran’s analysis highlights that
timely detection for plutonium, HEU, and 233U in metal
and in fresh MOX is simply not possible. He concludes
that countries that do not yet have nuclear weapons
should not be allowed to stockpile or produce these
materials. He reaches the same conclusion regarding
the agency’s ability to detect diversions of plutonium,
HEU, and 233U in nonweapons states that may have a
declared or covert enrichment or reprocessing plant.
In these cases, the problem is not that the IAEA’s
timeliness detection goals are too liberal; it is that the
IAEA claims that timely detection is possible at all (see
Figure 4 below).
To some extent, these critical conclusions are gaining
official support. As the IAEA’s former director for
safeguards recently explained, when it comes to nuclear
fuel making, the IAEA is must rely on its limited ability
to ascertain the inspected country’s military intent. 28
Even the director general of the IAEA conceded that
once a country acquires separated plutonium and
HEU, the IAEA must rely on these states’ continued
peaceful intentions, which could change rapidly.
Unfortunately, the IAEA’s Board of Governors and
major governments, including the United States, do
not yet fully appreciate the full implications of these
points.
If the IAEA cannot provide timely detection of
diversions of weapons-usable HEU and plutonium
from centrifuge enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing,
and other fuel-making plants, how can it claim
that it is “safeguarding” such facilities in Brazil,
the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan? How can it
29

Official
IAEA
Timeliness
Detection
Goal

NPEC
Conclusions
and
Recommended
Timeliness
Detection Goals

MATERIAL

IAEA
Conversion
Time

Cochran/
NPEC
Commissioned
Estimate

Pu, HEU, 233U
in metal form

Order of
days (7-10)

Order of days
(7-10)

1 month

Timely detection
is not possible

In fresh MOX

Order of
weeks (1-3)

Order of days
(7-10)

1 month

Timely detection
is not possible

In irradiated
spent fuel

Order of
months
(1-3)

Order of
months (1-3),
if reprocessing
- enrichment
plant on tap
(7-10 days

3 months

For countries
with covert
or declared
nuclear fuel
making plants,
timely detection
is not possible

Low enriched
uranium

Order of
months
(3-12)

Order of
weeks to
months

1 year

For countries
with covert
or declared
enrichment
plants, timely
detection is not
possible

Figure 4. IAEA’s Timeliness Detection Goals
and NPEC’s Conclusions.
effectively safeguard an Indian reprocessing plant (as
is being currently proposed by the Indian government
as a way to allow for the reprocessing of foreign fuel
for use in an unsafeguarded Indian breeder reactor)?
What of the idea of promoting regional nuclear
fuel-making centers in nonweapons states, such as
Kazakhstan? How might the IAEA prevent diversions?29
What of other more ambitious missions for the
IAEA? If one cannot keep track of many bombs’ worth
of nuclear weapons-usable material produced annually
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at declared civilian nuclear fuel-making plants or
assure that the plants themselves would not be seized,
how much sense does it make to encourage the IAEA
to oversee an even more difficult to verify military
fissile production cut-off treaty?30 Finally, there is the
question of large research reactors and nuclear power
plants, which require lightly enriched fuel or produce
significant quantities of plutonium. If the IAEA cannot
reliably ferret out covert nuclear fuel making programs,
how safe is it to export such machines to new countries,
particularly in war-torn regions, such as the Middle
East?
The questions here are all intentionally rhetorical.
Yet, many experts and officials within the IAEA and
the U.S. and other governments actively support at
least one or more of the questionable nuclear initiatives
referred to. This needs to change.
One of this report’s key recommendations is to
encourage governments and the IAEA to reassess the
agency’s estimates of what a significant quantity is,
along with the conversion times for various materials
and what the proper detection goals should be for the
agency. The most important part of this reassessment
would be to clarify precisely what nuclear material
diversions the agency cannot be counted upon to
detect in a timely fashion. At a minimum, this should
include the possible diversion of HEU, 233U, and MOX
from storage facilities, reprocessing plants, enrichment
plants, fuel fabrication plants and of direct-use materials
from large research or power reactors in nonweapons
states that might have covert or declared nuclear fuelmaking plants.
For these nuclear activities and materials, the IAEA
would do well simply to declare that the agency can
monitor, but not safeguard them—i.e., that it can mind
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these facilities and materials but not assure detection
of their possible military diversion in a timely fashion.
Such an honest announcement would be helpful.
First, it would put governments on notice about how
dangerous the conduct of certain nuclear activities most
closely related to bomb making actually are. Second, it
would encourage countries to demand more monitoring
and physical security of these unsafeguardable nuclear
materials and activities. The primary aim in increasing
such security and monitoring would not be to block
diversions so much as to increase the chance of at
least detecting them after they had occurred. This
would help to deter such deeds and to limit further
the risks of nuclear theft or sabotage. It is difficult to
determine what the optimal level of monitoring and
physical security might be for this purpose. But a good
place to start would be to upgrade physical security
at nuclear facilities that handle or produce nuclear
weapons-usable materials to those security standards
currently employed at the most secure nuclear weapons
production and storage facilities.
FUNDING
As already noted, the IAEA’s inspections of
safeguardable nuclear materials and activities could
be enhanced in a number of ways. More near-real time
monitoring could significantly enhance the agency’s
ability to detect the diversion of fuel rods. Retention
and increasing the numbers of experienced nuclear
inspectors could help assure the IAEA actually meets
its timelines detection goals and is able to analyze
remote sensing information and imagery properly.
Full support for the IAEA’s environmental sampling
activities would enable it to replace its aging Safe32

guards Analytical Laboratory and help the IAEA shorten the time needed to analyze samples from months
to days or weeks. Much needed work to develop new
safeguarding research capabilities and equipment could
proceed much more quickly if more funds were made
available.31 Similarly, with proper funding, the IAEA
could muster reserve inspections staff and resources to
meet unexpected demands and to provide the agency
with deployable wide-area surveillance capabilities.
The first step to address these current gaps is
simply to admit that they exist. For years, the IAEA
has avoided doing this publicly. At the very outset
of NPEC’s investigations, early in 2005, the IAEA’s
safeguards planning staff briefed NPEC that it believed
safeguards funding for the mid-term (i.e., the next 5
years) was sufficient. It conceded that it had given
little or no thought to what funding agency safeguards
might require beyond this period.
Fortunately, in the last 2 years, the agency’s
approach to safeguards planning has improved. Most
recently the IAEA’s director general highlighted the
agency’s lack of safeguards funding to deal with urgent
inspections requirements associated with monitoring
the shutdown of the reactor in North Korea. In a
statement he made on July 9, 2007, IAEA Director
General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei explained that the
IAEA was having difficulty paying for the nearly 4
million euros needed to cover the monitoring costs. He
went on to note:
The DPRK case clearly illustrates the need for the
agency to have an adequate reserve that can be drawn
upon to enable it to respond promptly and effectively
to unexpected crises or extraordinary requests, whether
in the areas of verification, nuclear and radiological
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accidents, or other emergencies. The agency’s financial
vulnerability is also demonstrated by our current cash
situation, which indicates that unless some major donors
pay their outstanding contributions by the end of next
month, the agency will have to draw from the Working
Capital Fund in order to continue operations. And
unless contributions are received by September, that
Fund would be depleted. Finally, let me stress that the
recent process of preparing and getting approval for the
programme and budget for the next biennium has once
again highlighted the urgent need for adequate resources
to ensure effective delivery of the entire programme
that you have requested. As I made clear during the
last Board, even with the budget originally proposed
by the Secretariat, the agency remains under-funded
in many critical areas, a situation which, if it remains
unaddressed, will lead to a steady erosion of our ability
to perform key functions, including in the verification
and safety fields.

At the conclusion of this statement, the director
general then announced that he had initiated a study
to examine the IAEA’s “programmatic and budgetary
requirements” over the “next decade or so.” In
addition, he announced his intention to create a high
level panel to study options for financing the agency’s
requirements.32
The director general’s announcement accords
almost precisely to the recommendations Dr. Thomas
E. Shea made to a select group of U.S. and European
officials, including Dr. ElBaradei’s top scientific advisor,
Andrew Graham, at an NPEC-sponsored conference
held in Paris, France, on November 13, 2006.33 In his
brief, “Financing IAEA Verification of the NPT,”
Dr. Shea argued that North Korea “provides a clear
justification” for additional safeguards funding and
that to secure it the director general “should convene a
council of wise men to assist in determining how best
to respond in this matter.”
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As has been noted, the IAEA‘s funding is based
on a United Nations formula that weights a country’s
gross domestic product and other factors. This formula
may be sensible for raising general funds, but for
nuclear safeguards purposes it produces several
anomalies. Countries with no large reactors (e.g., Italy)
are sometimes asked to pay in more than countries
that have a score or more of them (e.g., the Republic
of Korea). The UN assessment method also overlooks
the actual inspections requirements particular nuclear
facilities impose that are significantly higher than
the norm. Nuclear fuel-making plants of any type,
reactors that are on-line fueled (i.e., fueled constantly
while they are operating, e.g., heavy water and gascooled reactors, versus off-line fueled reactors, e.g.,
light water reactors), and fast reactors all impose
additional inspections challenges that are significantly
higher than other types of nuclear facilities. Inspecting
or monitoring these facilities costs much more than it
does for other nuclear plants, yet the operator or owner
pays no premium to cover these additional expenses.
Finally, because the IAEA’s current approach to
assessing its members for contributions fails to raise
enough money for the Department of Safeguards,
the agency must depend on additional voluntary
contributions of cash and technical assistance. Almost
all of voluntary contributions come from the United
States (amounting to roughly 35 percent of the IAEA’s
safeguards budget). That so much of the safeguards
budget is paid for voluntarily by the United States
is politically awkward, since the agency’s most
challenging inspections cases—e.g., India, Iran, North
Korea, Taiwan, and South Korea—are all of special
interest to Washington.34
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Dr. Shea suggests several ways to increase funding
for safeguards—from setting up an endowment to
selling bonds. All of them are worth pursuing, but
one of his ideas is particularly deserving: the customer
(i.e., the inspected party) should pay. There already is
a precedent for doing this. Taiwan, which the IAEA
does not recognize as being an independent, sovereign
nation does not pay as other nations do but instead
pays what the IAEA estimates it costs the agency to
inspect Taiwan’s plants.
This report recommends that the United States
take the lead getting the IAEA to help fund its
safeguards activities with a user fee. The United States
should continue to make its voluntary contributions
but instead of making them as it currently does,
Washington should justify them as representing a
specific percentage of costs associated with generating
nuclear electricity annually in the United States. Japan,
which also gives voluntary contributions, should be
urged to do likewise. Agreement might subsequently
be reached on an international standard and this
surcharge should be tacked on to the cost of electricity
or other products these civilian plants produce. The
last step would be to make the surcharge obligatory
and assign all of the funds so raised to the IAEA’s
Department of Safeguards.
In addition to these funds, the agency should
consider assessing an additional charge for the
monitoring of unsafeguardable nuclear materials or
facilities (e.g., nuclear fuel-making plants and nuclear
weapons or near-nuclear weapons-usable fuels, etc.).
Finally, an additional fee might be levied against
nuclear facilities or plants that are particularly costly
for the IAEA to meet its own timeliness detection goals
(e.g., for on-line fueled reactors).
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RIGHTS
Some countries, of course, are likely to bridle at
these proposals, arguing that imposing surcharges
would interfere with their right to peaceful nuclear
energy. These arguments, however, should be rejected.
The exercise of one’s right to develop, research and
produce peaceful nuclear energy hardly extends to
not paying what it costs to safeguard these activities
against military diversion. Also, the premise behind
these arguments is a dangerously distorted view of
the nuclear rules—that so long as states can claim
a nuclear material or activity has some conceivable
civilian application, any country has a right to acquire
or engage in them even if they are unprofitable
commercially, bring their possessor to the very brink
of having bombs, and cannot be safeguarded against
military diversion. The danger of this over-generous
interpretation of the NPT is obvious: It risks, as U.N.
General Secretary Koffi Anan explained to the 2005
NPT review conference, creating a dangerous world
full of nuclear fuel-producing states that claim to be on
the right side of the NPT, but are, in fact, only months
or even days from acquiring nuclear weapons.35
Luckily, as research conducted for NPEC makes
clear, this interpretation of the NPT is wrong.36 The
NPT makes no mention of nuclear fuel making,
reprocessing, or enrichment. Spain, Romania, Brazil,
and Mexico all tried in the late 1960s to get NPT
negotiators to make it a duty under Article IV for all
of the nuclear supplier states to supply “the entire fuel
cycle” including fuel making, to nonweapons states.
Each of their proposals was turned down.37 At the time,
the Swedish representative to the NPT negotiations
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even suggested that rules needed to be established
to prevent nations from getting into such dangerous
activities, since there seemed no clear way to prevent
nations that might make nuclear fuel from quickly
diverting either the fuel or the fuel making plants
very quickly to make bombs.38 They certainly were not
interested in protecting uneconomical propositions
that are unnecessary and that could bring states to the
brink of having bombs.39
A clear case in point was the NPT’s handling of
peaceful nuclear explosives, which turned out to be
so dangerous and impossible to safeguard that the
treaty spoke only of sharing the “potential benefits” of
peaceful nuclear explosives that would be supplied by
nuclear weapons states. No effort, however, was ever
made to request or to offer such nuclear explosives
because they were so costly to use as compared to
conventional explosives and no clear economic benefit
could be found in using them.40
Finally, in no case did the framers of the NPT
believe that the inalienable right to develop, research
or produce peaceful nuclear energy should allow
states to contravene the NPT restrictions designed to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These
restrictions are contained in articles I, II, and III of
the treaty. Article I prohibits nuclear weapons states
“assist[ing], encourage[ing], or induc[ing] any nonweapons state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire”
nuclear weapons. Article II prohibits non-weapons
states from acquiring in any way nuclear explosives
or seeking “any assistance” in their manufacture.
Together these two prohibitions suggest that the NPT
not only bans the transfer of actual nuclear explosives,
but of any nuclear technology or materials that could
“assist, encourage or induce” nonweapons states to
“manufacture or otherwise acquire” them.41
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If there was any doubt on this point, the NPT also
requires all nonweapons states to apply safeguards
against all of their nuclear facilities and holdings of
special nuclear materials. The purpose of these nuclear
inspections, according to the treaty is “verification of the
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.”42 It was hoped
at the time of the treaty’s drafting that a way could be
found to assure such safeguards. It, however, was not
assumed that such techniques already existed.43
CONCLUSION
It would be useful to remind members of the IAEA
of these points. The most direct and easiest way to begin
is to make clear what can and cannot be safeguarded—
i.e., what can and cannot be monitored so as to detect
a military diversion before it is completed. Beyond
this, the IAEA should have the owner, operators, and
customers of nuclear facilities bear the costs associated
with monitoring and safeguarding them. The hope here
would be that the poor economics associated with large
nuclear power reactors and nuclear fuel making plants
might help some nations reconsider the desirability
of acquiring them. Making sure that the full external
costs of IAEA inspections are carried by each inspected
party would be useful. The NPT, after all, is dedicated
to sharing the “benefits” of peaceful nuclear energy,
not money losing programs that bring countries to the
brink of having bombs.44
In this regard, it is worth noting that a popular idea to
promote nonproliferation that enjoys IAEA support—
assuring supplies of nuclear fuel at “affordable” or
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“reasonable” prices with fuel banks and the construction
of fuel making centers in nonweapons states—could,
under certain circumstances, actually undermine the
NPT’s intent. If these assurances come with subsidies,
more countries may be enticed to develop large nuclear
programs that may not be economically viable. If these
assurances come, as they now do, with repeated pledges
that the recipients of the fuel retain a per se right to
make nuclear fuel any time they wish, then, there also
is a danger that after bootstrapping themselves up with
fuel assistance, recipient nations will simply proceed
to make fuel on their own. Finally, if the assurances
result in building fuel-making centers in countries that
do not yet have nuclear weapons, the risks of nuclear
weapons proliferation will surely increase.45
Unfortunately, there is no technical fix yet for the
dangers associated with declared and covert nuclear
fuel making activities. Initially, one of the claims of
the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
initiative was that it would make it possible to recycle
spent fuel in a proliferation resistant manner and,
thereby, strengthen the international nonproliferation
regime. NPEC commissioned two leading national
nuclear experts at MIT and Princeton to examine these
claims.46 Their conclusion—that these assertions do
not hold up and that the recycling technology would
be more not less difficult to monitor—now is closer
to the view that even the Department of Energy itself
is making. Its official strategy document now warns
against spreading its “proliferation resistant” uranium
extraction (UREX) system for fear it, too, might be
diverted to make bombs.47
Finally, routine inspections alone are unlikely
to deter states from breaking the rules. One of the
key reason why is that after the agency’s experience
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with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, it is no longer clear
what might happen to the next nation that breaks its
IAEA safeguards agreement or the strictures of the
NPT. Pierre Goldschmidt, the former IAEA Deputy
Director who headed up the agency’s Department of
Safeguards, knows this first hand: He had to deal with
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea where the burden of proof
for misbehavior was laid at IAEA’s doorstep rather than
with the suspect party. NPEC was fortunate to be able
to commission Dr. Goldschmidt to review what might
be done to correct this. His recommendations, which
consist of developing a set of country-neutral rules
that come into play when the IAEA is unable to clarify
suspicious behavior or when a majority of the IAEA
board finds a nation to be non-compliant or attempting
to break free from the NPT before it is found to be in
compliance, are among the ones contained in this final
report.
Adoption of these recommendations, along with the
others, is essential to give the IAEA the resources and
authorities it needs to succeed. Beyond this, member
states must stop pushing the IAEA to safeguard nuclear
materials and projects that are both unnecessary and
so close to bomb making that no agency, national or
international, could credibly safeguard them against
military misuse. The balance, in short, that must be
struck is to give the agency much more to do its job and
to back off demanding that it tackle the impractical.
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APPENDIX II
THE PROLIFERATION DANGERS OF LWRS
Adding to the IAEA’s nuclear inspection challenges
is the continued spread of large research and power
reactors to countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Iran that
require lightly enriched uranium as fuel and produce
a significant amount of plutonium-laden spent fuel—
materials, which, as has already been noted, could be
seized to accelerate the production of weapons-usable
uranium or plutonium. Most of these reactors are offline fueled and so are considered to be “proliferation
resistant” because their fuel cannot be removed or
inserted without shutting the entire reactor down
and because they are fueled with slightly enriched
uranium that only a handful of advanced nuclear
nations can produce. This makes inspections against
possible diversions or misuse of the fuel easier than
with graphite or heavy-water moderated reactors like
those found in Israel, India, and North Korea where
the reactor is fueled “on-line,” i.e., while the reactor is
still operating with natural uranium, a fuel that, unlike
lightly enriched uranium, is much easier to produce
indigenously.48
But with the development in North Korea and
Iran of covert enrichment and reprocessing facilities,
the proliferation resistance of even these “peaceful”
reactors now is far less than advertised. In fact, one
could seize all, or a portion, of the many tons of fresh
lightly enriched uranium fuel that normally sits outside
of most power reactors for safety reasons.49 divert it to
a covert or declared enrichment plant, open the fuel
rods, crush the uranium oxide fuel pellets, heat them,
and run fluoride gas over the material. The result
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would be the quick production of massive amounts of
uranium hexafluoride without ever having to mine and
mill uranium ore, or use a complicated hexafluoride
production plant. More important, the enrichment
of the uranium produced would reduce five-fold the
amount of effort otherwise required to enrich natural
uranium for use in nuclear explosives. This would
significantly reduce the amount of time required for a
country to produce its first uranium bomb.50
Yet another way that would-be bomb makers could
exploit the operation of large reactors would be to
divert the reactor’s spent fuel either from the reactor
itself, or from its spent fuel pond. Spent fuel is laden
with plutonium—itself a nuclear fuel, which—once
chemically stripped from the other spent fuel byproducts, can make nuclear weapons of any yield. In
fact, during the normal operation of large light water
reactors of the sort Iran is building at Bushier, the
reactor will produce 330 kilograms of near-weapons
grade plutonium—enough to make over 50 crude
nuclear bombs.51
As for chemically separating the plutonium from
spent fuel, this could be accomplished in a facility as
small as 65 feet by 65 feet (small enough to be built
and hidden within an existing large warehouse). This
plutonium separation plant also need not be elaborate.
Yet another “quick-and-dirty” design plant, detailed by
the nuclear industry’s leading experts in the late 1970s
(measuring 130 feet by 60 feet by 30 feet, see Figure 5
below), employs technology little more advanced than
that required for the production of dairy products and
the pouring of concrete.
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Source adapted from D.E. Ferguson “Simple Quick (Re)processing
Plant” Memorandum to F.L. Gulier, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, August 30, 1977; and J.A. Hassberger, “Light-Water
Reactor Fueling Handling and Spent Fuel Characteristics,”
Fission Energy and System Safety Program, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, circa February 25, 1999.

Figure 5.
These relatively compact plutonium chemical
separation plants could be built within other larger
buildings undetected, would not send off any signal
until operated, and could separate a bomb’s worth of
plutonium each day after the first 10 days of operation.
Assuming the country in question had already perfected
a working implosion device,52 the separated plutonium
could be inserted to make a bomb directly—i.e., much
more quickly than any outside party could act to block
the diversion.
ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II, CHAPTER 1
1. An additional argument often offered to explain why light
water reactors are proliferation resistant is that the plutonium they
produce is “reactor” grade rather than “weapons” grade. This
argument is specious. Reactor-grade plutonium will normally
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utility of reactor and fuel-grade plutonium as compared to
weapons-grade, see, Gilinsky, A Reassessment, pp. 21-33; and
Harmon W. Hubbard, “Plutonium from Light Water Reactors as
Nuclear Weapons Material,” April 2004, Washington, DC: The
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, available from www.
npec-web.org/projects/hubbard.pdf.
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5. Although developing a working implosion device that can
be used with either uranium or plutonium nuclear fuel is much
more challenging than perfecting a working gun device, which
can only be used to make a uranium bomb, it should no longer be
assumed to be a major technical hurdle for most nations. Saddam
Hussein’s scientists perfected a working implosion device over
15 years ago. Working, tested designs have also been shared
with at least Pakistan, Israel, and Libya by the French, United
States, China, and Pakistan. For more on these points, see Barton
Gellman, “Iraqi Work Toward A-Bomb Reported U.S. Was Told
of ‘Implosion Devices’,” The Washington Post, September 30, 1998,
p. A01; Carey Stublette, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Development,” January 2002, available from nuclearweaponarchive.
org/Pakistan/PakDevelop.html; BBC News, UK Edition, “China
‘Link’ to Libya Nuke Design,” February 16, 2004, available from
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3491329.stm; and Avner
Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1998, pp. 82-83; and Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney,
The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East,
New York: Times Books, 1981, pp.114-117.
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PART II:
NEW IAEA INSPECTIONS POSSIBILITIES
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CHAPTER 2
CAN WE TRACK SOURCE MATERIALS
BETTER— DO WE NEED TO?
Jack Edlow
Uranium is a naturally occurring element found
in low levels within all rock, soil, and water. This is
the highest-numbered element to be found naturally
in significant quantities on earth. It is considered to be
more plentiful than antimony, beryllium, cadmium,
gold, mercury, silver, or tungsten, and is about as
abundant as arsenic or molybdenum. It is found
in many minerals including uraninite (also called
pitchblende, the most common uranium ore), autunite,
uranophane, torbernite, and coffinite. Significant
concentrations of uranium occur in some substances
such as phosphate rock deposits and minerals such as
lignite and monazite sands in uranium-rich ores (it is
recovered commercially from these sources).
All of this is to say that uranium is found in most
countries at least in some concentrations, and in many
countries in fairly rich deposits. Uranium has been
mined in many countries around the world, including
Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Portugal, France, East
Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Niger, Gabon,
Namibia, South Africa, Zaire (Democratic Republic
of the Congo [DRC]), Russia, United States, Canada,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, China, Mongolia, and
Sweden. New mines are under development in Malawi,
Zambia, and Uganda, to name a few.
It should be obvious that uranium, as a source
material, can be used within even a small commercial
research reactor to create quantities of plutonium that
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can in turn be used to create weapons. This could be
done in such a way as to circumvent international
safeguards. The case of the Osirak Reactor bombed by
the Israelis on June 7, 1981 under Operation OPERA was
deemed by Israel and Iran to be such a case. Ironically,
the Iranians had bombed the reactor on September
30, 1980, but had not destroyed it. Israel was more
successful. Why was it necessary to bomb the reactor?
Iraq had obtained large quantities of natural uranium
either through open commercial means or through
stealth. This material would have been transmuted
into plutonium 239 in the reactor. Both Iran and Israel
felt the need to deal with the threat before it became a
certainty.
Israel well understood this method because it
had itself apparently followed a similar path. Under
Operation PLUMBAT in 1968, the German freighter
Scheersberg A disappeared on its way from Antwerp
to Genoa along with its cargo of some 200 tons of
uranium oxide (yellowcake). When the freighter
reappeared in Iskenderun, a Turkish port, the cargo
was missing; it had been transferred at sea to an Israeli
ship. It is believed that this uranium was transferred
to the Dimona facility in Israel for use in the research
reactor.
More recently, A United Nations (UN) report
dated July 18, 2006, said there was “no doubt” that a
huge shipment of smuggled uranium 238 uncovered
by customs officials in Tanzania in October 2005 was
transported from the Lubumbashi mines in the Congo.
A senior Tanzanian customs official said the illicit
uranium shipment was found hidden in a consignment
of coltan, a rare mineral used to make chips in mobile
telephones. The shipment was destined for smelting in
the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan and delivered
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via Bandar Abbas, Iran’s biggest port. It is unlikely that
this cargo would have made it to Kazakhstan. It would
have been diverted for use in Iran for purposes we can
only suspect.
Prima facie, these cases would call for more controls
over source materials, including uranium and the
other principal source material, thorium. Thorium,
which can also be used to produce materials suitable
for weapons applications, is found in small amounts
in most rocks and soils, where it is about three times
more abundant than uranium and is about as common
as lead. The current thorium mineral reserve estimates
are shown in Figure 1.
Current Thorium Mineral
Reserves (in Tons)

Country
Australia

300,000

Brazil

16,000

Canada

100,000

India

360,000

Norway

170,000

South Africa

35,000

United States

160,000

Others

95,000

Figure 1. Current Thorium Mineral Reserves
Estimates.
But there are already requirements for reporting the
sale and transfer of source materials from one country to
another. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
member states do report these shipments, and they are
generally effective, as long as the parties want them to
be. The question is how to enforce these requirements.
It seems obvious that in the not too distant past there
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has been circumvention, caused by a national program
disguised to evade international detection. In the
case of the Tanzanian intercept, the shipment was
apparently detected by equipment installed at the
port under the U.S. Megaports program to detect the
potential smuggling of radioisotopes along the Indian
Ocean Coast. It may have been merely a coincidence
that it detected the uranium ore concentrates, BUT IT
DID.
Since uranium and thorium are so abundant; since
it is not illegal to sell these materials; since it is easy
to ship the materials and possibly to divert them; and
since the materials can be used in programs to create
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it seems that
additional administrative controls, while possibly
helpful, cannot be relied upon to track and control
these materials. Diversion will occur, when diversion
is desired.
It is because of this, that tracking of material needs
to rely on detection. In the past, railroads kept track
of their rolling stock through administrative controls,
and cars were lost on sidings, sometimes for months.
Subsequently, an identification system using bar
coding was developed so that when cars passed
detectors, their last location was known. The problem
was that when the cars were not moving, only their
last known location was known. More recently, global
positioning systems (GPS) have been incorporated
into the tracking of cars and also now truck fleets. This
provides for location detection even when vehicles are
not moving.
In order to detect diversion, producers of uranium
could incorporate some advanced technology into
the shipping components. This would detect the
PLUMBAT-type circumstance as long as the shipper
was not a party to the diversion.
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No type of “in package” device will detect the
nationally-sponsored diversion like that which
occurred in Tanzania last year. Presumably, no one
would wish to be detected in that case. Iran planned an
elaborate mechanism to evade detection, but did not
count on the MegaPorts detectors. One would expect
future diversions to take this into account.
The next line of defense is to render the possession
of the materials harmless. Without unsafeguarded
reactors or enrichment plants, the possession of source
materials is meaningless. North Korea could not use
the spent fuel from its reactor as long as the reactor
was under IAEA safeguards. Instead, they built an
undeclared enrichment facility and later quit the
safeguards regime to pursue their objectives by using
the reactor fuel after all. They are clearly able to obtain
source materials despite the current controls, both
administrative and physical.
More physical detection equipment at seaports and
airports would be essential to detect the movement of
radioactive cargos and to alert officials to potentially
unknown shipments. This, unfortunately, would also
trigger many alerts based on known and existing
shipments. It could slow or even impede the transport
of legitimate cargos as carriers and ports prohibit the
shipment of cargos so as not to impact their general
operations. This leads to more “delay and denial”
problems.
Australia and Canada have put substantial
administrative contols on their source materials. Strict
conditions apply through the bilateral agreements
that these countries enter into with other nations. It
is certain that their materials will not be diverted to
be used inappropriately. If only all countries were to
take the same approach. But such is not the case at this
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time. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has outlined the
mechanisms for the control, transfer, and retransfer
of source materials, including export licenses and
physical security. This is not enough, however. It has
not prevented the diversion of centrifuge technology,
although it may have slowed it somewhat.
Uranium and thorium, being so widely distibuted,
are much easier to mine, process, and ship. The good
news is that these radioactive materials can be detected,
if sufficient equipment is positioned worldwide.
Beyond yellowcake, of course, are the source material
products of processed uranium hexaflouride. Unlike
yellowcake, only a limited number of countries
currently produce uranrium hexiflouride products.
As a result, monitoring the production and transfer of
these materials would be much more practicable than it
would be for yellowcake. In fact, it was intelligence on
the transfer of Chinese uranium hexaflouride to Iran in
the early 1990s that helped tip off the United States and
the IAEA on Iran’s undeclared uranium enrichment
program. This example suggests the leveraged utilty
of focusing on such transfers.
In conclusion, tracking of source material through
either administrative or physical controls is essential.
The methods used to date have not prevented and
cannot prevent diversion of these materials. Advanced
technology could be useful in further detection of
attempts to divert but would not be foollproof. IAEA
facility safeguards are only useful when applied to all
facilities within a willing country. Tracking of source
materials cannot in itself prevent development of
weapons, but it can be one small tool in the process to
detect and slow the diversion of materials.
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CHAPTER 3
NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE DETECTION
OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES*
Nikolai Khlebnikov, Davide Parise,
and Julian Whichello
INTRODUCTION
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
works to maximize the contribution of nuclear
technology to human endeavors, while verifying
its peaceful use. The IAEA’s mission is addressed
by science and technology, mobilizing peaceful
applications of nuclear science and technology
to developing countries; by safety and security,
protecting people and the environment from harmful
radiation exposure; and by safeguards and verification,
preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. In
the area of safeguards and verification, the IAEA carries
out inspection activities that include confirming a
state’s declared nuclear material (including plutonium
and enriched uranium) and maintaining vigilance for
evidence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
In exceptional circumstances, the IAEA may also be
granted special responsibilities under United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, allowing it
to search for and uncover covert nuclear weapons
programs (e.g., following the 1991 Gulf War), or to
conduct ongoing monitoring of disarmament (e.g.,
monitoring the freeze on reprocessing plutonium under
the 1994 framework agreement with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
*This is International Atomic Energy Agency paper IAEA-CN148/32.
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In 2004, the IAEA General Conference called upon
the Secretariat to examine innovative technological
solutions to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Member States also
agreed to provide appropriate assistance to facilitate
the exchange of equipment, material, and scientific
and technological information for the implementation
of additional protocols. The project Novel Techniques
and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear
Facilities, Material, and Activities (known as the Novel
Technologies Project) was established in 2005 to identify
specific needs and initiate the necessary research and
development (R&D) of techniques and instruments
that will be used for the implementation of additional
protocols, including the conduct of complementary
access.
The IAEA Strategic Objectives for 2006-111 include
the enhancement of the IAEA’s detection capabilities
through the development of new or improved
safeguards approaches and techniques, and the
acquisition of more effective verification equipment.
The following goals are applicable to the Novel
Technologies Project:
• Improve current detection capability;
• Pursue R&D for the development of novel
technologies for detection of undeclared
activities;
• Utilize, inter alia, Member States Support
Programme (MSSP) mechanisms as well as
internal resources and expertise; and,
• Optimise
safeguards
equipment
and
technology.

72

DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF SAFEGUARDS METHODS AND
INSTRUMENTS
Implementation of effective and efficient safeguards
has increasingly relied on the development and
deployment of methods and instruments meeting
specific functional and technical requirements. Accordingly, equipment development has complemented the
safeguards implementation approaches. For example,
early safeguards equipment was developed in support
of on-site verification of materials and activities at
declared locations.
After the 1991 Gulf War and the discovery of
a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq,
safeguards approaches were enhanced to include
additional methods and techniques, providing the
IAEA with further tools by which it could better detect
undeclared activities. These included environmental
sampling, information analysis, export monitoring,
satellite imagery, and new technologies such as
ground penetrating radar. New technologies were also
developed in support of additional protocols activities,
including those for complementary access.
By their very nature, clandestine weapons programs take place at undeclared locations or at declared
locations that may be used as a “cover” for an undeclared process being carried out. The location of
such activities requires appropriate equipment that can
detect unique characteristics related to the particular
activity. The Novel Technologies Project aims to broaden the range of techniques and instruments available
to the IAEA, including emerging techniques and
instruments that enable the IAEA to detect undeclared
activities in undeclared locations (e.g., small industrial
areas, universities, and workshops).
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THE NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT
In 2005, the IAEA Department of Safeguards
solicited suggestions and proposals through its MSSP
system. Broad requirements based on safeguards
needs were prepared and sent to all MSSPs and other
international bodies. Over 60 proposals, covering a
wide range of techniques, were received and reviewed
by the Safeguards Department. Techniques regarded as
“new”2 were forwarded to the relevant organizational
unit in the IAEA for further consideration. Those regarded as “novel”3 methods or instruments addressing a particular safeguards problem were selected for
further development and evaluation within the Novel
Technologies Project. Interestingly, many were based
on emerging laser and other forensic techniques.
Project Tasks.
The following proposals, meeting specific
safeguards needs for both on-site and away-from-site
detection of undeclared activities, have been selected
by the IAEA for further development and evaluation.
Optically stimulated luminescence (OSL).
Need: To determine if an undeclared location has been
used previously for storing radiological material.
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Figure 1. An undeclared Figure 2. The materials are
location is used for storage of removed and the location is
subsequently “disquised.”
undeclared materials.

Proposed Solution: Use OSL to measure the radiationinduced signature retained in many common building
materials.

Figure 3. An IAEA inspector Figure 4. The collected samples
collects samples of the sur- are analyzed for residual
rounding building materials. nuclear activation, indicating
the previous presence of stored
nuclear materials.
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Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS).

Need: To determine the nature and history of
compounds and elements found on site.

Figure. 5. Unidentified materials found during an on-site
complementary access inspection.

Proposed Solution: Use on-site LIBS to determine the
nature and history of compounds and elements.

Figure 6. LIBS comprises (i)
a laser system to ablate the
material surface to create a
micro-plasma, and (ii) a spectrometer to generate a spectroscopic profile of the microplasma’s constituent components.
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Figure 7. A trained IAEA
inspector operates the LIBS
unit on-site. The spectroscopic
profile is compared to those
in its library to determine
material’s make-up and history.

Light detection and ranging (LIDAR).

Need: To detect the presence and nature of nuclear fuel
cycle process activities at suspected locations.
Proposed Solution: Use a mobile LIDAR laboratory in
the vicinity of a suspected site to detect the presence
of characteristic gaseous compounds, emanating
from nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) processes into the
atmosphere.

Figure 8. LIDAR methods are used routinely by environmental
monitoring agencies to determine the presence of pollutants in
the atmosphere.
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Figure 9. A mobile LIDAR travels to the vicinity of a suspected
location engaged in undeclared NFC processes. A laser, tunable
to precise wavelengths (λ) selectively stimulates specific airborne
molecules emanating as gaseous compound from the process.
A light-sensitive telescope scans the atmosphere, detecting the
presence of the stimulated molecules.
Sampling and analysis of atmospheric gases.

Need: To detect the presence and nature of nuclear fuel
cycle process activities at suspected locations.
Proposed Solution: Use on-site laboratory to determine
the atmospheric composition of gaseous mixtures.
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Figure 10. A mobile on-site laboratory samples and concentrates
atmospheric-borne pollutants. Local meteorological conditions
and the GPS location are also recorded.

Figure 11. Samples are brought to a field laboratory for
analysis.
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Figure 12. Airborne material is identified through sample analysis,
and the data are combined with meteorological information in a
suitable atmospheric computer model to provide an estimate of
the source direction and probable location.

Project Activities.
In parallel to pursuing the tasks outlined in
Project Tasks, the Project has also convened specialist
technical meetings on techniques for the verification
of enrichment activities,4 noble gas sampling and
analysis,5 and laser spectrometry techniques.6 Further
specialist meetings covering novel technologies are
being planned. Additionally, the Project has been active
with the support of Member States in establishing
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contacts with international R&D organizations and
with experts engaged in a wide range of sensor
and detection technologies. MSSPs have also been
supportive, agreeing to assist the Project by facilitating
technical exchanges with both private and governmentoperated R&D laboratories and by providing access to
experts for short-duration tasks, facilitating attendance
at technical meetings, advising on novel methods and
instruments, conducting field tests and providing
supplementary funding.
The Project is also developing a secure technical
database to handle relatively large volumes of technical
information. The database will also provide nonsensitive
information on the Project’s tasks and activities on a
dedicated website to further raise the profile of this
work to the international R&D community.
Project Planning.
The Novel Technologies Project was established
to develop and evaluate effective techniques that
meet IAEA needs and that can be incorporated within
safeguards approaches for detecting evidence of
undeclared nuclear fuel-cycle activities, particularly
at undeclared locations. To that end, the Project will
continue to conduct surveys to identify safeguards needs
that cannot be met with available techniques, broaden
technical collaboration with other nonproliferation
organizations and the international R&D community
and, where required, initiate further tasks that will lead
to safeguards-useable methods and instruments. The
basis of these initiatives will be a review and analysis
of the nuclear fuel cycle processes, the identification
of the most safeguards-useful activity indicators7
and emanating signatures8 that can “travel” from the
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source location and be detected with a high level of
confidence and accuracy. Indicators and signatures will
be information, matter, and/or energy associated with
a particular NFC process. Once identified, methods
useful for the detection of promising indicators, and
signatures will be assessed by experts to determine
if suitable methodology or instruments are available.
Where none exist in a safeguards-useable form, then
the Project will define appropriate technical and
procedural requirements, initiating the necessary R&D
and testing regimes.
CONCLUSIONS
The establishment of the Novel Technologies
Project has provided a mechanism for the IAEA to
address the technologies required for emerging and
future inspectorate needs. Moreover, it has facilitated
the IAEA’s access to a greatly expanded range of
methods and instruments, thereby allowing safeguards
planners the opportunity to develop novel verification
and detection approaches.
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safeguards applications.
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CHAPTER 4
WIDE AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING
IN IRAN
Garry Dillon
In 2005 NPEC commissioned me to write this paper on WAES
in Iran which I did - after many false starts. The paper was not
meant to be any more than a starting point. It contains many gross
assumptions and simplifications. There are a number of costs
not addressed such as internal transport and security measures
for the sampling stations. My rationale was that the overall cost
would be so influenced by the actual detection range and practical
servicing frequency that the “odd million here or there” would be
of little consequence.

Any meaningful negotiated agreement with
Iran must, at the very minimum, require Iran to:
1. Unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop
nuclear weapons or weapons -useable nuclear material
or any subsystems or components or any research,
development, support or manufacturing facilities
related thereto.
2. Submit to the Secretary General and to the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) a declaration containing complete
details of its past activities to produce or acquire
special nuclear materials (plutonium and enriched
uranium) and nuclear weapons technology, including
complete details of external assistance, both offered and
provided, as well as related procurement activities.
3. Immediately enter into force the “Additional
Protocol” and actively cooperate with the IAEA in its
robust implementation for the purpose of verifying
the accuracy and completeness of the information
provided with respect to Iran’s past nuclear activities
and in building ongoing confidence that Iran’s present
and future nuclear activities are confined to exclusively
peaceful uses.
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The IAEA is very well-experienced in the verification
of the accuracy and completeness of declarations and,
while significant uncertainties remain, has already
gained considerable knowledge of Iran’s past nuclear
activities.
The IAEA has also gained much experience in Wide
Area Environmental Sampling (WAES), both through
its field and laboratory work in laying the technical
groundwork for the Additional Protocol and from the
implementation of its plan for the Ongoing Monitoring
and Verification (OMV)1 of Iraq’s undertaking in
compliance with paragraph 12 of United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687 (1991).
This chapter addresses the viability of WAES—as
defined in Article 18.g of the Additional Protocol—as a
means of gaining assurance that all nuclear activities in
Iran are known to the IAEA and are subject to routine
verification in accordance with Iran’s safeguards
agreement with the IAEA.
The context for the implementation of WAES in
Iran would be twofold:
• Iran is already a potential nuclear weapons
state, and should Iran so choose, it would be
merely a matter of time until it fully developed
a production capability for weaponsusable nuclear material and its subsequent
weaponization.
• Iran’s oft-declared peaceful nuclear undertakings
might well be genuine, but pragmatism requires
that comprehensive verification measures be
implemented over a substantial period of time
to build the necessary level of international
confidence of Iran’s compliance with those
undertakings.
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The Locations and Scope of Monitoring Activities
Prescribed by the Additional Protocol.
The Additional Protocol defines, inter alia,
the locations to which the IAEA may gain “Complementary Access”2 and specifies the verification measures
the IAEA may implement to gain assurance of the absence of nuclear material or nuclear-related activities.
The locations fall into three specific categories:
1. Locations not holding, or no longer holding,
nuclear material.
2. Locations holding material that has not been
processed to a level of purity for it to be suitable for fuel
fabrication or isotopic enrichment, or holding material
that has been exempted from safeguards verification
measures by virtue of its non-nuclear use or nuclear
material (typically in the form of waste) judged to be
unrecoverable.
3. Locations hosting nuclear-related activities but
not holding nuclear material.
The verification measures for the three categories
comprise a subset of the following:
• Visual observation (common to all three
categories).
• Collection of environmental samples (common
to all three categories).
• Radiation detection and measurement (common
to all three categories).
• Nondestructive measurements and sampling.
• Item counting.
• Application of seals…and other tamper indicating devices.
• Examination of records…of [nuclear] material.
• Other objective measures…agreed by the [IAEA]
Board.
These locations and verification activities are summarized in Table 1.
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5.a (ii)

Any location holding exempted material

Any location holding exempted material not yet in non-nuclear use form

2.a (vii)
(a)

2.a (vii)
(b)

item counting of nuclear materials

NDA and sampling

(material quantities, origin and disposition)

examination of records

other locations exceeds 10Te uranium or 20Te thorium respectively

Any location of the import of uranium and thorium in the above actual or cumulative quantities

radiation detection and measurement

and other locations holding more than 1Te of such material where the collective holding of all such

2.a (vi)
(c)

collection of environmental samples

Any location holding source material quantities exceeding 10Te uranium and/or 20Te thorium

2.a (vi)
(a)

visual observation

other objective measures - BoG approved

seals

radiation detection and measurement

collection of environmental samples

visual observation

Any uranium mine or uranium or thorium concentration plant

6.b

6.a

Permitted verification measures

2.a (v)

Locations holding material that has not been processed to a level of purity for it to be suitable
for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment or holding material which has been exempted from
safeguards by virtue of its non-nuclear use or nuclear material for which safeguards has been
terminated (Waste)

Any decommissioned facility or location outside facility (LoF)

5.a.(iii)

Locations not holding or no longer holding nuclear material

Any place on a site (co-located with a declared nuclear facility)

para

para

Generic description

5.a (i)

Sub

Main

SUMMARY OF LOCATIONS SUBJECT TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS AND PERMITTED VERIFICATION MEASURES
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5.c

5.b

Any location engaged in Annex I activities

Any location holding imported Annex II materiel

As 2.a (i) but where activities are not state funded or carried out on behalf of the state

2.a.(iv)

2.a.(ix)
b

2.b

6.d

6.c

other objective measures - BoG approved

radiation detection and measurement

visual observation

AND IF QUESTION UNRESOLVED

collection of environmental samples

other objective measures - BoG approved

(production and shipping records)

examination of safeguards relevant records

radiation detection and measurement

collection of environmental samples

visual observation

other objective measures - BoG approved

Table 1. Summary of Locations Subject to Complementary Access
and Permitted Verification Measures.

Any location specified by the IAEA to carry out location specific environmental sampling

Any location of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities not involving nuclear material

Locations hosting nuclear- related activities but not holding nuclear material

Any location storing or processing high-level waste on which safeguards have been terminated

2.a.(i)

2.a
(viii)

It is clear that, under the Additional Protocol, the
IAEA’s right of (complementary) access and freedom
of choice of verification activities are considerably
less than was provided in the case of its OMV plan
implemented in Iraq. Nonetheless, given Iran’s active
cooperation, there is enough flexibility in the text of
the protocol for the IAEA to be able to implement a
verification process that would provide substantial
assurance of Iran’s compliance with its undertakings.
In the special context of this chapter, two Articles
of the Additional Protocol are of fundamental
importance:
1. Article 5.c, which would require Iran to “. . .
provide the Agency [IAEA] with access to any location
specified by the Agency . . . to carry out location-specific
environmental sampling . . .,” and
2. Article 9, which would require Iran to “. . .
provide the Agency with access to locations specified
by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling . . .”
Article 9, however, goes on to state that “The
Agency shall not seek such access until the use of
wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural
arrangements therefore have been approved by the
Board and following consultations between the Agency
and [the state].”
Wide-area environmental sampling is defined in
Article 18.g as meaning the collection of environmental
samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, and smears)
at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the
purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions
about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or
nuclear activities over a wide area. Location-specific
environmental sampling differs only in its application
being confined “. . . at, and in the immediate vicinity of
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a location . . .” and that the Agency’s conclusions are
drawn with respect to that “. . . specific location . . .”
It is clear from the foregoing that a legal basis for
the implementation of WAES in Iran exists and, with
the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors and the
cooperation of Iran, could be implemented. Furthermore, the text of the Additional Protocol underwrites the fundamental value of environmental sampling as a contributing technology to the IAEA’s ability to
draw conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared
nuclear material or nuclear activities. However, it is clear
that a prerequisite to the implementation of WAES is
a reasonable understanding of the costs involved and
the technical resource requirements.
A Notional Plan for the Implementation of WAES
in Iran.
There is no particular complication to the “frontend” of environmental sampling, it is simply a
matter of determining what kind of sample is most
appropriate and at which and how many locations
the samples should be taken. The premise on which
WAES is based is that any significant activities related
to the processing of nuclear material would result in
a detectable impact on the environment—either from
chronic low-level releases or an acute high-level release
following a processing malfunction.
In the context of a clandestine enrichment facility,
WAES would be focused mainly on the detection of
uranium but also on related processing elements such
as fluorine. Due to its ubiquity, the mere detection of
uranium is of little significance unless it is detected in
concentrations markedly different from those occurring naturally in the area sampled or the relative abundance of the 235U isotope is greater than .71 percent.
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WAES is further complicated by the fact that in a
state such as Iran with a history of uranium processing
activities, analysis of deposition samples (such as
surface smears or vegetation) would not be able to
readily distinguish whether the material deposited was
a result of current nuclear activities or originated from
past activities. Although vulnerable to resuspension
complications, it is now widely accepted that the
sampling of air for the collection of particulate and
gaseous matter is the most reliable and unambiguous
means of detection of current nuclear activities. A
variety of designs of air samplers exist, ranging from
those little more sophisticated than a domestic vacuum
cleaner to those capable of continuous analysis of
the collected matter combined with the capability to
transmit the results of that analysis to a headquarters
control room.
However, the IAEA’s experience in Iraq shows that
simplicity of design and robustness of construction
are likely to provide the most reliable performance.
Ideally, the air sampling equipment would be housed
within a small trailer or road vehicle and would have
battery back-up and the capability to transmit alarm
annunciations to an appropriate IAEA control and
supervision location in the event of loss of power
supplies or tampering. The transportability of the air
sampling station enables the grid to be readily adjusted
or, if appropriate, completely redesigned.
Nuclear forensics have achieved such extraordinary
sensitivities that it is virtually impossible to sanitize
radioactively contaminated surfaces or to avoid the
detection of leakages of radioactive airborne or liquid
discharges. For example, analysis of environmental
samples—airborne particulate matter, water, deposited
or sedimented materials—is capable of detecting
the presence of uranium down to a few millionth,
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billionth, billionth parts of a gram. However, even
with such sensitivities, it has to be recognized that the
concentration of any environmental contamination
reduces inversely and nonlinearly with the distance
from the point of release. The actual reduction would be
a function of terrain and the prevailing meteorological
conditions.
A detailed topographical/meteorological study
would thus be required to determine a practical
detection range based on an assessed notional release
and the practical limits of sample analysis. It is, of
course this “detection range-R” that will determine
the grid array of the air sampling stations and thus
the related capital equipment costs, in-field service
personnel resources costs, and analytical costs.
For purposes of this notional plan, it is assumed that
air sampling stations would be set up on a regular square
grid with the diagonal separation of the air sampling
stations equal to the detection range. It follows that
the grid would be of side R/√2 with a corresponding
grid-element area of R2/2. As a first approximation the
number of air sampling stations could be calculated by
dividing Iran’s superficial area by the area of a single
grid element. However, it would also be necessary to
recognize the need for additional sampling stations to
cover the perimeter of the grid. Again, for purposes
of illustration, the number of additional air sampling
stations is derived from the state’s land boundary
divided by R/√2.
Iran is not a small country and covers an area of some
1.65 million square kilometers with a land boundary
of 5,400km. Based on the foregoing assumptions, a
sampling network designed around a detection range
of 10km would require an unmanageable 33,764 air
sampling stations and even stretching the detection
range to 100 kilometres would still require some 400
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air sampling stations. As was the case in Iraq, it is
likely that the relatively high levels of atmospheric
dust would require frequent sample changing to avoid
blockage of the collecting media. Assuming, therefore,
that samples were changed on a bi-weekly basis, a 400station network would generate some 10,400 samples
per year.
A cost assessment of a 400-station network is shown
in Table 2.
Operation

Cost

Detection range (km)

100

Number of air sampling stations

400

Equipment and installation cost per unit

$10,000

Amortization period (years)

3

Equipment and installation costs per year

$1,333,000

Number of service visits/year per installation

26

Servicing capacity (units/day-2 person team)

3

Servicing resources required (person-years )

40

Field Office resource requirements (person-years)

4

Personnel costs including travel and accommodation

$5,000,000

Number of samples collected for analysis

10,400

Cost per analysis

$1,000

Total analytical costs

$10,400,000

Total annual costs including equipment amortization

$16,733,000

Notional overall annual cost/air sampling station

$41,833

Notional overall cost per analytical result

$1,610

1

Table 2. Notional Cost Assessment of a 400-Air
Sampling Station Network.
The data in Table 2 are produced simply to illustrate
operational costs and should not be interpreted to
suggest that the exampled network is capable of
providing meaningful detection sensitivities. Indeed,
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the mountainous nature of much of the Iranian terrain
will complicate the country-specific topographical and
meteorological study and is likely to indicate the need
for a nonuniform grid including areas requiring a more
closely spaced grid.
Regardless of these complications, the table does
show that the most critical component of overall
cost is sample analysis, contributing, as it does to
more than 60 peercent of the costs in the illustrative
model. Furthermore, the data do not include the
complementary environmental samples (herbage,
smears, water, etc.) that should be collected. Although
these samples could be collected without additional
labor or equipment costs, they could potentially more
than double the analytical load, pushing the total
annual cost towards $30 million. Even without this
extra burden, the number of samples generated in the
Table 2 example far exceeds the currently available
international analytical resources at the very highest
level of sensitivity.
It should also be recognized that at $30 million
these notional costs represent about 25 percent of the
total annual operating budget of the IAEA Department
of Safeguards, including voluntary contributions from
motivated member states. At first glance, such costs
seem inordinately high. However, it is merely necessary
to change the comparator to, for example, the annual
cost of the military action in Iraq or the “replacement
costs” of Manhattan following the explosion of a 50
kiloton device to make the costs appear to be an entirely
worthwhile investment.
The notional case outlined in Table 2 will clearly
contain inaccuracies and is presented merely to arrive
at an “order of magnitude” costing of WAES in the
Iran context. However, many obvious refinements are
available.
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One such refinement would be to carry out a detailed analysis of Iran on the basis of a 10km grid, and to
weight each grid section with respect to any attributes
therein that could contribute to sustaining clandestine
nuclear activities. Such attributes would include, for example, access to power and water supplies, population
centers, road and rail transport, and geological
conditions compatible with undergrounding. On the
basis of this analysis, it would be possible to determine
those “high-potential” areas of the country worthy
of continuous and intensive monitoring activities—
probably less than 10 percent of the total area. Within
the so-termed high-potential areas, air sampling
stations would be positioned in conformity with
location-specific detection range calculations. Areas of
significantly lesser potential would be subject to less
intensive sampling and analysis.
Another simple refinement is available in the
analytical process in that portions of samples from
contiguous locations could be blended and analyzed
as a composite batch sample. Should analytical results
from the composite sample so indicate, the individual
sample portions could then be analyzed. It should also
be recognized that WAES serves, at least in part, as
a deterrent and provided the “target” is unaware, its
effectiveness is undiminished regardless of whether all
or only a fraction of the samples collected are actually
analyzed.
Yet another refinement would be to either
complement or entirely replace WAES by multiple
location-specific environmental sampling wherein the
locations would be chosen of the basis of their highpotential to support undeclared nuclear activities or on
the basis of information provided to or independently
developed by the IAEA. It is clear that motivated
member states should be investing considerable
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resources in gathering information relevant to Iran’s
professed peaceful uses of nuclear energy; for example,
by aerial/satellite surveillance, telecommunications
monitoring, and export/import monitoring. It is
equally clear that those states should be in a position
to provide “cues” to the IAEA to identify locations
worthy of location-specific environmental sampling and, as
appropriate, complementary access.
Recommendations.
1. If not already “work in progress,” the IAEA
should commission a working group of internal and
external experts to design a plan for the implementation
of WAES in Iran based on a detailed analysis of the
topographical and meteorological characteristics of
its various regions. The plan should include realistic
cost analyses and address the various options
available between full-scope WAES and the targeted/
cued implementation of multiple location-specific
environmental sampling campaigns.
2. Motivated IAEA member states should reevaluate
their relevant information gathering system and
establish formal pathways for the prompt transmission
of information to the IAEA.
3. Those states having high sensitivity analytical
capability—principally the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France—should invest significantly
in the expansion and further development of those
capabilities to ensure that the international community
will be in a position to satisfy the demand in the event
that it becomes necessary/appropriate to implement
WAES in Iran or elsewhere.
4. The IAEA Board of Governors should address
the question of funding for the implementation, as
necessary, of WAES. Too often in the past, too many
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IAEA Member States have been more focused on the
financial savings that could result from the evolution
of safeguards technologies and approaches. It is time to
recognize that the cost of international nuclear material
safeguards is trivial when compared to the financial
burden of pragmatic “worst case scenarios” that might
result from failure to implement robust safeguards
measures at the leading edge of technological
excellence.
ENDNOTES
1. As approved in United Nations Security Council Resolution
715, October 11, 1991.
2. Access to locations other than those containing declared
nuclear materials.
3. Assuming a 3-month tour of duty and a 6-day working
week and taking into account annual leave, official holidays, and
compensatory time off, 1 person-year equates to 170 inspection
days.
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CHAPTER 5
CAN NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION IN IRAN
AND ELSEWHERE BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST
DIVERSION?
Edwin S. Lyman
Introduction: Material Accountancy is Still
Relevant.
The challenges to the nonproliferation regime over
the last 15 years posed by the crises in Iraq, North
Korea, and Iran have led to an increased preoccupation
among the international community with the lack of
capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to detect undeclared facilities for production
of fissile material. However, the foundation of IAEA
safeguards remains the ability of the Agency to
effectively verify the absence of diversion of special
nuclear material from declared facilities. One must
assume that the vast quantities of weapon-usable
plutonium flowing through commercial reprocessing
and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plants will
continue to present attractive targets to those looking to
covertly acquire small stockpiles of nuclear explosives.
Likewise, the huge separative work unit (SWU)
capacity of large commercial gas centrifuge plants will
provide a temptation for those who may wish to divert
a small fraction of that capacity toward highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) production. Consequently, such
activities should be forbidden in the absence of highly
credible assurances that all significant diversions will
be detected in a timely manner. The nuclear industry
will rightly not be able to increase public confidence
in the security of the nuclear fuel cycle if it continues
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to operate facilities where dozens of bombs’ worth
of plutonium or HEU could conceivably go missing
annually without being detected.
However, experiences with safeguarding plutonium
bulk-handling facilities in Japan and Europe have
made clear that, even when discrepancies in material
accountancy arise, the response is anything but timely.
The Agency’s reluctance to escalate the significance of
unresolved discrepancies to the level of violations of
safeguards agreements have led to standoffs in which
anomalies have remained unresolved for years or even
decades. Clearly, this state of affairs is intolerable in
the context of the current global threat environment.
The question of whether bulk-handling uranium
facilities for conversion or enrichment can be effectively
safeguarded against diversion raises somewhat different issues than those at plutonium bulk-handling facilities. Since the facilities under normal operating conditions do not involve weapon-usable process materials,
the risks associated with diversion are indirect and are
related to the effectiveness of enhanced safeguards
measures, both to exclude the possibility of reconfiguring
declared centrifuge plants to illicitly produce highly
enriched uranium and to exclude the existence of
clandestine enrichment plants that could utilize
undeclared feed. However, even the IAEA Director of
Safeguards has conceded that the additional authority
provided to the Agency under the Additional Protocol
is not sufficient to ensure that it will be able to discover
all undeclared activities at undeclared locations.1 Thus
again, the credibility of safeguards remains dependent
on the ability of international inspectors to ensure that
significant quantities of nuclear materials cannot be
diverted without detection from safeguarded facilities
to undeclared ones, even if the materials are not directuse.
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Another reason why detection of diversion
remains crucially important is the growing threat that
sophisticated subnational groups, perhaps with state
assistance, could obtain fissile materials to construct
crude nuclear weapons for use in terrorist attacks. The
world has only begun to fully appreciate the magnitude
and seriousness of this danger in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks. The potential for
clandestine diversion by a state of a few significant
quantities of plutonium is perhaps not the greatest
proliferation concern for states that already have nuclear
weapons or have large fuel cycle facilities that could
be overtly commandeered for the rapid production
of fissile material. But such a diversion would pose a
major threat if it were carried out by or on behalf of a
subnational group whose objective is to acquire only a
small number of weapons for terrorist purposes. And
in the latter context, the notion of timely warning as
applied to states may not be relevant, since the concept
as it applies to states is not directly applicable to terrorist
groups that are immune to political pressures and may
be able to evade capture for long periods of time if they
are able to successfully escape with diverted material.
Thus a security and safeguards posture that is stringent
enough to deter diverters must be a fundamental goal,
because the game may well be over once sufficient
material is diverted.
Of course, the IAEA does not have formal
authority to address subnational threats, which are
the responsibility of State Systems of Accounting and
Control (SSACs). However, it is apparent that improving the quality of SSACs of sufficient quality to provide
the IAEA with a stringent capability to detect diversions
by the operator would also provide the operator with
an enhanced capability to detect diversions by insiders.2
The problem is that aspects of domestic security that
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are important in countering internal threats, such as
access authorization programs, would remain out of
the IAEA’s formal domain, even under the provisions
of the revised Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM). This dichotomy between
state and nonstate actors, which appears more and
more artificial today in a world where their interests
are often intertwined, will hinder efforts to build
comprehensive systems to effectively ensure that civil
nuclear facilities cannot become covert sources of fissile
material for either states or subnational groups.
There are indications that instead of moving to
strengthen material accountancy practices, the IAEA is
actually moving to weaken them. According to the IAEA
2004 Safeguards Statement, the Standing Advisory
Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) “found
that the Safeguards Criteria were basically sound,
but that a key priority is the wider implementation of
integrated safeguards.”3 Integrated safeguards is an
effort by the IAEA to save money by reducing reliance
on the results of facility-level material accounting for
making state-level safeguards conclusions. However,
for the reasons stated above, the IAEA should avoid an
excessive focus on pursuing integrated safeguards at
the expense of improving basic material accountancy
measures at declared facilities.
The Challenges of Detecting Diversion at Plutonium
Bulk-Handling Facilities.
In 1990, the Washington, DC-based Nuclear Control
Institute issued a seminal paper by Dr. Marvin Miller
of the Massachusetts Instititute of Technology, entitled
“Are IAEA Safeguards on Bulk-Handling Facilities
Effective?”4 This paper illustrated, in simple yet stark
terms, that the IAEA, as a result of technical and political
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obstacles, was unable to meet its detection goals for
large-throughput plutonium bulk-handling facilities,
e.g., reprocessing and plutonium fuel fabrication
plants. Miller argued that this conclusion is significant
because he believed that it was reasonable to regard
the detection goals as performance criteria for effective
safeguards, not only to maintain the credibility of the
international safeguards system, but also to help ensure
that national systems of accountancy and control would
be stringent enough to deter subnational diversion.
One purpose of the present paper is to revisit
Miller’s arguments in light of any technical and political
developments related to nuclear material accountancy
over the last 15 years and to assess whether the
conclusions of his article remain true today.
The IAEA “detection goals” have not changed
since Miller’s paper was written, although they are
no longer universally applied. The goal remains the
detection of a diversion of a “significant quantity” (SQ)
of unirradiated direct use nuclear material (8 kilograms
of plutonium or 25 kilograms of uranium-235 contained
in HEU) within 1 month; one SQ of irradiated direct
use material (about the equivalent of two pressurizedwater reactor spent fuel assemblies) within 3 months;
and indirect use material (75 kilograms of uranium235 contained in low-enriched or natural uranium)
within 1 year. However, these timeliness detection
goals may be extended in states that have adopted the
Additional Protocol and where the IAEA has concluded
that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are
absent, as part of the initiative known as “integrated
safeguards.”
Miller observed that for large bulk handling facilities,
such as the 800 metric ton heavy metal (MTHM)/year
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) now undergoing
startup testing in Japan, it was not possible with the
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technologies and practices available at the time to detect
the diversion of 8 kilograms of plutonium (1 SQ)—about
0.1 percent of the annual plutonium throughput—with
a high degree of confidence. This is because the errors
in material accountancy measurements at reprocessing
plants were typically on the order of 1 percent—that
is, a factor of 10 greater than an SQ. If after taking a
physical inventory, the value of plutonium measured
was less than expected (on the basis of operator records)
by an amount on the order of 1 SQ, it would be difficult
to state with high confidence that this shortfall, known
as “material unaccounted for” or MUF, was due to an
actual diversion and not merely measurement error.
In the past, the IAEA acknowledged that the 1 SQ
detection goal could not be met in practice, and instead
adopted a relaxed standard known as the “accountancy
verification goal” (AVG), which was “based on a
realistic assessment of what then-current measurement
techniques applied to a given facility could actually detect.”5 The AVG was based on a quantity defined as the
“expected accountancy capability,” E, which is defined
as the “minimum loss of nuclear material which can
be expected to be detected by material accountancy,”
and is given by the formula E = 3.29σA, in which σ is
the relative uncertainty in measurements of the plant’s
inputs and outputs, and A is the facility’s plutonium
throughput in between periodic physical inventories.6
This formula is derived from a requirement that the
alarm threshold for diversion be set at a confidence
level of 95 percent and a false alarm rate of 5 percent.
Miller estimated that for the RRP, based on an input
uncertainty of ±1 percent (which was the IAEA’s value at
the time for the international standard for the expected
measurement uncertainty at reprocessing plants), the
value of E would be 246 kilograms of plutonium, or
more than 30 SQs, if physical inventories were carried
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out on an annual basis, as was (and is) standard
practice. This means that a diversion of plutonium
would have to exceed this value before one could
conclude with 95 percent certainty that a diversion had
occurred, and that the measured shortfall was not due
to measurement error.
Apparently, the IAEA no longer uses the AVG as a
standard for material accountancy, and the term was
not mentioned in the revised Safeguards Criteria issued
in 1991.7 The term also does not appear in the 2001
edition of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary. While some
have characterized the elimination of this criterion as an
attempt to strengthen material accountancy standards,
it could also be regarded as a way of concealing the
embarrassingly poor capabilities of conventional
material accountancy methods.
Miller also identified other problems that contribute
to the difficulty of detecting diversions on the order of
1 SQ, such as the accumulation of plutonium in waste
streams such as cladding hulls that are not amenable
to accurate assay by nondestructive means. The
accumulation of plutonium in such hard-to-measure
forms can lead to significant and growing contributions
to cumulative facility MUFs.
An Aside on False Alarm Rates.
Even if the IAEA were able to meet its detection goals,
those goals are arguably inadequate, given the evolving
trends in the threats from nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism that have become especially apparent
since the 9/11 attacks. For instance, the detection
probability guidelines of 90 to 95 percent confidence
level and 5 percent false alarm rate established by the
SAGSI in the 1970s do not appear to be sufficiently
stringent today. The Agency’s reluctance to pursue
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higher confidence levels for detection of diversion at the
expense of higher false alarm rates would seem to be a
lesser concern in the context of the heightened security
levels that have become standard operating practice
around the world since the 9/11 attacks. Today most
people are willing to tolerate a level of sensitivity for
security screening at airports and critical facilities that
would not have been acceptable in the past because of
a common appreciation that the occasional false alarm
is an appropriate price to pay to minimize the risk of
another 9/11-scale terrorist attack. But the guidelines
for probability of detection of diversion of plutonium
have not been similarly strengthened in the aftermath
of 9/11. On the contrary, ample evidence that
material accountancy techniques cannot meet current
quantitative detection goals does not bode well for the
prospect of developing techniques capable of meeting
more stringent goals without raising the acceptable
false alarm rate.
Failures of Material Accountancy.
Since the release of Miller’s paper in 1990, numerous
examples have come to light of serious lapses in
material accountancy at bulk-handling facilities around
the world involving the occurrence of large MUFs
that remained unresolved for years or even decades.
The reasons for these lapses illustrate some of the
fundamental problems encountered at bulk-handling
facilities that prevent timely closure of material balances
and that must be overcome if the IAEA detection goals
are to be met. These problems include accumulation
of residual holdup, accumulation of scrap and waste
materials in hard-to-assay material forms, inaccuracies
in nuclear material estimation methods, and operator
complacency/incompetence.
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The problem of residual holdup led to a significant
material accountancy failure at the Plutonium Fuel
Production Facility (PFPF), a MOX fuel fabrication
facility at Tokaimura, Japan. Residual holdup is
defined as material that remains behind after the inprocess material is removed for measurement prior to
the taking of a physical inventory. Residual holdup
resulting from the adhesion of powders on process
equipment and accumulation in cracks, corners, and
pores can result in persistent MUFs that grow with
time. Ultimately, these MUFs can only be resolved
by dismantlement and careful cleaning of process
equipment.
At PFPF, operators noticed an unusually severe
residual holdup problem soon after the plant started
up in 1988. As a result, the plant operator, PNC, in
conjunction with safeguards experts at Los Alamos,
designed an nondestructive analysis (NDA) system to
measure residual holdup in-situ known as the Glovebox
Assay System (GBAS). However, measurement
biases contributed to an overall uncertainty of about
15 percent. By 1994, the plant MUF had grown to
about 69 kilograms of plutonium. Even if this entire
amount was residual holdup, given the measurement
uncertainty associated with the GBAS, the IAEA could
not exclude the possibility with a confidence level of
95 percent, based on NDA measurements alone, that at
least 1 SQ had been diverted. Consequently, the IAEA
wanted PNC to cut open the plant gloveboxes, remove
the holdup directly, and measure it with destructive
assay (DA) methods. PNC balked at this request, and
the dispute remained unresolved until the Nuclear
Control Institute (NCI) publicly disclosed the existence
of the discrepancy in 1994, after which PNC agreed to
shut down the plant, recover the holdup, and install
new equipment to reduce further holdup accumulation
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and improved NDA systems for measuring residual
holdup more accurately. After an expenditure of $100
million to remove and clean out old gloveboxes and
install new ones, PNC announced in November 1996
that it had reduced the MUF to less than 10 kilograms
(but not less than 1 SQ). This partial resolution of the
MUF took more than two years after the situation
became public.
Another long-unresolved MUF issue at Tokaimura
was associated with the accumulation of plutoniumladen fuel scrap resulting from decades of MOX research
and production activities at the site.8 Press reports in
the mid-1990s indicated that the scrap inventory at
Tokaimura contained between 100 and 150 kilograms
of plutonium.9 However, much of this scrap was in an
impure form that could not be accurately measured via
NDA methods. An instrument known as the Plutonium
Scrap Multiplicity Counter (PSMC), developed by
Los Alamos, was good for assaying clean scrap but
was much less useful for assaying plutonium that
was contaminated with moisture or other substances
containing light elements that could generate neutrons
through (α,n) reactions. For such heavily contaminated
scrap, the measurement precision ranged from 10- 50
percent, which is well over the 4 percent uncertainty
cited by the IAEA as the acceptable international
standard for scrap measurements.10 At an average
precision of 10 percent, the uncertainty associated with
measuring a scrap inventory containing 150 kilograms
of plutonium would be greater than 1 SQ, and the 95
percent confidence level for detecting diversion would
be over six SQs. Consequently, the IAEA wanted the
plant operator, PNC, to chemically purify the scrap
so that it could be made homogeneous and could be
more precisely measured using DA. PNC apparently
had long-range plans to build a facility for aqueous
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processing of the scrap, but a formal agreement with
the IAEA that it would do so was not reached until
1998, when the IAEA announced that the plant operator
would embark on a 5-year program “aimed at reducing
the inventory of heterogeneous scrap material,” which
would be “gradually homogenized to allow enhanced
verification, including destructive analysis.”11 Aside
from a short mention in the IAEA 2000 Safeguards
Statement of the implementation of a containment and
surveillance approach for the receipt and storage of
MOX scrap at something called the “Critical Solution
Facility” in Japan,12 no public information could be
located by the author regarding the status or outcome
of this program.
Measurement and estimation errors also contributed to substantial material accountancy failures
that occurred at the spent fuel reprocessing plant at
Tokaimura since it began operating in 1977. In January
2003, Japan admitted that the cumulative shipperreceiver difference—that is, the difference between
the amount of plutonium that was estimated to have
been shipped to the reprocessing plant and the amount
that had actually been measured—was 206 kilograms,
or about 25 SQs. This was nearly 3 percent of the
total amount of plutonium estimated to have been
processed in the plant over its lifetime. A few months
later, Japan revised its figures, claiming that the actual
discrepancy was 59 kg, with the remainder either bound
in cladding hulls (12 kg), discarded with high-level
liquid waste (106 kg), or decayed into americium-241
(29 kg). However, it was unclear how figures as precise
as these were derived, given the uncertainties inherent
in measuring the plutonium in cladding hulls and in
high-level waste, and the uncertainties in determining
the initial isotopic composition.
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MUF issues have arisen in other countries that
produce and process plutonium, including France and
the United Kingdom. The Euratom Safeguards Agency
reported in 2002 that “the annual verification of the
physical inventory of the Cogema-Cadarache plant
in France found an unacceptable amount of material
unaccounted for (MUF) on the plutonium materials.”13
The problem was later attributed to issues associated
with differences between measurement results taken
by inspectors and operators and with the accounting
of poorly-defined historical materials (although it is
unclear why the issue did not arise until 2002, if that
were the case). The finding of “high values of MUF”
was reiterated in the 2003 report. It was reported in
September 2004 that Euratom had “recently” sent
a response to Cogema accepting its explanation for
the 2002 MUF finding. Thus it took at least 2 years to
resolve the discrepancy (and the time period would
potentially be much longer if it was due to long-stored
historical materials).
In the United Kingdom (UK), the most recent audit
of nuclear materials at BNFL Sellafield, published on
February 17, 2005, revealed a plutonium MUF of 29.6
kilograms, or about 3.5 SQ. BNFL insisted at the time
that the figure did not mean that any material had been
removed from its plants, and that “the techniques we use
to account for our nuclear material are internationally
approved and recognized as best practice. In particular,
the systems of statistical measurement and control in the
Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) estimate
the amount of plutonium are the most advanced in the
world. . . .”14
BNFL was forced to eat these words only a few
months later when the public was informed on May 9
of a massive leak at THORP that had gone undetected
for 9 months. The leak, which occurred in a feed pipe
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to one of the two accountancy vessels, resulted in the
accumulation of 83.4 cubic meters of dissolver solution,
containing an estimated 19 metric tons of uranium and
190 kilograms of plutonium.15 In spite of the fact that
the leak occurred at an accountancy tank, which is
where the initial inventory is measured for the purpose
of establishing shipper-receiver differences (SRDs),
the steadily increasing loss of material did not attract
notice until 8 months after it began. To the credit of the
plant’s material accounting system, first indications of
a problem came not from any safety indicators (several
of which were malfunctioning), but from the Safeguards
Department, when it detected an anomalous SRD in
March 2005. However, an unambiguous finding of a
leak did not take place until a month later.
In BNFL’s review of the incident, it commended
the role of the Safeguards Department in detecting
the leak, but pointed out that the Nuclear Materials
Accountancy system “is intended to provide overall
accountancy balances,” but “is not designed to (nor is it
intended that it should) be responsive to track material
on a more real time basis.” BNFL goes on to recommend
introduction of “a nuclear material tracking regime .
. . with the objective of promptly detecting primary
containment failure or misdirection of material.”16
This statement appears completely baffling in view
of the claims that BNFL had made previously, and fully
supported by Euratom, regarding the status of near real
time accountancy at THORP. For instance, in a paper
delivered at an IAEA safeguards symposium in 2001, a
joint paper by BNFL and Euratom safeguards officials
stated that “Near Real Time Materials Accountancy
(NRTMA) is fully operational in THORP, providing
regular assistance of high quality material control.”17
One can only conclude that this claim was a bluff—a
bluff that has now been called.
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Even more troubling than the control failures on the
part of the operator was that Euratom also appeared
to be asleep at the wheel. THORP is allegedly under
Euratom safeguards, which is charged with verifying
that there has been no diversion of plutonium, based on
a timeliness criterion identical to that of the IAEA (one
SQ within 1 month). In addition to having access to the
operators’ accountancy data, Euratom apparently also
had independent access to process data, upon which
it performed its own statistical tests.18 Yet there is no
indication that Euratom inspectors were any more
successful than the plant operators at detecting the leak
and sounding an alarm. If this was indeed the case,
this incident does not instill confidence in the ability of
Euratom safeguards to detect a diversion.
Have Things Improved?
While the above real-world examples demonstrate
the practical difficulties of ensuring through material
accountancy methods the timely detection of diversions
of significant quantities of plutonium at large, complex,
messy, bulk-handling facilities, it is reasonable to ask
whether they are representative of the situation today.
After all, these facilities by and large are fairly old,
and were planned and built decades ago; many of
the most challenging material accountancy problems
resulted from processes that were not optimized for
safeguards effectiveness or from inventories of poorly
characterized legacy materials. Can’t we do better
now?
Miller observed that his assessment of the
limitations of material accountancy could change if
improvements were made in the technical capabilities
of material accountancy tools. In particular, he cited
(1) a reduction in the overall measurement uncertainty
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in the chemical process area; (2) the use of near-realtime accountancy on a weekly basis to improve the
sensitivity of tests for protracted diversion; and (3) a
reduction in the measurement error of plutonium in
waste streams such as cladding hulls and sludges.
With regard to (1), perhaps the best indication that
there has been little progress in reducing measurement
uncertainties since Miller’s paper was written is the fact
that the IAEA “expected measurement uncertainty”
associated with closing a material balance at a
reprocessing plant remains 1 percent as of 2001, the
same value reported by Miller in 1990.19
With regard to (2), near-real-time accountancy
(NRTA) is a method in which inventories are taken
and material balances closed on a much more frequent
basis than the conventional annual physical inventory.
By reducing the throughput of material associated
with a material balance, the ability to detect diversions
is improved. For instance, Miller showed that the
threshold for detection of an abrupt diversion of 1 SQ
of plutonium at a large bulk-handling plant could be
accomplished by use of NRTA with physical inventories
carried out on a weekly basis. However, given that the
time to take a physical inventory of a large facility is
approximately 1 week, including preparation time,
cleanout of process equipment, measurement of the
inventory, and reconciliation of anomalies,20 such
a high frequency of physical inventories is utterly
impractical. Thus NRTA must utilize inventory
measurements of in-process materials where possible,
and its effectiveness will depend in large part on the
uncertainties associated with these measurements. A
major question is, therefore, whether NDA techniques
have improved over the past 15 years to the extent
that the benefits of NRTA can be fully realized. The
uncomfortable fact of the leak at THORP, where NRTA
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was purportedly “fully operational,” tends to raise
doubts as to whether NRTA is yet capable of fulfilling
its promise.
Finally, with regard to (3), considerable efforts
at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and
elsewhere have been made over the last decade to
improve the capabilities of NDA instruments for
waste measurements. The development of neutron
multiplicity counters and high-efficiency epithermal
neutron counters showed some promise in improving
the precision of plutonium in waste drums. However, as
was seen above, these instruments perform best when
measuring well-characterized and pure materials,
but provide marginal benefit when measuring lowassay, contaminated, and heterogeneous plutonium
materials.
Any comprehensive assessment of the capabilities
of material accountancy at large bulk-handling
facilities today must include a review of the safeguards
approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP),
which is the only large-scale commercial reprocessing
plant where IAEA safeguards are being applied. The
safeguards system at Rokkasho, which has been under
development since the early 1990s, is the product of a
massive multinational effort and should be regarded
as the state-of-the-art.
Independent of the technical capabilities of the
safeguards system at RRP are two overarching points.
First, according to members of the team who developed
the safeguards approach, “the most important factor
leading to the success” of meeting all the challenges of
developing a safeguards system on the scale needed
for the RRP is “the open and full cooperation between
all parties—the IAEA, the State, and the operator.”21
Therefore, even the most fully developed and
technically sophisticated safeguards system will likely
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fail in the context of an uncooperative or adversarial
relationship between these parties, which is exactly the
situation of most interest in considering the future of
IAEA safeguards as an instrument for controlling the
use of nuclear energy not only in friendly states but in
potentially adversarial ones. Second, issues of cost and
convenience played a major role in development of the
safeguards approach and resulted in many questionable
compromises. For instance, instead of having its own
independent on-site analytical laboratory, the IAEA
must share a laboratory with the facility operator.
Clearly, this situation raises additional complications,
such as the potential for tampering, that must be
addressed.
There is insufficient information in the public
domain of the safeguards approach at Rokkasho
for this author to make an independent assessment.
However, it is clear that even after 15 years of designing
the safeguards approach, the IAEA itself admits that its
detection goals cannot be met at the facility. According
to Shirley Johnson, former head of the Rokkasho
safeguards project in the IAEA’s Department of
Safeguards,22
The overall measurement uncertainty [at the RRP] may
be less than +/-1%. This we won’t know until we get
further into Active Commissioning. However, even if it
is 0.7% or 0.8% the fact remains that we cannot achieve
the IAEA goal of 1 SQ detection capabilities. This has
always been known. It comes down to a fact of very
large throughput … It is why it has taken us 15 years
to develop the SG [safeguards] approach … we had
to compensate for lack of detection capabilities by
enhancing our assurance that the facility operations are
as declared … all major flows of nuclear material … are
continuously monitored …
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Ms. Johnson said earlier during a talk at the 47th
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual
Meeting in 2006 that the measurement uncertainty at
RRP remained at 80 kilograms a year (corresponding
to 1% of throughput, the same assumed by Miller in
1990), and that higher sensitivity and reliability of
measurements were needed to improve on this.
Recent results from the performance of NDA
solution monitoring systems at RRP indicate that they
themselves have high measurement uncertainty. For
instance, it was reported that the Plutonium Inventory
and Management System (PIMS), which is designed
to perform assays on relatively pure plutonium and
uranium mixtures, has a total measurement uncertainty
of +/-6%.23
Conclusion.
The bottom line is that nuclear material bulkhandling facilities, like other industrial facilities, are
messy affairs. Although society may tolerate small leaks
from a chemical plant to the environment if the hazards
are limited, when the material in question can be used
to build nuclear weapons, there is no acceptable level
of leakage into the hands of hostile states or terrorists.
The consequences of a single nuclear weapon falling
into the wrong hands would be so catastrophic that
there must be a zero-tolerance policy for diversion. If
this standard cannot be met, then the underlying basis
for claims that the closed fuel cycle can be adequately
safeguarded against malevolent uses must be called
into question.
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CHAPTER 6
ADEQUACY OF IAEA’S SAFEGUARDS
FOR ACHIEVING TIMELY DETECTION
Thomas B. Cochran
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine, in light
of the A. Q. Kahn network in Pakistan and recent
events in Iran and North Korea, the adequacy of
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
safeguards for achieving timely detection of an effort
to acquire nuclear weapons by a non-weapon state.
For those less familiar with the obligation of state
members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT)
and/or states that operate under agreements with the
IAEA, the Appendix to this chapter includes relevant
excerpts from the NPT, the IAEA’s enabling statute,
and other IAEA publications.
THE OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS
As set forth in Article III.1 of the NPT, a primary
purpose of IAEA’s safeguards system is to prevent
“diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
(See Appendix, Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Since Article III.1 of the NPT stipulates that IAEA
safeguards shall be followed, any violation of IAEA
safeguards is a violation of Article III of the NPT
and therefore a violation of the treaty. Thus, when
observers point out that the IAEA has no mandate to
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verify compliance with the NPT but only compliance
with IAEA safeguards agreements, this is at best
misleading since failure to comply with an applicable
IAEA safeguards agreement is a violation of the NPT.
As set forth in the IAEA’s enabling statute, IAEA
safeguards are “designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment,
facilities, and information made available by the
Agency or at its request or under its supervision or
control are not used in such a way as to further any
military purpose . . .” (see Appendix, IAEA’s Enabling
Statute).
The IAEA’s enabling statute gives the IAEA certain
rights. Among them is the right to establish an inspection
system that is designed to ensure that the purpose of
the safeguards is met. IAEA document INFCIRC/153,
which details the safeguards obligations of states that
are party to the NPT, provides a technical definition of
the object of IAEA safeguards, namely, “the objective
of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
of other explosive devices or for purposes unknown,
and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early
detection.”1
KEY SAFEGUARDS TERMS
The key terms of the objective of safeguards were
not defined in INFCIRC/153; this task was given
to the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards
Implementation (SAGSI) of the IAEA, an advisory
group of technical safeguards experts.2
SAGSI considered the problem of quantifying the
safeguards objective for several years. It identified
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four terms appearing either explicitly or implicitly in
the statement of the objective just quoted as in need
of quantitative expression. These were: significant
quantities, timely detection, risk of detection, and
the probability of raising a false alarm. It defined the
associated numerical parameters (significant quantity,
detection time, detection probability, and false alarm
probability) as detection goals.3
In 1977, SAGSI submitted numerical estimates for
these goals to the Director of Safeguards of the IAEA.
The values recommended by SAGSI for the detection
goals were carefully described as provisional guidelines
for inspection planning and for the evaluation of
safeguards implementation, not as requirements, and
were so accepted by the Agency.4 They have since been
incorporated in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, excerpts
of which are reproduced below and in the Appendix.
Significant Quantity.
Significant quantity (SQ) is the approximate
amount of nuclear material for which the possibility
of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device
cannot be excluded. Significant quantities take into
account unavoidable losses due to conversion and
manufacturing processes and should not be confused
with critical masses.5 Significant quantity values
currently in use by the IAEA are given in Table 1.
In a previous Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) report, we argued that the IAEA’s SQ values
for direct use materials are not technically valid or
defensible, and it was proposed that the SQ values for
direct use plutonium and HEU be reduced by a factor of
about eight.6 Table 2 gives the approximate plutonium
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Material

SQ

Direct Use Nuclear Material
8kg Pu

Pua
233

U

8kg 223U
25kg 235U

Highly enriched uranium [HEU]
(235U>20%)
Indirect Use Nuclear Material
U (235U < 20%)b

75kg 235U (or 20t natural U or 20 t
depleted U)

Th

20 t Th

a. For Pu containing less than 80 percent 238Pu.
b. Including low enriched natural and depleted uranium.

Table 1. Significant Quantities.7
WEAPON-GRADE

HIGHLY-ENRICHED

PLUTONIUM (kg)

URANIUM (kg)

Yield

Technical Capability

Technical Capability

(kt)

Low

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

1

3

1.5

1

8

4

2.5

5

4

2.5

1.5

11

6

3.5

10

5

3

2

13

7

4

20

6

3.5

3

16

9

5

Values rounded to the nearest 0.5 kilogram.

Table 2. NRDC Estimate of the Approximate Fissile
Material Requirements for Pure Fission Nuclear
Weapons.8
and HEU requirements for pure fission weapons as
estimated by NRDC. Regarding indirect use material,
we note that 375 kilograms (kg) of 20 percent-enriched
uranium, which contains one SQ (75kg of 235U), when
enriched, using a tails assay of 0.2 to 0.3 percent, yields
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79-80kg of 93.5 percent-enriched product, which is three
times larger than the SQ for direct use HEU. While it is
not the purpose of this chapter to reexamine the validity
of the SQ values, we simply note the obvious: if the SQ
values are substantially lowered, it could significantly
impact estimated conversion times.
Detection Time.
Detection time is the maximum time that may elapse
between diversion of a given amount of nuclear material
and detection of that diversion by IAEA safeguards
activities. Where there is no additional protocol in force
or where the IAEA has not drawn a conclusion of the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
in a state (see IAEA Safeguards Glossary, No. 12.25), it is
assumed that: (a) all facilities needed to clandestinely
convert the diverted material into components of a
nuclear explosive device exist in a state; (b) processes
have been tested (e.g., by manufacturing dummy
components using appropriate surrogate materials);
and (c) nonnuclear components of the device have been
manufactured, assembled, and tested. Under these
circumstances, detection time should correspond
approximately to estimated conversion times (see
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, No. 3.13). Longer detection
times may be acceptable in a state where the IAEA has
drawn and maintained a conclusion of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities. Detection
time is one factor used to establish the timeliness
component of the IAEA inspection goal (see IAEA
Safeguards Glossary, No. 3.24).9 [Emphasis added]
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Conversion Time.
Conversion time is the time required to convert
different forms of nuclear material to the metallic
components of a nuclear explosive device. Conversion
time does not include the time required to transport
diverted material to the conversion facility or to
assemble the device, or any subsequent period. The
diversion activity is assumed to be part of a planned
sequence of actions chosen to give a high probability
of success in manufacturing one or more nuclear
explosive devices with minimal risk of discovery
until at least one such device is manufactured.10 The
conversion time estimates applicable at present under
these assumptions are provided in Table 3.
Beginning Material Form
Pu, HEW, or

233

Conversion Time

U metal

Order of days (7-10)

PuO2, PU(NO3)4 or other pure Pu compounds; HEU
or 233U oxide or other pure U compounds; MOX or
other nonirradiated pure mixtures containing Pu, U
(233U+235U>20%); Pu, HEU, and/or 233U in scrap or
other miscellaneous impure compounds
PU, HEU, or 233U in irradiated fuel
U containing <20%

235

U and

233

Order of months (1-3)

U; Th

Order of months (3-12)

a This range is not determined by any single factor, but the pure Pu and U
compounds will tend to be at the lower end of the range and the mixtures and scrap
at the higher end.

Table 3. Estimated Material Conversion Times for
Finished Pu or U Metal Components.11
IAEA Timeliness Detection Goal.
The IAEA timeliness detection goal is the target
detection times applicable to specific nuclear material
categories (see IAEA Safeguards Glossary, No. 4.24).
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These goals are used for establishing the frequency
of inspections (see No. 11.16) and safeguards activities
at a facility or a location outside facilities during a
calendar year to verify that no abrupt diversion (see
IAEA Safeguards Glossary, No. 3.10) has occurred.
Where there is no additional protocol in force or where
the IAEA has not drawn and maintained a conclusion
of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in a state (see IAEA Safeguards Glossary, No.
12.25), the detection goals are as follows:
• One month for unirradiated direct use
material,
• Three months for irradiated direct use material,
and
• One year for indirect use material.
Longer timeliness detection goals may be applied in
a state where the IAEA has drawn and maintained
a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in that state.12
With regard to the IAEA’s timeliness detection
goals, it should be noted that the Agency’s resource
limitations and resistance of member countries keep the
actual inspection frequencies lower than the goals.13
ADEQUACY OF CONVERSION TIMES AND
DETECTION GOALS
We now turn to the issue of the adequacy of the
IAEA’s estimated conversion times set forth in Table
3 above, and the timeliness detection goals set forth in
paragraph 3.20, of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary. We
begin with unirradiated direct use material.
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Unirradiated Direct Use Material in Metal Form.
As seen in Table 3, the IAEA estimates that it will
take a state on the “order of days (7-10)” to manufacture
finished nuclear weapon components from plutonium,
HEU or 233U metal, where it is assumed that: (a) all
facilities needed to clandestinely convert the diverted
material into components of a nuclear explosive device
exist in a state; (b) processes have been tested (e.g., by
manufacturing dummy components using appropriate
surrogate materials); and (c) that non-nuclear
components of the device have been manufactured,
assembled, and tested.
This is not an unreasonable estimate based on the
time it took the United States to fabricate finished
HEU components for the Little Boy device dropped on
Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. Consistent with
the IAEA assumption, the non-nuclear components of
Little Boy were assembled and tested before the all of
the HEU was produced.
The HEU metal was shipped from Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, to Los Alamos, New Mexico, in batches
over a period of about a year. In the 6-week period from
June 16 to July 28, Oak Ridge produced about 22kg of
HEU. This was shipped to Los Alamos in batches of a
few kilograms each. We estimate that the cumulative
Oak Ridge production of HEU through July 14, 1945,
was about 67kg, only 3kg in excess of what went into
Little Boy. Thus, allowing for some losses, it is unlikely
that Oak Ridge had produced enough HEU for Little
Boy before that date.
The shipments of HEU metal from Oak Ridge to Los
Alamos by road and rail typically took about 2 days.
The shipment of the last six HEU finished components
departed in three cargo planes carrying two components
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each from Kirtland Field, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
on the morning of July 26, and, after stopping in San
Francisco, arrived at Tinian in the Mariana Islands,
South Pacific, on July 28. Thus, allowing for 2 days
to transport the HEU metal from Oak Ridge to Los
Alamos, Los Alamos must have fabricated the last of
the HEU components in 9 days or less.
Little Boy was a gun-assembly type weapon requiring
more than one SQ of HEU. The IAEA assumptions are
based on an SQ value of 25kg of HEU, which implies
an implosion device that would require the casting and
machining of only one or two components. Moreover,
although it took a relatively long time to enrich the
HEU for Little Boy, this longer HEU production period
is not a factor to be considered here. In sum, if we are
correct that it took 9 days or less for Los Alamos to
fabricate a few HEU Little Boy components in 1945,
then 7-10 days is also reasonable assumption for the
time it would take today for a state to manufacture
finished components for an implosion-type weapon
from an SQ amount of HEU.
Although the estimated detection time for direct
use material appears reasonable, what is puzzling
is that the timeliness detection goal is much longer,
namely 1 month according to paragraph 3.20 of the
IAEA Glossary (reproduced above). Moreover, both the
estimated detection time and the timeliness detection
goal, in our view, are far too short to allow time for
diplomatic pressure to prevent the non-weapon state
from fabricating a weapon. In fact, there is insufficient
time to the IAEA staff to develop its report to the
Board of Governors of the IAEA and for the Board of
Governors to report to the UN Security Council.
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Unirradiated Direct Use Material in Chemical
Compounds and Mixtures.
As seen in Table 3, the IAEA estimates that it
will take a state on the “order of weeks (1-3)” to
manufacture finished components from unirradiated
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, or from other compounds
or mixtures containing plutonium, HEU or 233U, again
assuming that: (a) all facilities needed to clandestinely
convert the diverted material into components of a
nuclear explosive device exist in a state; (b) processes
have been tested (e.g., by manufacturing dummy
components using appropriate surrogate materials);
and (c) non-nuclear components of the device have
been manufactured, assembled, and tested.
Certainly, the lower end of this range—that is, on
the order of a week—is a reasonable estimate of the
time required in that it assumes that the time to convert
the compound to a metal does not add appreciably to
the time estimated to convert the metal to a finished
component shape.
The upper end of the range—on the order of 3
weeks—seems unnecessarily generous. For example,
plutonium metal can be prepared by calcium reduction
of plutonium fluorides or oxides in induction-heated
MgO crucibles, under an inert atmosphere of helium or
argon.14 Preparation of plutonium metal by reduction
of a halide with an alkali or alkaline earth metal in
a sealed pressure bomb is the only facet of chemical
processing of plutonium that has remained unchanged
over the years.15 Using this technique, a few SQs of
plutonium could readily be prepared in a small hot cell
in a few days’ time.
In any case, whether starting with unirradiated
direct use material in metal or compound form, setting
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a timeless detection goal of 1 month is longer than
any conservative estimate of the conversion time and
shorter than the time required to bring diplomatic
pressure to bear to halt the program.
Pu, HEU or 233U in Irradiated Fuel.
Here the IAEA estimates a conversion time of on
the “order of months (1–3)” and the IAEA’s timeliness
detection goal is 3 months. Assuming the plutonium
or HEU is in irradiated fuel, the state must reprocess
the fuel, convert the product into metal, and fabricate
finished components. With regard to the reprocessing
step, there are three diversion cases to consider: 1) the
state already operates one or more reprocessing plants,
pilot plants, or hot cells under IAEA safeguards; 2) it
possesses a clandestine pilot reprocessing plant or hot
cell; or 3) the state constructs a small “quick and dirty”
reprocessing plant. Another important consideration
is the spent fuel cooling time, that is, the time period
between the removal of the irradiated fuel from the
reactor and commencement of reprocessing.
Due to the high radioactivity levels and high thermal
heat output associated with high burnup spent fuel
from power reactors, the irradiated fuel is cooled 180
days or longer prior to reprocessing. For low burnup
fuel, e.g., fuel elements or target materials removed
from plutonium production reactors, the irradiated fuel
can be processed after a shorter cooling period. In the
United States during the Manhattan Project, the first
fuel elements removed from the Hanford production
reactors in late-1944 and early-1945 were chemically
processed after only about 32-50 days of cooling time.
Plutonium product was removed within a week of
initiation of the batch processing.
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If a state such as Japan already operates a declared
reprocessing plant under safeguards, it could divert
limited quantities of separated plutonium from plant
operations with a low probability of detection by the
IAEA, absent an informer. The inventory difference
(ID) of reprocessing plants is on the order of 0.5 to 1
percent of the fuel throughput. High burnup, light
water reactor (LWR), spent fuel typically contains
approximately 1 percent plutonium. Thus, a pilot-scale
reprocessing plant, if it processed 80 tons (t) of LWR
spent fuel per year, would have an annual cumulative
ID of about 0.5 to one SQ of plutonium. Some largescale commercial reprocessing plants have a capacity
that is 10 times greater.
Thus, a state with a large declared reprocessing
plant under IAEA safeguards could divert an SQ of
plutonium without detection over a period of about 1
month. A state with a pilot–size plant could divert the
same quantity over a period of 1 year.
Some advanced reprocessing technologies contemplate not completely separating the plutonium from
some actinides and fission products. While this
should make it more difficult for an insider to divert
plutonium, it would not represent a significant added
barrier to a state effort to divert plutonium. Given that
the added actinides and fission products would not
add significantly to the plutonium mass, the state could
divert the spiked plutonium to a small clandestine hot
cell for additional processing. The processing time to
recover an SQ of plutonium should take only a few
days.
If a state does not have an existing declared
reprocessing facility, it has the option of developing a
clandestine capability, such as the Israeli facility hidden
for years below the Dimona reactor. Alternatively, the
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state could attempt to develop a “quick and dirty”
reprocessing capability. The feasibility of clandestine
reprocessing of LWR fuel has been addressed by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory,16 Sandia Laboratories,17
and others, and these studies have been reviewed by
Marvin Miller.18
“The [Oak Ridge] study concluded the [reprocessing]
plant could be in operation 4 to 6 months from the start
of construction, with the first 10 kilograms of plutonium
metal (about two bomb’s worth) produced about 1
week after start of operation. Once in operation, the
small plant could process about one PWR [pressurized
water reactor] assembly per day, which translates into
production of about 5 kilograms of plutonium per
day.”19
The 1966 Sandia study estimated the preparation
lead-time for producing the first kilograms of
plutonium employing a staff of six technicians was
about 8 months.20
In sum, if a state has a declared pilot-scale or larger
reprocessing plant, the conversion time should be the
same as for unirradiated compounds of direct use
materials, since the state could divert unirradiated
compounds of direct use materials without being
detected by the IAEA.
Low Enriched Uranium.
Here the IAEA estimates a conversion time of on
the “order of months (3-12)” and the IAEA’s timeliness
detection goal is 1 year. The enrichment work,
measured in kilograms of separative work units (kg
SWU, often abbreviated SWU), required to obtain one
SQ of HEU is a function of 235U concentration of the
uranium feed, product, and tails. Marvin Miller has
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identified and reviewed the major proliferation risks
associated with centrifuge enrichment plants: (1) secret
use of a declared, safeguarded low-enriched uranium
(LEU) plant to produce HEU or exceeds LEU covertly;
(2) construction and operation of a clandestine plant
to produce HEU; and (3) conversion of a declared,
safeguarded LEU plant to HEU production following
breakout.21
According to Miller:
(1) The basic “Hexapartite” safeguards approach
for centrifuge plants was developed during the early
1980s by a group of six countries—Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (the URENCO
states), and the United States, Japan, and Australia. It
consists of two sets of activities:
(a) verifying the uranium material balance by
measuring the amount of uranium as UF6 introduced
into the plant as feed material and withdrawn as
enriched product and tails; and.
(b) verifying that no material beyond the
declared enrichment level, in particular, no HEU is
being produced.
While (a) doesn’t require inspector access to the
cascade halls where the centrifuges are installed, (b)
does, and the inspection procedures were designed
to provide an element of surprise in order to deter
production of HEU between routinely scheduled
inspections, while also accounting for the plant
operator’s concern about the inspector’s gaining
knowledge of proprietary information relating to the
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construction and operation of the centrifuges. Various
technical difficulties have been encountered over the
years in applying (b) at specific plants. But confidence
in the IAEA’s ability to detect illicit production of
HEU has improved dramatically since 1995 with the
introduction of sampling and subsequent analysis of
particles deposited on surfaces in the cascade area as
a standard safeguards tool. Since release of particles
to the plant environment is difficult to avoid and the
analysis is highly precise, environmental sampling
has emerged as a significant deterrent to clandestine
HEU production in a declared LEU plant. On the other
hand, current safeguards procedures cannot detect the
production of LEU in excess of what the plant operator
declares to be the normal production rate,22 and this
can significantly increase the difficulty of detecting a
clandestine plant, as we discuss next.
(2) The much smaller energy consumption and
process area characteristic of centrifuge plants
compared to gaseous diffusion plants of the same
separative capacity make the former much more
difficult to detect. For example, a centrifuge plant with
a separative capacity of 5,000 SWU/yr—sufficient to
produce 25kg/yr of 90 percent enriched uranium—
would likely require less than 100kW of power and have
a “footprint” of about 500m2.23 Moreover, detection by
wide area environmental monitoring is also difficult
because emissions from a centrifuge plant normally
are very small. The plant operates under high-vacuum
conditions so that leaks primarily lead to an inflow of
air into the centrifuge equipment, not to a significant
release of UF6 from the system into the environment.
Finally, as noted above, if excess LEU is used as feed
for the clandestine plant instead of natural uranium,
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the size of plant required to produce a given amount of
HEU product is reduced significantly, especially if the
tails concentration is also increased.
(3) There is the possibility of breakout, i.e.,
takeover by a state of a declared, safeguarded LEU
centrifuge plant, and reconfiguration of the plant to
produce weapons grade uranium.24 Because of its high
separation factor compared to the gaseous diffusion
process, the inventory of a centrifuge plant is much
smaller than a diffusion plant, and so is the equilibrium
time, i.e., the time required to achieve full production
after plant startup or subsequent modification, e.g.,
from production of LEU to production of HEU by
recycling the product material back as feed. Typically,
the equilibrium time for LEU centrifuge and diffusion
plants are on the order of hours and months,
respectively.
As noted by Gilinsky et al., the SWU requirements
to obtain one SQ of HEU can be reduced substantially
if a state already has access to, and can successfully
divert fresh LWR fuel.25 In the examples given in Table
4, using 4 percent-enriched feed (typical of LWR fresh
fuel) and operating the enrichment plant at a high tails
assay—for example 2 percent 235U—the separative work
requirements are reduced by more than 80 percent of
that required if natural uranium feed (0.711% 235U)
were used.
The enrichment plant capacity (SWU/y) is a product
of the number of stages and the capacity of each stage.
For a centrifuge enrichment plant, the capacity of a
single stage is a function of length of the rotor and its
peripheral speed.26 In Table 4, we also calculate the
number
of
centrifuge
stages
required
to
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Product (% 235U)
Feed (%

235

U)

93.5

93.5

93.5

0.711

0.711

4.0

4.0

0.25

0.5

0.25

2.0

Enrichment Work (kg SWU)

5,422

4,021

1,769

894

U Feed (tons)
1.144

5,057

11.02

0.622

2,711

2,011

885

Tails (%

235

U)

93.5

Centrifuges Required to Obtain 1 SQ/y27
2 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (P1)

447

5 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (P2)

1,084

804

354

179

10 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (Russia)

542

402

177

89

40 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (URENCO)

136

101

44

22

300kg SWU/y/centrifuge (U.S. R & D)

18

13

6

3

Table 4. Enrichment Requirements to Obtain One
SQ of HEU.
obtain one SQ per year of 93.5 percent-enriched HEU.
As seen from Table 4, depending primarily on the feed
enrichment and the efficiency of each stage, the number
of centrifuge stages required to obtain one SQ if HEU
per year varies from a few to a few thousand.
We know from events in Iran (and North Korea),
a small centrifuge enrichment plant with up to a few
hundred centrifuge stages can be readily hidden from
the IAEA and from foreign intelligence efforts. A state
can acquire the necessary technology and construct
and operate a small clandestine centrifuge plant with
little risk of detection, and the probability of detection
is substantially reduced if the state has a declared
centrifuge plant under safeguards.
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Assuming a state may have a small clandestine
enrichment plant, the conversion time could be on the
order of weeks to months, depending on the number
of size of the plant and the technology employed.
CONCLUSIONS
IAEA safeguards are inadequate for achieving the
objective of timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to
the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
The IAEA’s SQ values are technically erroneous
and excessive.
For unirradiated direct use material in metal form,
the IAEA’s estimated conversion time (7-10 days) is
adequate, but the timeliness detection goal (1 month)
is too long, and timely warning cannot be achieved.
Nonweapon states should not be permitted to possess
an SQ of unirradiated direct use material in metal
form.
For unirradiated direct use material in chemical
compounds and mixtures, the IAEA’s estimated
conversion time is on the order of weeks (1-3). The
lower end of this range is adequate, but the upper end
appears too generous. The timeliness detection goal (1
month) is too long, and the timely detection cannot be
achieved. Non-weapon states should not be permitted
to possess an SQ of unirradiated direct use material in
the form of chemical compounds or mixtures.
For plutonium, HEU or 233U in irradiated fuel, the
IAEA’s estimated conversion time (1-3 months) is
adequate. However, if a state possesses a safeguarded
pilot-size or larger reprocessing plant, a state can divert
SQs of separated plutonium from plant operations
with a low probability of detection by the IAEA absent
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an informer. If a state has a declared pilot-scale or
larger reprocessing plant, the conversion time should
be the same as for unirradiated compounds of direct
use materials.
Non-weapon states should not be permitted to
possess pilot-scale or larger reprocessing plants.
When conducted in non-weapon states, research on
reprocessing and transmutation related technologies,
including those that are unlikely to ever be
commercialized, simply train cadres of experts in
actinide chemistry and plutonium metallurgy, a
proliferation concern in its own right. The hot cells,
used for on-hands research, provide readily available
facilities for separation of plutonium and fabrication
of plutonium components for weapons. Thus, smaller
reprocessing activities, and research and development
on transmutation related technologies, should not be
permitted in non-weapon states.
For indirect use material, such as low-enriched
uranium, the IAEA’s estimated conversion time is on
the order of months (3-12). The lower end of this range
is adequate, but the upper end appears too generous.
Small gas centrifuge plants can be readily hidden from
IAEA inspectors and foreign intelligence forces. If a state
is permitted to possess a safeguarded enrichment plant,
it can be used as a cover for procuring components and
materials needed for a small clandestine plant. A state
possessing a safeguarded centrifuge enrichment plant
can rapidly reconfigure the plant to produce HEU.
Also, a state may have a small clandestine enrichment
plant. In either case, the conversion time could be
on the order of weeks to months, depending on the
number of and size of the plants and the technology
employed.
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Even if the IAEA’s timeliness detection goal of
1 year is met, this is unlikely to provide “timely
warning.” Consequently, enrichment plants should
not be permitted in non-weapon states.
In sum, our recommended conversion times are
given in Table 5. The detection goals should be the
lower end of the conversion time range in each case.
Beginning Material Form

Conversion Time

Pu, HEW, or 233U metal

Order of days (7-10)

PuO2 PU(NO3)4 or other pure Pu compounds; HEU
or 233U oxide or other pure U compounds; MOX or
other nonirradiated pure mixtures containing PU, U
(233U+235U>20%); Pu, HEU, and/or 233U in scrap or other
miscellaneous impure compounds

Order of days (7-10)

PU, HEU, or 233U in irradiated fuel State without declared
reprocessing Non-weapon states are no permitted to
possess reprocesing plants

Order of months (1-3)

U containing <20% 235U and 233U; Th State without
declared enrichment Non-weapon states are not
permitted to posses enrichment plants

Order of weeks to
months

Table 5. Recommended Material Conversion Times
for Finished Pu or U Metal Components.
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APPENDIX
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed
July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970. All
non-weapon state parties to the NPT are required to
comply with International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, as indicated under Article III of the
NPT Treaty:
III.1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards,
as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated
and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Agency’s safeguards system, for
the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Procedures for the safeguards required by
this article shall be followed with respect to
source or special fissionable material whether
it is being produced, processed or used in any
principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this
article shall be applied to all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of such State,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its
control anywhere. (Emphasis added)
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The following nuclear weapon states are NOT
parties to the NPT:
• Israel
• Pakistan
• India
• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK
or North Korea).
The first three, Israel, India, and Pakistan, are known to
have nuclear weapons and have never been signatories
to the NPT. The DPRK is believed to have nuclear
weapons and has declared that it has possesses nuclear
weapons. On January 10, 2003, DPRK announced that it
was withdrawing from the NPT effective immediately.
All other states of any consequence are members of
the NPT, and with the exception of the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, all are
non-weapon states subject to IAEA safeguards.
IAEA’S ENABLING STATUTE
The IAEA was established in 1957, 11 years
prior to the inception of the NPT. Under Article III,
paragraph A. 5, of its enabling statute, the Agency is
authorized:
To establish and administer safeguards
designed to ensure that special fissionable
and other materials, services, equipment,
facilities, and information made available
by the Agency or at its request or under its
supervision or control are not used in such a
way as to further any military purpose; and to
apply safeguards, at the request of the parties,
to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement,
144

or at the request of a State, to any of that
State’s activities in the field of atomic energy;
(Emphasis added)
The safeguards system is defined primarily in
Article XII of the IAEA Statute. Article XII of the IAEA
Statute states in part:
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other
arrangement where the Agency is requested by
the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the
Agency shall have the following rights and
responsibilities to the extent relevant to the
project or arrangement:
1. To examine the design of specialized
equipment and facilities, including nuclear
reactors, and to approve it only from the
viewpoint of assuring that it will not further
any military purpose, that it complies with
applicable health and safety standards, and
that it will permit effective application of the
safeguards provided for in this article;
...
5. To approve the means to be used for the
chemical processing of irradiated materials
solely to ensure that this chemical processing
will not lend itself to diversion of materials
for military purposes and will comply with
applicable health and safety standards; to
require that special fissionable materials
recovered or produced as a by-product be used
for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency
safeguards for research or in reactors, existing
or under construction, specified by the member
or members concerned; and to require deposit
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with the Agency of any excess of any special
fissionable materials recovered or produced as
a by-product over what is needed for the abovestated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of
these materials, provided that thereafter at the
request of the member or members concerned
special fissionable materials so deposited with
the Agency shall be returned promptly to the
member or members concerned for use under
the same provisions as stated above.
6. To send into the territory of the recipient
State or States inspectors, designated by the
Agency after consultation with the State or
States concerned, who shall have access at all
times to all places and data and to any person
who by reason of his occupation deals with
materials, equipment, or facilities which are
required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as
necessary to account for source and special
fissionable materials supplied and fissionable
products and to determine whether there is
compliance with the undertaking against
use in furtherance of any military purpose
referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of article Xl,
with the health and safety measures referred
to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and
with any other conditions prescribed in the
agreement between the Agency and the State
or States concerned. Inspectors designated
by the Agency shall be accompanied by
representatives of the authorities of the State
concerned, if that State so requests, provided
that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed
or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their
functions; (Emphasis added)
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IAEA AGREEMENTS WITH MEMBER STATES
The IAEA administers its safeguards requirements pursuant to agreements that the IAEA has with
member states.
As of November 2004, there were 138 member
states and 65 intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations worldwide having formal agreements
with the Agency, and 232 safeguards agreements in
force in 148 states (and with Taiwan) involving 2,363
safeguards inspections performed in 2003.1 The DPRK
joined the IAEA in 1974, but withdrew its membership
on June 13, 1994; and Cambodia, which joined the
IAEA in 1958, withdrew its membership on March 26,
2003.
Since the IAEA was established in 1957,
over the years the IAEA safeguards requirements
have been upgraded and strengthened. The more
explicit requirements are set forth in a series of IAEA
Information Circulars, the most important of which are
INFCIRC/26 (the Agency’s Safeguards approved by the
Board of Governors on January 31, 1961), INFCIRC/66
(designed to be applied in any state that concluded a
safeguards agreement), and INFCIRC/153 (used as a
basis for agreements with states that are parties to the
NPT-and the Additional Protocol.
The “Basic Undertaking” of IAEA safeguards
agreements with other parties is currently set forth in
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972:
The Agreement should contain, in accordance
with Article III.l of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons), an
undertaking by the State to accept safeguards,
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement,
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on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within its territory,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its
control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose
of verifying that such material is not diverted
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. (Emphasis added)
COMPREHENSIVE, OR FULL-SCOPE,
SAFEGUARDS
A comprehensive safeguards agreement is an
IAEA safeguards agreement that applies safeguards
on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a state.
These are primarily safeguards agreements pursuant
to the NPT, concluded between the IAEA and nonnuclear–weapon state (NNWS) parties as required
by Article III.1 of the NPT, but they also include
agreements pursuant to the Tlatelolco Treaty; the sui
generic agreement between Albania and the IAEA;
and the quadripartite safeguards agreement between
Argentina, Brazil, the Brazil-Argentine Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),
and the IAEA. As of July 19, 2005, 37 NNWS parties to
the NPT have not yet brought into force comprehensive
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Most of these
37 countries do not have significant nuclear facilities.2
IAEA INFORMATION CIRCULAR 153
INFCIRC/153 places constraints on the agency’s
safeguards implementation:
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IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS
The Agreement should provide that safeguards
shall be implemented in a manner designed:
a. To avoid hampering the economic and
technological development of the state or
international cooperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear activities, including international
exchange nuclear material 2);
b. To avoid undue interference in the state’s
peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in
the operation of facilities; and
c. To be consistent with prudent management
practices required for the economic and safe
conduct of nuclear activities.
INFCIRC/153 defines the:
OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS
28. The Agreement should provide that the
objective of safeguards is the timely detection
of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities to
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of
other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by
the risk of early detection.
29. To this end the Agreement should
provide for the use of material accountancy
as a safeguards measure of fundamental
importance, with containment and surveillance
as important complementary measures.
30. The Agreement should provide that the
technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification
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activities shall be a statement, in respect of each
material balance area, of the amount of material
unaccounted for over a specific period, giving
the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.
Also, INFCIRC/153 calls for a:
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR
AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
31. The Agreement should provide that the
state shall establish and maintain a system
of accounting for and control of all nuclear
material subject to safeguards under the
Agreement, and that such safeguards shall
be applied in such a manner as to enable the
Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has
been no diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, findings of the
state’s system. The Agency s verification shall
include, inter alia, independent measurements
and observations conducted by the Agency in
accordance with the procedures specified in Part
II below. The Agency, in its verification, shall
take due account of the technical effectiveness
of the state’s system.
IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY
The IAEA Safeguards Glossary includes the definitions
of several terms that are important to a discussion of
the adequacy of the IAEA’s safeguards with respect to
timely warning, namely “diversion rate,” “conversion
time,” “significant quantity,” and “detection time”:3
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3.10. Diversion rate—the amount of nuclear
material which could be diverted in a given
unit of time. If the amount diverted is 1 SQ
or more (see No. 3.14) of nuclear material in a
short time (i.e., within a period that is less than
the material balance period [see No. 6.47]), it
is referred to as an “abrupt” diversion. If the
diversion of 1 SQ or more occurs gradually
over a material balance period, with only small
amounts removed at any one time, it is referred
to as a “protracted” diversion.
3.13. Conversion time—the time required
to convert different forms of nuclear material
to the metallic components of a nuclear
explosive device. Conversion time does not
include the time required to transport diverted
material to the conversion facility, or to
assemble the device, or any subsequent period.
The diversion activity is assumed to be part of
a planned sequence of actions chosen to give
a high probability of success in manufacturing
one or more nuclear explosive devices with
minimal risk of discovery until at least one
such device is manufactured. The conversion
time estimates applicable at present under
these assumptions are provided in Table I.
[Reproduced as Table 3 above.]
3.14. Significant quantity (SQ)—the
approximate amount of nuclear material for
which the possibility of manufacturing a
nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
Significant quantities take into account
unavoidable losses due to conversion and
manufacturing processes and should not be
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confused with critical masses. Significant
quantities are used in establishing the quantity
component of the IAEA inspection goal (see
No. 3.23). Significant quantity values currently
in use are given in Table II. [Reproduced as
Table 1 above.]
3.15. Detection time—the maximum time
that may elapse between diversion of a given
amount of nuclear material and detection of
that diversion by IAEA safeguards activities.
Where there is no additional protocol in force
or where the IAEA has not drawn a conclusion
of the absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities in a state (see No. 12.25), it
is assumed: (a) that all facilities needed to
clandestinely convert the diverted material into
components of a nuclear explosive device exist
in a state; (b) that processes have been tested
(e.g., by manufacturing dummy components
using appropriate surrogate materials); and
(c) that nonnuclear components of the device
have been manufactured, assembled and
tested. Under these circumstances, detection
time should correspond approximately to
estimated conversion times (see No. 3.13).
Longer detection times may be acceptable in a
state where the IAEA has drawn and maintained
a conclusion of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities. Detection time
is one factor used to establish the timeliness
component of the IAEA inspection goal (see
No. 3.24).
3.20. IAEA timeliness detection goal—the
target detection times applicable to specific
nuclear material categories (see No. 4.24).
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These goals are used for establishing the
frequency of inspections (see No. 11.16) and
safeguards activities at a facility or a location
outside facilities during a calendar year, in
order to verify that no abrupt diversion (see
No. 3.10) has occurred. Where there is no
additional protocol in force or where the IAEA
has not drawn and maintained a conclusion of
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in a state (see No. 12.25), the detection
goals are as follows:
—One month for unirradiated direct use
material,
—Three months for irradiated direct use
material,
—One year for indirect use material.
Longer timeliness detection goals may be
applied in a state where the IAEA has drawn
and maintained a conclusion of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in
that state.
3.22. IAEA inspection goal—performance
targets specified for IAEA verification activities
at a given facility as required to implement
the facility safeguards approach (see No. 3.3).
The inspection goal for a facility consists of
a quantity component (see No. 3.23) and a
timeliness component (see No. 3.24). These
components are regarded as fully attained if all
the Safeguards Criteria (see No. 3.21) relevant
to the material types (see No. 4.23) and material
categories (see No. 4.24) present at the facility
have been satisfied, and all anomalies involving
1 SQ or more of nuclear material have been
resolved in a timely manner (see No. 3.26). (See
also Nos 12.23 and 12.25.)
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3.23. Quantity component of the IAEA
inspection goal—relates to the scope of
the inspection activities at a facility that are
necessary for the IAEA to be able to draw the
conclusion that there has been no diversion of 1
SQ or more of nuclear material over a material
balance period and that there has been no
undeclared production or separation of direct
use material at the facility over that period.
3.24. Timeliness component of the IAEA
inspection goal—relates to the periodic
activities that are necessary for the IAEA to
be able to draw the conclusion that there has
been no abrupt diversion (see No. 3.10) of 1
SQ or more at a facility during a calendar year.
(Emphasis added)
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ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
The Additional Protocol is a legal document
granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority
to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements.
A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to
provide assurance about both declared and possible
undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA
is granted expanded rights of access to information
and sites, as well as additional authority to use the
most advanced technologies during the verification
process.4
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world
learned about the extent of Iraq’s clandestine pursuit
of an advanced program to develop nuclear weapons.
The international community recognized that the
Agency’s international inspection system needed to
be strengthened in order to increase its capability to
detect secret nuclear programs. After 4 years of work
by the Secretariat of the Agency, an Agency committee
agreed on a Model Additional Protocol (the “Model
Protocol”) for strengthening nuclear safeguards.
The Model Protocol was approved by the Agency’s
Board of Governors in 1997. The Model Protocol was
designed to be used to amend existing safeguards
agreements to strengthen such safeguards by requiring
NNWS to provide, inter alia, broader declarations to
the Agency about their nuclear programs and nuclearrelated activities, and by expanding the access rights
of the Agency. The new safeguards measures become
effective in each state when it brings its protocol into
force.5
The Model Protocol requires states to report a
range of information to the Agency about their nuclear
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and nuclear-related activities and about the planned
developments in their nuclear fuel cycles. This
includes expanded information about their holdings of
uranium and thorium ores and ore concentrates and of
other plutonium and uranium materials not currently
subject to Agency safeguards, general information
about their manufacturing of equipment for enriching
uranium or producing plutonium, general information
about their nuclear fuel cycle-related research and
development activities not involving nuclear material,
and their import and export of nuclear material and
equipment.6
As of July 19, 2005, 69 states and Euratom have
ratified Additional Protocols.7 Thirty-three additional
states have signed, but not ratified Additional Protocols,
bringing the total number of states that have signed
to 102. The IAEA Board has approved Additional
protocols for six additional states that have not signed.
Notable countries that have not signed an Additional
Protocol include:
• Algeria (IAEA Board Approval)
• Argentina
• Belarus
• Brazil
• DPRK
• Egypt
• India
• Israel
• Pakistan
• Serbia and Montenegro
• Syria
• Thailand
• Venezuela
• Vietnam
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6 APPENDIX
1. Available from www.iaea.org/About/by_the_numbers.html.
2. The Republic of the Congo has two small research reactors,
at least one of which is not operable, and Niger is involved in
uranium mining.
3. IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Ed., International verification
Series, No. 3, Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), 2002.
4. Available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/
sg_overview.html.
5. Available from www.state.gov/t/np/trty/11757.htm.
6. Available from www.state.gov/t/np/trty/11757.htm.
7. The IAEA also applies safeguards, including the measures
foreseen in the Model Additional protocol, in Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 7
MANAGING SPENT FUEL
IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE ILLOGIC OF REPROCESSING
Frank von Hippel
I. SUMMARY
Since 1982, it has been U.S. policy, for nonproliferation and cost reasons, not to reprocess spent powerreactor fuel. Instead, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DoE) is to take spent power reactor fuel from U.S. nuclear utilities and place it in an underground federal
geological repository. The first U.S. repository is being
developed under Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Originally,
it was expected to begin taking fuel in 1998. However,
project management problems and determined
opposition by the State of Nevada are expected to
delay its opening for at least 2 decades.
U.S. nuclear utilities, therefore, have been pressing
the DoE to establish one or more centralized interim
storage facilities for their accumulating spent fuel. They
insist that a “nuclear renaissance,” i.e., investments
in new nuclear power plants, will not take place
in the United States until the federal government
demonstrates that it is able to remove the spent fuel
from the reactor sites. U.S. state governments resist
hosting interim spent fuel storage, however, out of
concern that the Yucca Mountain repository may never
be licensed, and that interim storage could become
permanent.
In Japan, a similar situation ultimately resulted in
Japan first shipping its spent fuel to France and the
159

United Kingdom to be reprocessed and then building
a $20 billion domestic reprocessing plant to which
spent fuel is now being shipped. In 2006, DoE similarly
proposed reprocessing as a “solution” to the U.S. spent
fuel problem.
Reprocessing of light-water-reactor fuel is being
conducted on a large scale in France and in the United
Kingdom. Much of the spent fuel that has been
reprocessed has been foreign, notably from Germany
and Japan, but since France and the United Kingdom
require that the radioactive waste from reprocessing
be returned to the country of origin, the need for
interim radioactive waste storage in their customer
countries was only postponed. In Japan, as part of
its agreement to host Japan’s domestic reprocessing
plant, Amori Prefecture has also agreed to accept
for interim storage the reprocessing waste returning
from Europe to Japan. Germany and other European
countries that were having their spent fuel reprocessed
in France, Russia and the UK have decided not to
renew their reprocessing contracts and instead plan to
store their spent fuel until a geological repository can
be sited. France plans to continue reprocessing most
of its domestic spent fuel and, like Japan, is storing the
resulting radioactive waste at its reprocessing site in
La Hague. The United Kingdom is shutting down its
reprocessing plants.
The construction of plants to reprocess light-waterreactor spent fuel was originally justified in the 1970s
as a way to obtain plutonium to start up liquid-sodiumcooled plutonium-breeder reactors that, in theory,
could extract 100 times more energy than current generation reactors from a ton of natural uranium. Breeder
reactors were expected to be dominant by the year
2000. The transition to breeder reactors did not occur,
however, because their capital costs, and those of
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reprocessing plants, were much higher than had
been projected and because global nuclear generating
capacity has grown to only a few percent of the level
that was projected in the 1970s. This, along with the
discovery of huge deposits of high-grade uranium ore
in Australia and Canada, has postponed, for at least a
century, concerns about shortages of low-cost uranium.
Today, where plutonium is being recycled, it is being
recycled as fuel for the light-water reactors (LWRs)
from which it was extracted. Even with the cost of
the reprocessing ignored as a “sunk cost,” plutonium
fuel is generally more costly than conventional lowenriched uranium (LEU) fuel.
Worldwide, about half of the plutonium being
separated is simply being stockpiled at the reprocessing
plants along with the associated high-level waste from
reprocessing. In effect, those sites are interim spentfuel storage sites—except that much of the spent fuel is
being stored in separated form. As of 2005, the global
stockpile of separated civilian plutonium had grown to
250 tons—sufficient to make more than 30,000 nuclear
weapons.
The DoE does not plan to recycle in existing LWRs
the plutonium that would, according to its proposal,
be separated from U.S. spent fuel. Instead, it proposes
that the federal government subsidize the construction
of tens of sodium-cooled fast-neutron “burner”
reactors—basically, except for changes in their core
design, the same sodium-cooled reactors that could not
compete economically as plutonium breeder reactors.
Plutonium—and, in the future, other less abundant
transuranic elements extracted from spent LWR fuel—
would be recycled repeatedly through these reactors
until, except for process losses, they were fissioned. The
principal advantage claimed from doing this would be
less long-lived waste per ton of spent fuel, and that the
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residue from more spent fuel could be stored in the
Yucca Mountain repository before a second repository
would be required. Such a program would be
enormously costly, however. The extra cost to deal with
just the spent fuel that has already accumulated in the
United States was estimated in 1996 by a U.S. National
Academy of Sciences study as “likely to be no less than
$50 billion and easily could be over $100 billion.” U.S.
nuclear utilities have made clear that these extra costs
would have to be funded by the federal government.
It is quite possible that the program would stop—as
previous efforts to commercialize sodium-cooled
reactors have—after only one or two “demonstration”
reactors have been built. In this case, the reprocessing
plant would simply become an interim storage site for
the reprocessed spent fuel—as has happened in the
United Kingdom and Russia after their breeder-reactor
commercialization programs failed.
The French nuclear combine, AREVA, has
proposed that it would be less costly to adopt the
French approach with a third-generation combined
reprocessing and plutonium-fuel fabrication plant in
the United States. This would involve recycling the
plutonium once in LWRs. The resulting spent “mixedoxide” (MOX) fuel, which would still contain twothirds as much plutonium as was used to fabricate it,
would then remain indefinitely in interim storage at the
reprocessing plant. Thus, once again, the reprocessing
plant would serve as a costly type of interim spent-fuel
storage.
U.S. Government policy turned against reprocessing
after India, in 1974, used the first plutonium recovered
by its U.S.-assisted reprocessing program to make a
nuclear explosion. Reprocessing makes plutonium
accessible to would-be nuclear-weapon makers—
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national or subnational—because it eliminates the
protection provided by the lethal gamma radiation
emitted by the fission products with which the
plutonium is mixed in spent fuel.
In early 2006, the DoE originally proposed, as a
more “proliferation-resistant” alternative to traditional
reprocessing, to keep the reprocessed plutonium mixed
with some or all of the minor transuranic elements in
the spent fuel. Some of these elements are much more
radioactive than the plutonium, but the radiation field
that would surround the mix would be one thousand
times less intense than the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) considers necessary to provide
significant “self protection.”
Recently, because of unresolved technical
difficulties with fabricating fuel containing some of the
minor transuranics, the DoE has sought “expressions of
interest” from industry in building a reprocessing plant
that would differ from conventional reprocessing only
in that it would leave some of the uranium mixed with
the plutonium. Pure plutonium could be separated out
from this mixture in an unshielded glove box.
In fact, the Bush administration does not argue that
any of the variants of reprocessing proposed by the DoE
are proliferation resistant enough to be deployed in
states of proliferation concern. It has therefore proposed
a “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” in which the
weapon states and Japan would provide reprocessing
services for other nonweapon states. This proposal has
already backfired in stimulating a revival of interest
in France in exporting reprocessing technology and in
South Korea in acquiring its own national reprocessing
capabilities. A similar Bush administration proposal
to confine enrichment to states that already have fullscale commercial enrichment plants has similarly
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stimulated a revival of interest in enrichment in half a
dozen nonweapon states.
In comparison, the U.S. policy, which is, in effect, that
“we don’t reprocess, and you don’t need to either,” has
been much more successful. During the 30-year period
it has been in force, no nonweapon state has initiated
commercial reprocessing, and seven countries have
abandoned their interest in civilian reprocessing. In
Belgium, Germany, and Italy domestic developments
were more important than U.S. policy. In Argentina,
Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, however, countries
that were interested in developing a nuclear-weapon
option, U.S. pressure played a key role. Today, Japan is
the only nonweapon state that engages in commercial
reprocessing.
The principal alternative to reprocessing, until U.S.
spent fuel can be shipped to Yucca Mountain or some
other centralized storage, is simply to keep older spent
fuel in dry storage on the reactor sites. There is ample
space inside the security fence at all U.S. power-reactor
sites to store all the spent fuel that will be discharged,
even if the reactor licenses are extended to allow them
to operate until they are 60 years old. At an operating
reactor site, the incremental safety and security risk
from dry stored fuel is negligible relative to the danger
from the fuel in the reactor core and the recently
discharged fuel in the spent fuel pool.
II. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, in response to congressional pressure to
start moving spent fuel off U.S. power-reactor sites,
DoE proposed U.S. Government-funded reprocessing
of the fuel and recycling of the recovered plutonium
and minor transuranic elements. If carried through,
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this proposal would reverse a nonproliferation policy
established by the Ford and Carter administrations
after India, in 1974, used the first plutonium it extracted
as part of a U.S.-supported reprocessing program, to
make a nuclear explosion. U.S. policy became to oppose
reprocessing where it was not already established and
not to reprocess domestically.1 Four years later, in
1981, the Reagan administration reversed the ban on
domestic reprocessing.2 By that time, however, U.S.
utilities had learned that reprocessing would be very
costly and were unwilling to pay for it.3
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 therefore
established that, in exchange for revenue from a tax
of 0.1 cent per nuclear-generated kilowatt-hour of
electricity, starting in 1998, DoE would take spent
power reactor fuel from U.S. nuclear utilities and place
it in an underground federal geological repository.4 In
1987, Congress decided to site the first such repository
under Yucca Mountain, Nevada.5 Project management
problems and determined opposition by the State of
Nevada, however, have delayed the licensing process.
Currently, DoE expects to receive a license for the
Yucca Mountain repository in 2017 at the earliest.6 U.S.
utilities therefore have been suing DoE for the costs
of building on-site dry-cask storage for the spent fuel
that would have been shipped to Yucca Mountain on
the originally contracted schedule. DoE has informed
Congress that the cost of settling these lawsuits is likely
to climb to $0.5 billion per year of delay in licensing the
Yucca Mountain repository.7 DoE has refused to share
the basis for this estimate because of the lawsuits.
The incremental cost for additional storage capacity,
after the nuclear power plants have paid for the
infrastructure for dry-cask storage (most have already)
probably will be somewhat less.8 In any case, the costs
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would be about the same if DoE had to pay for off-site
storage.
Even if the Yucca Mountain repository had been
licensed on time, however, DoE would have faced
another problem. When Congress selected Yucca
Mountain to be the site of the first U.S. geological spentfuel repository, it limited the quantity of commercial
spent fuel that could be stored there to 63,000 tons
until a second repository is in operation.9 U.S. nuclear
power plants will have discharged about 63,000 tons
of spent fuel by the end of 2008. DoE is therefore
faced with the challenge of siting a second repository
at a time when it has not yet succeeded in licensing
the first one. The Bush administration has submitted
legislation that would remove the 63,000-ton legislated
limit. It is believed that the physical capacity of Yucca
Mountain is great enough to hold the lifetime output
of the current generation of U.S. power reactors and
perhaps several times that amount (see below).
Because of the delay in the availability of the Yucca
Mountain repository, in 2005 Congress asked DoE to
develop a plan for centralized interim storage and
reprocessing of U.S. spent fuel. In May 2006, DoE
responded with a plan for a “Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership” (GNEP) as a part of which DoE would
build reprocessing plants and subsidize the construction
of tens of fast-neutron reactors to fission the recovered
plutonium and other transuranic elements. DoE argues
that, if the transuranics are fissioned and the 30-year
half-life fission products that generate most of the
heat in the resulting waste are stored on the surface
for some hundreds of years, then residues from much
more spent fuel could be stored in Yucca Mountain.
DoE’s Argonne National Laboratory, which
provides technical support for DoE’s research
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and development (R&D) program on advanced
reprocessing technologies, envisioned GNEP as
limited for many years to an R&D program, because
the technology for recycling the minor transuranics,
americium and curium, is not in hand. Paul Lisowski,
DoE’s Deputy Program Manager for GNEP, has
described transuranic recycle as a “major technical
risk area for GNEP.”10 Under congressional pressure to
move more quickly, however, DoE issued a request to
industry for “Expressions of Interest” in constructing a
conventional reprocessing plant and a demonstration
fast-neutron reactor as soon as possible. The most
likely contractor for construction of the reprocessing
plant, the French nuclear conglomerate AREVA,
advises the United States to defer recycling anything
other than plutonium and to build a larger-capacity
version of France’s reprocessing and plutonium
recycle infrastructure. Specifically, it proposes that
the plutonium in recently discharged U.S. spent fuel
be recycled once in LWRs and then the resulting spent
MOX fuel be stored at the reprocessing plant until the
advent of fast-neutron “burner” reactors.11
The U.S. House of Representatives insisted, however,
that a “first test of any site’s willingness to host such a
facility is its willingness to receive into interim storage
spent fuel in dry casks . . . Resolution of the spent fuel
problem cannot wait for the many years required for .
. . GNEP [which] will not be ready to begin large-scale
recycling of commercial spent fuel until the end of the
next decade, and the Yucca Mountain repository will
not open until roughly the same time. Such delays
are acceptable only if accompanied by interim storage
beginning this decade” [emphasis added].12
Thus the revived interest in the United States in
reprocessing is very much entangled in the perceived
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urgency of starting to move spent fuel off of reactor
sites.
The report that follows describes the history of
interest in civilian reprocessing, past experience with
reprocessing costs, estimates of its likely costs in the
United States with and without transmutation of the
recovered transuranic elements, and the debate over
the relative “proliferation resistance” of alternative
fuel cycles. It concludes that a much less costly and
proliferation resistant alternative to reprocessing and
transuranic recycle would be continued on-site storage
of U.S. spent fuel until either Yucca Mountain or some
other off-site location is available.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Fuel reprocessing was invented during World War
II as a way to recover plutonium for nuclear weapons
from irradiated reactor fuel. From the 1950s through
the 1970s, however, it was expected to play an essential
role in civilian nuclear power as well.
The Original Rationale for Reprocessing.
This expectation was based on the belief that
deposits of high-grade uranium ore were too scarce
to support nuclear power on a large scale based on a
“once-through” fuel cycle. The once-through fuel cycle,
as realized with the dominant LWR today, involves the
production of LEU containing about 4 percent U-235,
which is then irradiated until most of the U-235 and
about 2 percent of the U-238 have been fissioned, and
then is stored indefinitely (see Figure 1.)
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1 kg. natural uranium
993 grams U-238
7 grams U-235

Light
water
reactor

0.13 kg
LEU
125gm U-238
5 gm U-235

0.87 kg. depleted
uranium
868 grams U-238
2 grams U-235

0.13 kg spent fuel
121 gm U-238,
1 gm U-235
6.5 gm fission
products

The once-through fuel cycle fissions less than 1 percent of the atoms
in natural uranium, but it is less costly and more proliferation
resistant than fuel cycles involving reprocessing. If, in the future,
reprocessing becomes economical and otherwise acceptable, the
uranium that is not fissioned in the once-through fuel cycle will
still be available in the depleted uranium and spent fuel.13

Figure 1. The Once-Through Fuel Cycle.
This fuel cycle uses most of the fission energy stored
in the rare chain-reacting uranium isotope, U-235,
which makes up 0.7 percent of natural uranium. Atom
for atom, however, the U-238 atoms, which make up
virtually all of the remaining 99.3 percent of natural
uranium, contain as much potential fission energy. If
it were possible to fission the U-238, the amount of
energy releasable from a kilogram of natural uranium
therefore would be increased about 100-fold.
Plutonium breeder reactors. A month after the first
reactor went critical under the stands of the University
of Chicago’s football stadium, Leo Szilard, who first
conceived of the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction,
invented a reactor that could efficiently tap the energy
in U-238 by turning it into chain-reacting plutonium. In
a sodium-cooled reactor, a chain reaction in plutonium
would be sustained by “fast” neutrons that had not been
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slowed down as much by collisions with the sodium
coolant as neutrons are in collisions with the light
hydrogen atoms in the cooling water of conventional
reactors. Plutonium fissions by fast neutrons produce
enough neutrons so that it is possible on average to
convert more than one U-238 atom into plutonium per
plutonium atom destroyed.14 Such reactors are called
plutonium “breeder” reactors. Alternatively, they can
be thought of as U-238 burner reactors.
Being able to exploit the energy stored in the
nucleus of U-238 would make it possible to mine ores
containing about 1 percent as much natural uranium as
could be economically mined for the energy in U-235
alone. Indeed, even the 3 grams of uranium in a ton
of average crustal rock, if fissioned completely, would
release almost 10 times as much energy as is contained
in a ton of coal.15 The nuclear-energy pioneers therefore
talked of breeder reactors making it possible to “burn
the rocks” and thereby create a source of fission energy
that could power humanity for a million years.
The growth of global nuclear-power capacity slowed
dramatically in the 1980s, however, (see Figure 2) and
huge deposits of rich uranium ore were discovered in
Australia, Canada, and elsewhere. As a result, the longterm trend of natural-uranium costs has been down
rather than up (see Figure 3). Concerns about uranium
shortages linger on today in arguments that nuclear
power based on a “once-through,” LEU fuel cycle is not
“sustainable.” But such concerns about the inadequacy
of the world’s uranium resources have shifted to far
beyond 2050.16 In any case, depleted uranium and spent
fuel can be stored so as to be available in the event that
it becomes cost-effective to “mine” them for the energy
in their uranium-238.
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Global nuclear generating capacity grew rapidly in the 1970s,
leading to concerns that the supply of natural uranium might
not be able to keep up with the increasing demand, but growth
slowed in the 1980s as a result of the high capital costs of nuclearpower plants, the slowing growth in overall demand for electric
power and the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986.17

Figure 2. Global Nuclear Generating Capacity.
At the same time, the differences between the
capital and operating costs of water and sodium-cooled
reactors have remained discouragingly large. Many
experimental and demonstration breeder reactors
have been built around the world but none has been a
commercial success.18
Because of its compact core, Admiral Hyman G.
Rickover, the father of the U.S. nuclear navy, had
a sodium-cooled reactor built for the second U.S.
nuclear submarine, the Seawolf. After sea trials in 1957,
however, he had the reactor replaced by a pressurized
water reactor. His summary of his experience with the
sodium-cooled reactor pretty aptly characterizes the
problems that have been subsequently experienced
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Average and spot uranium prices in constant 2003 dollars,
1971-2005.19

Figure 3. Average and Spot Uranium Prices.
in attempts to commercialize sodium-cooled breeder
reactors. These reactors are “expensive to build,
complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown
as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult
and time-consuming to repair.”20
In anticipation of a need for large quantities of
separated plutonium to provide startup cores for the
breeder reactors, however, commercial reprocessing of
spent LWR fuel was launched in the 1960s. Spent LWR
fuel contains about 1 percent plutonium. Civilian pilot
and full-scale reprocessing plants have been built in
eight countries.21
Growing stockpiles of separated civilian plutonium. In
the absence of significant breeder-reactor capacity,
some countries—notably France and Germany—have
been recycling their separated plutonium back into
LWR fuel. The cost of fabricating MOX plutoniumuranium fuel for LWRs has been greater, however,
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than the value of the LEU fuel that has been saved.22 As
a result, there is no commercial demand for plutonium
as a fuel and large stockpiles have accumulated at the
reprocessing plants, along with the fission-product
waste from which the plutonium was separated. The
United Kingdom and Russia have stockpiled all the
plutonium that they have been separating from their
own spent fuel (and, in Russia’s case, also from the
spent fuel that Eastern and Central European utilities
have been shipping to Russia for reprocessing). Japan’s
separated plutonium has accumulated at the French
and U.K. reprocessing plants because local government
opposition in Japan has delayed its plutonium recycle
program for a decade. 23
Based on declarations of civilian plutonium stocks
to the IAEA, the global stock of separated civilian
plutonium has been growing by an average of 10 tons
per year since 1996 and was about 250 metric tons
as of the end of 2005 (see Table 1). This stockpile is
approximately the same size as the global stockpile
of plutonium that was produced for weapons during
the Cold War. About 100 tons of Russian, U.S., and
U.K. weapon plutonium have been declared excess,
increasing the global stockpile of excess separated
plutonium still further.
As an energy resource, the world stockpile of
separated civilian plutonium is not huge. It could fuel
the world’s fleet of power reactors for less than a year.
In terms of weapon equivalents, however, it is huge.
Using the IAEA’s 8-kg weapon equivalent, the 350
tons of civilian and excess weapons plutonium could
be converted into 40,000 first-generation (Nagasakitype) nuclear weapons. In 1998, a Royal Society report
observed that the possibility that the United Kingdom’s
very large stockpile of separated civilian plutonium
“might, at some stage, be accessed for illicit weapons
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production is of extreme concern.”24 If this is a concern
in the United Kingdom, it should be a concern in
any country with significant quantities of separated
plutonium.
Country

Civilian Stocks
(end of 2005)

Military Stocks
Declared Excess

Belgium

3.3 (2004)
(+0.4 tons in France)

--

China

0

0

France

81 (30 tons foreign owned)

0

Germany

12.5
(+ 15 tons in France & U.K.)

--

India

5.4

0

Japan

5.9
(+38 tons in France & U.K.)

--

Russia

41

34-50

Switzerland

Up to 2 tons in France & U.K.

0

U.K.

105 (27 foreign owned)
(+ 0.9 tons abroad)

4.4

U.S.

0

54

TOTALS

≈250 tons

92-108

Table 1. Global Stocks of Separated Civilian and
Excess Military Plutonium.25
(Metric Tons)
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Why Reprocessing Persists.
The United Kingdom plans to end its reprocessing
by 2012.26 But France continues, Japan put a big new
reprocessing plant into operation in 2006, and the Bush
administration has proposed that the United States
launch a domestic reprocessing program. Why, in the
face of adverse economics, does civilian reprocessing
persist?
NIMBY pressures. Reprocessing continued in
Western Europe and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s
in part because of a combination of local political
pressures to do something about the problem of spent
fuel accumulating at power-reactor sites and not-inmy-backyard (NIMBY) political opposition elsewhere
to geological repositories or central interim storage
facilities for spent fuel. Reprocessing provided an
interim destination for the spent fuel.
German and Japanese nuclear utilities largely
financed the French and British multi-billion-dollar
commercial reprocessing facilities.27 Their respite was
only temporary, however, because the reprocessing
contracts provided that the solidified fission-product
waste would be shipped back to the countries of origin.
Germany’s anti-nuclear movement finally succeeded
in persuading the SPD-Green coalition government
to stop reprocessing and eventually phase out nuclear
power in Germany and, in exchange, agreed to accept
the construction of dry-cask interim spent-fuel storage
at the reactor sites until the site of a geological repository
could be settled.28
Japan’s nuclear utilities went down a different
route. They persuaded the rural Amori Prefecture to
store for 50 years the radioactive waste being returned
from Europe as part of an agreement in which the
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prefecture accepted a large reprocessing plant in return
for receiving large payments from a central fund.
Japan’s nuclear utilities now are shipping their spent
fuel to the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The separated
plutonium and high-level waste will be stored there.
The high level waste, at least, will stay there until a
geological repository can be opened—hopefully
within the promised 50 years. The plutonium will be
added to Japan’s existing 40-ton stockpile of separated
plutonium that is eventually to be recycled in MOX
fuel.29
The Bush administration’s reprocessing proposal. U.S.
nuclear utilities, too, have been unable to ship their
accumulating spent fuel off their reactor sites. As
noted above, the reason is delays in the licensing of
DoE’s proposed geological repository under Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. U.S. utilities therefore have been
suing DoE for the costs of building additional on-site
dry-cask storage.
In 2005, in order to stop these accumulating lawsuits,
the U.S. Congress asked DoE to develop a plan for
centralized interim storage and reprocessing of U.S.
spent fuel.30 In May 2006, DoE responded with a plan
for building reprocessing plants. These reprocessing
plants would separate spent LWR fuel into four streams:
uranium, plutonium mixed with the other transuranic
elements (neptunium, americium, and curium); the
30-year-half-life fission products strontium-90 and
cesium-137; and other fission products. This is the socalled UREX+ fuel cycle (see Figure 4).
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The reprocessing plant (designated here as “LWR Spent Nuclear
Fuel Separation”) would be built as soon as possible. The reactors
shown here as “Advanced Burner Reactors” would be fastneutron reactors. Only one would be built at the same time as
the reprocessing plant. Others would be built on an unspecified
time schedule. After reprocessing, the 30-year half-life isotopes,
cesium-137 and strontium-90, which dominate the radiological
hazard until they decay away, would be placed in interim surface
storage for some hundreds of years. This raises the question as to
why the unreprocessed spent fuel should not be remain in interim
storage until fast-neutron reactors actually are built in significant
numbers. 31

Figure 4. The Department of Energy’s May 2006
Proposal for Reprocessing U.S. Spent Fuel and
Fissioning the Transuranics.
The transuranic elements would be recycled in
a hypothetical future generation of fast-neutron
“burner” reactors until—except for losses to various
waste streams—the transuranics were fissioned. The
designs of the burner reactors would be adapted from
the sodium-cooled reactors that previously were to be
commercialized as plutonium-breeder reactors, only
with the plutonium breeding uranium blankets around
their cores removed. The uranium would be stored or
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disposed of as waste. The strontium-90 and cesium-137
would be placed into interim surface storage for some
hundreds of years—presumably at the reprocessing
plant. Only the residual wastes after the separation
of these three streams would be placed in the Yucca
Mountain repository.
By removing in each cycle 99 percent of the
strontium-90 and cesium-137 and of the transuranic
elements, the main sources of radioactive decay heat
in the spent fuel on century and millennial scales,
respectively, the long-term temperature increase of
the rock around the disposal tunnels under Yucca
Mountain per ton of spent fuel would be decreased
about 20-fold. The residue from 20 times as much
spent fuel therefore could be emplaced in the mountain
before a new repository would have to be sited.32 The
political resistance to the siting of the Yucca Mountain
repository has been so fierce that this is considered by
DoE to be a major long-term advantage of the proposed
UREX + fuel cycle and a prerequisite for nuclear power
to have a long-term future in the United States.
The current limit on the capacity of Yucca Mountain,
however, is not physical but legislated. When Congress
selected Yucca Mountain as the nation’s first geological
radioactive waste repository, it wished to reassure
Nevada that it would not have to carry this burden
alone. As already noted, it therefore limited the quantity
of commercial spent fuel or reprocessing waste that
can be stored there to 63,000 tons “until such a time as
a second repository is in operation.” This amount of
spent fuel will have been discharged by U.S. reactors
by 2008. Hence the dire warnings of the necessity to site
repositories in additional states. In order to deal with
this problem, the Bush administration has proposed to
lift the legislated limit on the amount of spent fuel that
can be stored in Yucca Mountain. 33
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The federal government has not come to its own
conclusion about what the physical capacity of Yucca
Mountain might be. Using federal studies made as part
of the licensing process for the repository, however, the
utility industry’s Electrical Power Research Institute
estimates that there is enough capacity in the surveyed
areas of Yucca Mountain to store 260,000 -570,000
tons of spent fuel—and perhaps more. This is two to
five times as much as the current generation of U.S.
power reactors are expected to discharge over their
lifetimes.34
Because of the delay in licensing the repository
and the utility lawsuits, however, the Congressional
Appropriations Subcommittees that fund DoE have
been pressing DoE to begin moving spent fuel off
power reactor sites. In part at least in response to this
pressure, on August 7, 2006, DoE announced that it
was considering building a 2000-3000 ton per year
spent-fuel reprocessing plant based on the existing
technology being used in France, and a 2000 MWt
(thermal) sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactor of the
pool-type design used for France’s failed Superphénix
reactor. The reprocessing plant would be modified
so that some of the uranium in the spent fuel would
remain mixed with the plutonium. In this way, DoE
would honor its commitment to make reprocessing
more “proliferation resistant.” Plutonium can be
separated out of such a mixture very much more easily,
however, than from spent fuel (see Section V). The fast
reactor would be fueled initially by “conventional fast
reactor fuel,” i.e., a mix of plutonium and uranium.35
In January 2007, DoE announced that it planned to
lay the basis for a decision by the Secretary of Energy
to launch this program “no later than June 2008,” i.e.,
before President Bush leaves office.36
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Reprocessing 2000-3000 tons of LWR spent fuel
would separate 24-36 tons of plutonium per year.37 By
comparison, France’s failed 3000 MWt Supérphenix,
even operating on a once-through fuel cycle, would
have annually irradiated only about 2 tons of
plutonium.38 In effect, unless DoE adopts the French
strategy of recycling MOX in LWRs, its reprocessing
initiative would, for the foreseeable future, transform
almost all spent fuel shipped from U.S. nuclear-powerreactor sites into separated plutonium and high-level
waste stored at a reprocessing site. The compelling
reason for DoE initiative, therefore, appears to be, as in
Japan, to provide an alternative destination for spent
fuel until a geological radioactive waste repository
becomes available.
DoE’s reprocessing proposals are controversial
both because of their cost and their impact on U.S.
nonproliferation policy. We discuss these issues in the
next two sections.
IV. REPROCESSING AND RECYCLE COSTS
We consider the costs for two scenarios:
1. DoE’s May 2006 scenario in which all of the
transuranics in U.S. light-water spent fuel would
be separated and fissioned in fast-neutron reactors
in order to increase the number of reactor-years of
radioactive waste that can be accommodated in Yucca
Mountain. Although DoE has never mentioned it in
connection with its current proposal, these costs were
examined in depth in a massive National Academy of
Sciences study that was commissioned by DoE in the
early 1990s and published in 1996. 39
2. The cost and benefits of doing what is done in
France, which is to reprocess spent LWR fuel, mix the
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separated plutonium with depleted uranium to make
MOX fuel for LWRs, and then store the spent MOX
fuel. AREVA, the French nuclear conglomerate, has
launched a major effort to convince DoE to follow
this route, including by funding a study that claims
that reprocessing would not be much more costly in
the United States than building a second geological
repository for spent fuel. 40
The 1996 Study by the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences.
The 1996 U.S. National Academy of Sciences
study estimated the extra cost of a separations and
transmutation program for the first 62,000 tons of U.S.
spent fuel, relative to the cost of simply storing the spent
fuel in a repository, as “likely to be no less than $50
billion and easily could be over $100 billion”(1996$).41
For the estimated lifetime discharges of the current
generation of U.S. LWRs (101,000 to 129,000 tons, see
Figure 5), this cost would be approximately double.
Currently, U.S. nuclear utilities are paying into
DoE’s Nuclear Waste Fund 0.1 cents per kilowatt-hour
in exchange for DoE taking responsibility for disposing
of their spent fuel. Assuming that the average amount
of fission energy released in the first 62,000 tons of U.S.
spent fuel was 40,000 megawatt-days per ton and taking
the heat-to-electric energy conversion efficiency of an
average nuclear power plant to be one-third, this would
translate into about $20 billion. Even including interest,
this fund would not be able to cover both the estimated
$50 billion cost of the Yucca Mountain repository
and a $100 billion separations and transmutation
program.42 Spokesmen for the nuclear utilities have
made clear that they will not pay for the extra costs
of a reprocessing plant or fast-neutron reactors.43
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Projections of the total amount of spent fuel to be discharged by
the current generation of U.S. power reactors depend upon what
fraction of the reactors have their licenses extended to 60 years.44

Figure 5. Projections of the Total Amount of Spent
Fuel To Be Discharged by the Current Generation
of U.S. Power Reactors.
It is conceivable that the U.S. Congress might fund
the launch (although perhaps not the completion) of
a federally funded reprocessing plant costing tens of
billions of dollars, but it seems unlikely that it would
provide a subsidy of on the order of a billion dollars
each for the construction of 40-75 fast-neutron reactors
to fission the transuranics being produced by 100
gigawatts electrical (Gwe) of LEU-fueled LWRs.45
The great cost of DoE’s proposed program and
the fact that it proposes to store the most dangerous
isotopes in the spent fuel46 on the surface for hundreds
of years may eventually increase the appeal of interim
storage without reprocessing.
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The AREVA Study of the Cost of Recycling Separated
Plutonium in MOX.
In July 2006, the Boston Consulting Group
published a report, Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear
Fuel Management in the United States. The report was
commissioned by the French nuclear combine, Areva,
and is based on proprietary data and analysis provided
by Areva. The report will therefore be referred to below
as the “Areva study.”
The report proposes that AREVA build for the U.S.
Government both a spent-fuel reprocessing plant with
a 2,500 ton-per-year capacity and a mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication plant to recycle the separated plutonium
back into LWR fuel. It argues that the cost would
approximately equal the savings from the United States
being able to delay a second repository by 50 years.47
Given the similarities of this proposal to DoE’s request
2 weeks later for expressions of interest in building a
reprocessing plant with a capacity of 2,000-3,000 tons a
year, it is worth examining the Areva report’s analysis.
Below, we examine the basis of its central conclusions
that:
1. AREVA could build and operate a reprocessing
plant and MOX fuel fabrication plant much more
cheaply for the U.S. Government than it did in France;
and,
2. French-style reprocessing and plutonium recycle
would postpone the need of a second U.S. repository.
Finally, we will summarize the results of a French
Government analysis of the net costs of plutonium
recycle in France.
Lower Costs in the United States than in France? The
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AREVA study asserted that reprocessing and MOX
fuel-fabrication plants could be built in the United
States more cheaply than the corresponding smallercapacity facilities it built in France.48 The capital cost
of the French complex was revealed to be about $18
billion in 2006 dollars, not including interest charges
during construction. The study also asserted that the
plants could be operated for about $0.9 billion per
year—about one-third the operating cost shown for
the smaller complex in France.

France’s spent-fuel reprocessing complex on Cap de La Hague
in northern France. Its plutonium fuel fabrication facility is in
southern France, requiring regular long-distance truck shipments
of separated plutonium.49

Figure 6. France’s Spent-Fuel Reprocessing Complex
on Cap de La Hague.
Thus far, however, DoE-AREVA combination has
resulted in much higher costs in the United States than
in France. DoE has contracted with AREVA to build
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a MOX fuel fabrication plant to deal with 34 tons of
excess U.S. weapon plutonium at a rate of 3.5 tons per
year.50 Measured in terms of MOX fuel tonnage, this is
about one-fifth the capacity of the plant that would be
required to take the plutonium output of 2,500 ton/
year reprocessing plant.51 The original estimated cost of
DoE’s MOX-fuel facility presented to Congress in 2002
was $1 billion. By July 2005, 3 years later, the estimated
cost had ballooned to $3.5 billion, and the project was
2.5 years behind schedule.52 Such cost overruns and
delays are typical for DoE projects.53
Would French-style reprocessing postpone the need for a
second repository? For the non-reprocessing alternative
to its proposal, the AREVA study assumed that the
physical capacity of Yucca Mountain is 120,000 tons
of spent LEU fuel. As indicated above, the capacity is
likely to be much larger. Using AREVA’s assumption,
however, at the current rate of discharge of spent fuel
by U.S. power reactors, (about 2,000 metric tons of
heavy-metal content per year) the Yucca Mountain
repository would be fully subscribed by 2040. Fuel
discharged later could not be loaded into a repository
until it had cooled for 25 years, i.e., till 2065, but the
AREVA study assumed that, already in the year 2030,
the United States would have to start spending $0.4
billion a year on a $45-50 billion second repository.54
Americium-241 (Am-241), which forms from the
decay of 14-year half-life plutonium-241, dominates
the heat output of LEU spent fuel during the period
from 100 years to 2,000 years after discharge. In
AREVA’s proposal, the Am-241 would go into the
high-level reprocessing waste and be emplaced in
Yucca Mountain.
To minimize the buildup of Am-241 in the spent
fuel and thereby the amount of Am-241 in the high
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level waste, the AREVA study assumes that, after the
reprocessing plant is completed, spent fuel would be
reprocessed within 3 years. This would reduce the
heat load from the associated high-level waste to the
point where the waste from 230,000 tons of spent fuel
could be stored in Yucca Mountain plus 50,000 tons
of unreprocessed pre-2003 spent fuel—more than
doubling the amount of spent fuel that could be dealt
with before a second repository would have to be
established. 55
The AREVA study is able to postpone the need of a
second U.S. repository beyond the study’s time horizon,
however, only because it assumes that the spent MOX
fuel would remain indefinitely in interim storage at
the reprocessing plant. There would be no delay in the
need for a second repository had it been assumed that
the spent MOX fuel, too, would be emplaced in Yucca
Mountain. Although reprocessing and plutonium
recycle consolidates the plutonium from roughly eight
tons of spent LEU fuel into one ton of fresh MOX fuel,
the total amount of plutonium in the spent MOX fuel is
still two-thirds as great as in the original eight tons of
LEU spent fuel. Furthermore, because of a shift toward
a hotter mix of plutonium and other transuranics, the
amount of heat that the ton of MOX spent fuel would
deliver into the mountain during the first crucial 2,000
years would be almost exactly the same as would have
been delivered by the eight tons of spent LEU fuel.
This is why the AREVA study states that “[D]isposal of
MOX [in a geological repository] is not considered to
be a viable option.”56 Indeed, the French Government
has concluded that spent MOX fuel would have to be
stored from 150 years to “centuries” before it cooled
enough to be emplaced in a geological repository.57
A complete cost analysis would have dealt with
cost of an alternative way of disposing of the spent
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MOX fuel. DoE proposes that the plutonium should be
recycled repeatedly in fast-neutron reactors until it is
completely fissioned. If this were done after one recycle
in LWRs had reduced the amount of plutonium by onethird, only 23-44 GWe of fast reactor capacity would
be required to fission the plutonium left in the oncerecycled LWR MOX fuel.58 This is down from the 40-75
GWe calculated above for DoE’s scenario, in which the
plutonium is fed directly into sodium-cooled burner
reactors. But the cost would still be huge. The AREVA
report assumes that sodium-cooled reactors would cost
20 percent more per unit of generating capacity than
LWRs.59 The only full-sized sodium-cooled ever built,
France’s Superphénix, cost about three times as much
as a LWR of the same capacity.60 In series production,
the cost could come down. LWRs are estimated to cost
$2 billion per GWe. The extra capital cost for buying
sodium-cooled reactors therefore would be $9-18
billion if AREVA’s 20 percent estimate were true and
$46-90 billion if the cost of a breeder were twice that
of an LWR. Tens of billions more would be required
for the infrastructure to fabricate and reprocess the
sodium-cooled reactor fuel.
The French Government’s estimate of the cost of
reprocessing in France. The AREVA study did not
reveal the cost of reprocessing and plutonium recycle
in France, but these costs were published in a study
done by the French Government in 2000. This study
also estimated the costs of alternative fuel cycles for
France’s current fleet of power reactors.
Shown in the Appendix are the results for four
scenarios: three treated in the French Government
report and one extrapolated from the results of those
calculations:
1. One hundred percent of the LEU spent fuel
discharged from France’s LWRs in a 45-year average
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operational lifetime would be reprocessed (the
extrapolated scenario). The separated plutonium
would be recycled in MOX fuel once—i.e., spent MOX
fuel would not be reprocessed within the time frame of
the study.
2. About two-thirds of the LEU fuel would be
reprocessed, and the plutonium recycled once (the
current plan).
3. Reprocessing would end in 2010. This would
amount to reprocessing 27 percent of the spent LEU fuel
expected to be discharged in the reactors’ lifetimes.
4. A retrospective scenario in which France was
assumed not to have built its reprocessing and
plutonium recycle infrastructure but instead would
have deposited its spent fuel directly in an underground
repository as is current U.S. policy.
The cost estimates are summarized in Table 2. It will
be seen by comparing the 100-percent-reprocessing
with the no-reprocessing scenarios that reprocessing
all of the LEU fuel would double the cost of the back
end of France’s fuel cycle. The net increase is 80 percent
when the savings in natural uranium and enrichment
associated with the use of the MOX fuel are taken into
account.
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Percentage of Spent LEU Fuel Reprocessed
100%
(Derived
scenario)
Back end costs
Front end cost
savings
from plutonium
recycle
Net costs

67%

27%
(Reprocessing
ends in 2010)

No
Reprocessing

84

74

61

41

-10

-8

-2

0

74

66

59

41

Table 2. Spent-Fuel Disposal Costs in Four
Scenarios for the French Fuel Cycle.61
(Billions of 2006 $, 58,000 tons of spent fuel)
V. ATTEMPTS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT
ON U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
Following India’s 1974 nuclear explosion, which
used civilian plutonium separated with U.S.-provided
technology, the United States reversed its policy of
encouraging reprocessing and plutonium recycle
worldwide. U.S. policy became, in effect, “We don’t
reprocess, and you don’t need to either.” Since 1977,
when Japan put its Tokai-mura pilot plant into operation, no nonweapon state has begun civilian reprocessing. During that same period, Argentina, Belgium,
Brazil, Germany, and Italy shut down their pilot reprocessing plants, and South Korea and Taiwan abandoned their laboratory-scale reprocessing research. Japan
remains the only nonweapon state that reprocesses.
In Europe, countries have abandoned reprocessing
primarily as a result of anti-nuclear movements and the
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high cost of reprocessing. Outside Europe and Japan,
however, U.S. anti-reprocessing policy has played a
key role in stopping programs that were covers for
countries that were interested in following India’s
example and using a civilian reprocessing program as
a cover for developing a nuclear-weapon option.
The Bush administration has responded in two
ways to concerns that a new U.S. reprocessing initiative
would undermine this very successful nonproliferation
policy:
1. DoE is developing reprocessing technologies that
do not separate out pure plutonium.
2. The Bush administration has proposed that
reprocessing and uranium enrichment be confined
to “countries that already have substantial, wellestablished fuel cycles.”62
“Proliferation Resistant” Fuel Cycles—The Saga
of UREX+.
The reprocessing technology currently used
worldwide has the acronym PUREX for Plutonium
and URanium EXtraction. It was originally developed
by the United States to extract pure plutonium for the
U.S. nuclear-weapons program.63 It is therefore difficult
to claim that this technology is proliferation resistant,
and DoE has not done so.
In fact, the revival of U.S. interest in reprocessing
was launched by the 2001 report of Vice President
Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development
Group, which recommended that “the United States
should reexamine its policies to allow for research,
development and deployment of fuel conditioning
methods (such as pyroprocessing) that reduce waste
streams and enhance proliferation resistance.”64
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Pyroprocessing is a reprocessing technology
developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)
for recycling the metal fuel used in its Experimental
Breeder Reactor II.
Another reprocessing technology would be
required, however, to separate transuranics from the
uranium-oxide fuel used in LWRs. For this purpose,
ANL proposed what it called UREX+, named to
denote the fact that pure uranium is extracted. The
transuranics are extracted in various combinations in
different variants of UREX+. In fact, a series of versions
of UREX+ have been proposed.
Plutonium Plus Neptunium.
The first version of UREX+ proposed by Argonne
(UREX+2)65 would keep the plutonium mixed with
neptunium.66 There is, however, typically only about
8 percent as much neptunium as plutonium in spent
fuel. Furthermore, neptunium is less radioactive than
plutonium and is as good a weapons material as the
U-235 used in the Hiroshima bomb. At best, the effect
of leaving the neptunium mixed with the plutonium
would be to dilute the plutonium slightly. The mix
could be used directly to make weapons, or the
plutonium could be extracted in the same type of glove
box that would be used to handle pure plutonium.
Unseparated transuranics (UREX+1a). The second
iteration of UREX is the GNEP fuel cycle proposed by
DoE in May 2006. It would leave all the transuranics
unseparated. Plutonium would still constitute more
than 80 percent of the mix. The mix would be about 100
times more radioactive than pure plutonium but would
still produce only about 0.1 percent of the intensity
of penetrating radiation that would be required to
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make it “self-protecting” by the IAEA’s standard
(see Figure 7).67 Enough plutonium for a few bombs
could be separated in a glove box without the workers
receiving a large radiation dose. For an industrialscale operation in which workers were exposed to
this material year around, however, shielding and
remote handling would be required to keep down
occupational radiation doses. This is why “addition
of minor [transuranics] or fission products to recycled
plutonium will increase significantly the costs of fuel
fabrication and transportation.”68

Factors by which dose rates from 1-kg spheres of transuranic metal
produced by various versions of UREX+ fall short of the IAEA
threshold for self protection (1 Sievert or 100 rems per hour at one
meter). For example, the dose rate from unseparated transuranics
is about 0.001 of the self-protection standard. 69

Figure 7. Factors by which Dose Rates from
1-kg Spheres of Transuranic Metal Produced by
Various Versions of UREX+ Fall Short of the IAEA
Threshold for Self-Protection.
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Unseparated transuranics mixed with lanthanide fission
products (UREX+1). Argonne responded to criticisms
of the lack of proliferation resistance of UREX+1a by
proposing yet another variant in which one class of
fission products, the lanthanides, would remain mixed
with the transuranics until the mix was transported to
a sodium-cooled “burner reactor” site (see Figure 8).
Although still not meeting the IAEA’s self-protection
standard, the gamma-radiation level from the mix
would be higher than for the other UREX+ fuel cycles
considered earlier. It would be highest for material
separated from recently discharged spent fuel, since
the longest-lived significant lanthanide, Europium-154,
has a half-life of only 8.8 years. At the burner-reactor
sites, the lanthanides would be stripped out in a final
stage of reprocessing, and the transuranic fuel would
be fabricated. Thus each burner reactor site would have
its own final-stage reprocessing and fuel-fabrication
plant. This would compound the problem of the high
cost of the separations and transmutation approach.
Indeed, the complexity of this proposal approaches
that of a Rube Goldberg cartoon.70
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The top box describes the various stages of the reprocessing
plant and includes provisions for surface storage for hundreds
of years of the two most hazardous fission products, cesium-137
and strontium-90, both of which have half-lives of about 30 years.
The box at the bottom describes one of many proposed “burnerreactor” complexes. Each reactor site would have a facility to
carry out the final stage of the UREX+ reprocessing (TALSPEAK).
It would also have a fuel-fabrication facility and a spent-fuel
reprocessing facility for the burner reactors. The enormous
number of fuel processing facilities in this proposal would make
it much more costly even than the separations and transmutation
arrangements analyzed in the 1996 National Academies study.71

Figure 8. The Version of UREX+ Proposed by
Argonne National Laboratory in March 2006.
Safeguards problems.72 IAEA has been unable to
reduce statistical measurement uncertainties below
about 1 percent for traditional PUREX reprocessing,
which produces pure plutonium. To prevent frequent
false alarms, a 1 percent measurement uncertainty
requires raising the alarm threshold to about 3 percent.73
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Three percent of the 24 tons of plutonium discharged
annually by U.S. power reactors would amount to 760
kilograms, enough for about 100 Nagasaki bombs.
Unfortunately, the Argonne proposals to make
reprocessing more “proliferation resistant” by adding
radioactive materials to the plutonium also would make
it more difficult for both national and international
monitors to detect plutonium diversion.
Plutonium is ordinarily detected and measured
by the penetrating radiation that it emits. It fissions
spontaneously at a low rate, emitting neutrons (about
half a million per kilogram per second for reactor-grade
plutonium). The neutrons can be detected through
substantial shielding. Leaving plutonium mixed with
other transuranics makes neutron measurements much
less useful, however. The Curium-244 in spent fuel, in
particular, emits 100 times as many neutrons.74 As a
result, an uncertainty of only 1 percent in the Curium244 would mask the loss in neutron signal due to the
removal of all the plutonium.
All the plutonium isotopes also emit characteristic
gamma rays. These gamma rays are much less
penetrating than the neutrons, however. Large
corrections must therefore be made for shielding
and self-shielding of the fissile material. For this
reason, gamma measurements are almost useless for
quantitative assays of bulk inhomogeneous mixtures.
Back to MOX. Most recently, after learning that
UREX+ was still very much in the conceptual stage
and that techniques for fabricating fuel containing
americium and curium had not yet been developed,
DoE decided to explore the possibility of starting with
a slight modification of a PUREX plant. In its August
2006 “request for expressions of interest,” it specified
only that the reprocessing plant “products are not pure
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plutonium.”75 This was only a few weeks after AREVA
had proposed COEX, a variant of PUREX in which
the plutonium would not be fully separated from the
uranium.76 Of course, once again, the plutonium could
be easily separated from the COEX mix in a glove
box.
Proposal to Restrict Reprocessing to the NuclearWeapon States Plus Japan.
Despite its R&D initiatives to make reprocessing
more “proliferation resistant,” DoE has never
suggested that the improvement could be great
enough for reprocessing to be acceptable in states
of proliferation concern. Indeed, in its May 2006
presentation of its GNEP proposal, DoE included the
Bush administration’s February 11, 2004, proposal
to deny enrichment and reprocessing technologies
“to any state that does not already possess full-scale,
functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants,” and
instead to offer such states reliable access to LEU and
reprocessing services.77
The idea that other countries can be permanently
barred from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing
plants has not gained international acceptance,
however. An international panel of experts convened
by IAEA found that “there is a consistent opposition
by many [non-nuclear weapons states] to accept
additional restrictions on their development of peaceful
nuclear technology without equivalent progress on
disarmament.”78
This issue is currently joined primarily with
regard to the assertion by nonweapon states of their
rights to have national uranium-enrichment plants.
Since the Bush administration’s 2004 proposed ban
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on additional countries acquiring enrichment plants,
six nonpossessing countries have expressed increased
interest in acquiring them.79 The U.S. GNEP proposal
has, however, already revived interest in reprocessing
in South Korea,80 and AREVA has floated the idea of
exporting the plant that it is designing for the American
market to a number of nonweapon states that do not
currently reprocess.81
France, the United Kingdom, and Russia already
have been providing reprocessing services to foreign
countries, but France and the United Kingdom have
lost virtually all of their foreign customers. Russia
has kept a few because, unlike France and the United
Kingdom, it has been willing to keep the plutonium
and radioactive waste it recovers from its foreign
customers’ spent fuel.
In effect, Russia has been providing permanent
storage for foreign spent fuel—although with the fuel
separated into three components: uranium, plutonium,
and high-level waste. Under these conditions, its
customers have been happy for Russia to take their
spent fuel, whether it reprocesses it or not. Indeed,
while Russia has been reprocessing the spent fuel from
first-generation East European VVER-440 reactors at
its Mayak facility in the Urals, it has been storing the
spent fuel from second- generation Soviet-designed
VVER-1000 reactors in a second closed nuclear city,
Zheleznogorsk, Siberia.
VI. THE ALTERNATIVE: DRY-CASK SPENT FUEL
STORAGE
In the Sections II and III of this chapter, we
discussed how pressure from U.S. nuclear utilities
on DoE to remove spent fuel from their reactor sites
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and the unwillingness of U.S. state governments to
host off-site interim storage have stimulated DoE
interest in federally-funded reprocessing and recycle
of transuranics. In Sections IV and V, we discussed the
huge costs of such a program and the weaknesses of
proposals to make reprocessing “proliferation resistant.”
In this section, we discuss whether, considering the
alternatives, interim storage of unreprocessed spent
fuel on the power-reactor sites may after all be the least
bad solution.
First of all, it is important to understand that the
costs that the federal government is paying the utilities
for continuing to store the spent fuel on site is small in
comparison to the costs of reprocessing. As discussed in
section II, DoE estimates that the costs will grow to $0.5
billion per year. We estimated the cost to be somewhat
lower. Either cost is small, however, in comparison to
a reprocessing program. Secretary of Energy Samuel
Bodman has asked for an R&D budget ramping up to
$0.8-0.9 billion per year in 2009 just to assess the cost of
the GNEP program.82 The French Government’s figures
for the extra cost of PUREX reprocessing LWR fuel and
recycling the recovered plutonium once correspond to
about $1 billion per year in the United States, and the
National Academy of Science’s estimate of the cost of a
program involving sodium-cooled transuranic burner
reactors was $1.6 to 3.2+ billion per year (1996 $).83
Secondly, it must be understood that interim
storage of spent fuel would cost approximately the
same if the federal government took possession of the
spent fuel and moved it to a centralized storage site.
The largest contribution to the cost of dry-cask storage
is the storage casks. There would be economies of
scale in the monitoring and maintenance costs at the
centralized site, but these costs are quite modest for
198

decentralized storage at sites with operating power
plants because the casks require little maintenance
and are stored within the plant’s guarded perimeter.
Any cost savings associated with centralized storage
are likely to be offset by the fact that the infrastructure
costs for dry-cask storage at the reactor sites will have
already been paid for. There would also be the extra
cost of transporting the spent fuel to the centralized
storage site and then to Yucca Mountain or some other
repository rather than transporting the spent fuel
directly from the plant.84
Sometimes it is argued that continued storage of
spent fuel at reactor sites creates a hazard. The amount
of radioactivity that could be released from dry-cask
storage is very small, however, in comparison to the
potential releases from fuel in the reactor core or in a
spent-fuel storage pool at operating reactor sites. The
fuel in an operating reactor generates heat at a rate of
about 30 kilowatts per kilogram. In a spent-fuel pool,
a week after reactor shutdown, the fuel generates
about 100 watts per kilogram. Loss of cooling water
would result in the fuel in a reactor core heating up
to combustion temperature within minutes. Recently
discharged spent fuel in a pool would heat up to such
temperatures within hours after a loss of water. Tenyear-old spent fuel generates about two watts of heat
per kilogram and can be stored in dry casks passively
cooled by air passing slowly over the outside surface
of the canisters.85 Air warmed by the radioactive decay
heat rises and is replaced by cooler air. Even an attack
with an anti-tank missile that breached a cask would
release only a relatively small amount of radioactivity
(see Figure 9).86
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Two casks typically contain the equivalent of a year’s spent fuel
discharges from a 1,000 MWe nuclear power plant. Comparison of
the simplicity of interim spent fuel storage with the complexity of
the huge reprocessing complex shown in Figure 6 makes it easier
to understand the relatively low cost of interim storage.87

Figure 9. Dry Cask Storage of Spent Fuel.
Why, then, are nuclear utilities in the United States
pressing so hard for the government to begin moving
the spent fuel off site? Perhaps one reason is that, in
the 1970s, many nuclear-power opponents argued that
there should be no further commitment to nuclear
power until arrangements for ultimate disposal for
spent fuel are in place. In 1976, in California, this
became state law:
no [new] nuclear fission thermal power plant . . . shall
be permitted land use in the state . . . until both of the
following conditions have been met:
(a) The [California Energy] commission finds
that there has been developed and that the United
States through its authorized agency [the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission] has approved and there exists
a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of
high-level nuclear waste . . .88
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The California law cannot be satisfied by the mere
movement of spent fuel to a centralized storage site or
to a reprocessing plant. The only way to satisfy it is
through the licensing of a geological repository under
Yucca Mountain or elsewhere.89
The position of the nuclear-power critics has evolved, however. In response to the Bush administration’s
reprocessing proposal, many groups that are critical
of how nuclear power has been implemented in the
United States have decided that they would prefer onsite dry-cask storage to reprocessing.90
On the other side of the debate, the Nuclear Energy
Institute, which speaks for U.S. nuclear utilities, while
acknowledging that the subsidies in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 for the first new nuclear power plants
ordered since 1974 “clearly stimulated interest among
electric utilities in constructing new nuclear power
plants,” insists that “[t]his increased interest requires
[that] the federal government must meet its contractual
responsibility to accept, transport, and dispose of used
nuclear fuel through a comprehensive radioactive
waste management program, including continued
progress toward a federal used fuel repository.”91
Similarly, John Rowe, the President of Exelon, which
manages 20 percent of U.S. nuclear capacity, has stated
famously with regard to the urgency of licensing a
federal waste repository, “We have to be able to look
the public in the eye and say, ‘If we build a plant,
here’s where the waste will go.’ If we can’t answer that
question honestly to our neighbors, then we’re playing
politics too high for us to be playing.”92
Note, however, that there is no requirement for
reprocessing in the above statements of the nuclearutility position. This suggests that the utilities might be
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willing to live with continued interim on-site storage
as long as there is progress toward siting a repository.
The newly elected Senate Majority Leader, Harry
Reid, who represents the State of Nevada, is, however,
a dedicated opponent to the completion of the Yucca
Mountain repository.93 His proposed alternative is
“The Spent Nuclear Fuel On-site Storage Act of 2005,”
which would have DoE take over responsibility for
spent-fuel stored in dry casks at nuclear power plants
to allow time for “a safe scientifically-based solution to
be developed.”94
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Government’s current interest in a
federally-funded reprocessing program appears to
be driven in significant part by an interest in finding
a location to which it could ship the older spent fuel
accumulating on power reactor sites. Shipments were
to have begun to the Yucca Mountain geological
repository in 1998, but the licensing of that repository
has been delayed repeatedly and is now projected for
2017 at the earliest. If the federal government began
to ship spent fuel to a reprocessing site, that would
help it limit lawsuits by U.S. nuclear utilities that are
seeking federal government reimbursement for their
costs for prolonged on-site storage of spent fuel. The
reprocessing option would be 4-8 times more costly,
however, than on-site dry-cask storage for up to 50
years.95
At operating reactors, the incremental safety and
security risk from such dry-cask storage of older fuel
is negligible relative to the dangers from the fuel in the
reactor core and the recently discharged hot fuel in the
spent fuel pool.96
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The nuclear-weapon proliferation costs of the
United States unnecessarily embracing reprocessing
as a necessary part of its nuclear fuel cycle cannot be
quantified but could be severe.
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section II for details.
96. As of the end of 2002, less than 3,000 out of 50,000 tons
of U.S. spent fuel were stored at 10 U.S. sites with no operating
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APPENDIX
SCENARIOS FOR THE FRENCH FUEL CYCLE*
Percentage of Spent LEU Fuel Reprocessed
67% (S6)

27%
(Reprocessing Ends
in 2010, S4)

100%
(Derived Scenario)

No Reprocessing
(S7)

Fuel cycle costs (109 1999 FF [2006 $] undiscounted)
Front end

578 [116]

602 [120]

558 [112]

611 [122]

Back end

370 [74]

307 [61]

422 [84]

203 [41]

Net

948 [190]

909 [182]

980 [196]

814 [162]

Back end cost ($/kg)

$1450

$700

Back end cost
($10-3/kWh)

4.2

2.0

Inputs
Natural
uranium mined
(103 metric tons)

437

460

418

475

Separative Work
(million SWUs)

313

330

299

341

LEU fuel fabricated
(103 tons uranium)

54

56

52

58

MOX fuel fabricated
(103 tons)

4.8

2

7.1

0

LEU fuel reprocessed
(103 tons)

36

15

52

0

Wastes
Depleted uranium
(103 tons)

379

401

360

417

LEU Spent fuel
(103 tons)

18

41

0

58

MOX Spent Fuel
(103 tons)

4.8

2

7.1

0

Transuranic Waste
(103 cubic meters)

18

12

23

0

High-level waste
(103 cubic meters)

4.8

1.6

7.5

0

Plutonium/Americium
in spent fuel (tons)

514

602

441

667

Reprocessed uranium
(103 tons)

34

14

50

0
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*Assuming a 45-year average life for France’s LWR fleet. In all
scenarios, 20.2x1012 kilowatt hours are generated, J.M. Charpin, B.
Dessus and R. Pellat, Report to the Prime Minister: Economic Forecast
Study of the Nuclear Power Option, 2000, Tables on pp. 43, 56, 214.,
215. We assumed that a 1999 French Franc (FF) = $0.2 (2006$).
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CHAPTER 8
THE NPT, IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR ENERGY:
AN “INALIENABLE RIGHT,” BUT PRECISELY TO
WHAT?
Robert Zarate
In mid-October 2006, a few days after North Korea’s
surprise detonation of a nuclear explosive device, the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) sounded the alarm on what he now
sees as a troubling trend: the growing number of states
seeking to enrich uranium, reprocess spent nuclear
fuel to separate from it plutonium, and engage in other
sensitive nuclear fuel-making activities that provide
direct access to weapons-ready fissile material.1 During
an address to the IAEA’s symposium on international
safeguards, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei candidly
acknowledged that nuclear fuel-making “creates many
new challenges, both for the international community
and for [the Agency], because verifying enrichment
facilities or reprocessing facilities is quite difficult,
and the so-called conversion time”—that is, the time
required to convert fissile material for use in a nuclear
explosive device—“is very short.”2 Then, the IAEA
Director General went so far as to say that when nonnuclear-weapon states become nuclear fuel-makers,
then “we are dealing with what I call virtual nuclearweapon states.”3
As North Korea’s recent nuclear detonation and
Iran’s ongoing nuclear intransigence demonstrate, the
emergence of more nuclear fuel-making states—of
what ElBaradei now describes as virtual nuclear-weapon
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states—not only challenges the continuing relevance
of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT)4 and the
IAEA safeguards system, but also threatens the
security of the many nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states that participate in the NPTIAEA safeguards system. For if a non-nuclear-weapon
state has acquired fuel-making capabilities sufficient
to accumulate stocks of fissile material (principally
in the form of highly enriched uranium or separated
plutonium), then that state has cleared the most difficult
obstacle on the path to its first nuclear explosive. This
is why, during the May 2005 quadrennial NPT review
conference, then-Secretary-General of the United
Nations Kofi Annan called attention to what he called
the “Janus-like character” of nuclear fuel-making:

The [nonproliferation] regime will not be sustainable
if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases
of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology
to produce nuclear weapons on short notice—and, of
course, each individual State which does this only will
leave others to feel that they must do the same. This would
increase all the risks—of nuclear accident, of trafficking,
of terrorist use, and of use by States themselves.5

The extent to which the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty precludes—or should be interpreted as
precluding—“the most sensitive phases of the fuel
cycle” remains unclear, however. On the one hand,
the NPT’s Articles I and II articulate the fundamental,
corresponding, and overriding responsibilities of the
legally-recognized nuclear-weapon signatories and
non-nuclear-weapon signatories, the sine qua non
obligations that make this treaty a nonproliferation
treaty.6 On the other hand, the NPT’s Article IV
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recognizes both the “inalienable right” of signatories
“to develop research, use, and production of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with articles I and II”; and the right
of signatories “to participate” in the “fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.”7 Precisely what Articles I and II should
prohibit, and when and how these prohibitions should
apply to Article IV and the most weapons-relevant
civilian applications of nuclear technology, continue to
be a matter of heated debate.
Article IV never explicitly mentions enrichment,
reprocessing, and other nuclear fuel-making technologies, yet some governments nevertheless interpret
Article IV as implicitly recognizing the specific or per
se right of signatories to any nuclear technological
activities that can be conceivably labeled “peaceful,”
short of actually inserting fissile material into a nuclear
explosive device.8 Under this interpretation, all that
is required is that a non-nuclear-weapon signatory
conclude, in accordance with the NPT’s Article III, a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
that the IAEA administer safeguards on the nuclear
materials involved in the civilian nuclear activities of the
signatory; and that the signatory be in full compliance
with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has pushed the per se
right interpretation of Article IV much, much further,
however. In 2003, the IAEA became aware of the broad
range of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies
that the Iranian government had concealed from it for
nearly two decades.9 Over the next two years, Tehran
failed to cooperate fully and transparently as IAEA
inspectors attempted to reconstruct the shrouded
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history of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and
ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in
Iranian territory in order to verify both the correctness
and completeness of Iran’s declarations to the Agency.10
In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors
responded to Tehran’s lack of cooperation by finding
Iran to be in non-compliance with its NPT and IAEA
safeguards obligations.11 As a consequence, the IAEA
Board declared—and subsequently the Security
Council of the United Nations decided in a legallybinding manner—that Iran should suspend all nuclear
fuel-making activities until the IAEA fully resolves
the many serious issues surrounding Iran’s history of
non-compliance.12 In rejecting any suspension, though,
Iranian officials have argued that absolutely no
circumstance whatsoever—not even a finding of noncompliance by the IAEA Board or a legally-binding
resolution from the UN Security Council—can limit
what they interpret to be their government’s “specific
and undeniable right” to enrichment, reprocessing, and
other sensitive nuclear fuel-making activities under
the NPT.13 In short, the Iranian government claims
that Article IV recognizes not merely the per se right,
but rather the per se right without any qualification
whatsoever, of signatories to nuclear fuel-making.
Given the many challenges that the spread of
enrichment, reprocessing, and other sensitive nuclear
fuel-making technologies pose to the NPT-IAEA
safeguards system, this chapter addresses two related
questions:
1. To what extent can the IAEA, given its own
safeguarding goals, effectively safeguard nuclear
materials—especially weapons-ready nuclear materials
involved in nuclear fuel-making and other sensitive
activities?
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2. Does the NPT recognize the right of signatories
to develop, access, or use nuclear materials and
technologies that the IAEA cannot effectively
safeguard, even if these unsafeguardable materials
and technologies are claimed to be “for peaceful
purposes”?
Answers to these questions have far-reaching
implications for the nuclear energy and nonproliferation
policies of individual governments and international
organizations. Indeed, these questions go to the
very heart of the global nonproliferation system’s
rationale for sharing widely the civilian uses of nuclear
technology. If, in fact, the IAEA actually is capable of
safeguarding effectively even the most sensitive nuclear
materials and technologies, then this provides a strong
warrant for interpretations that view the NPT’s Article
IV as permitting any and all nuclear activities short
of inserting fissile material into a nuclear weapon.
However, if the IAEA cannot safeguard effectively
all nuclear materials and technologies, then broadly
permissive interpretations of Article IV become not only
unwarranted, but also perversely detrimental to the
NPT’s fundamental goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
With respect to the first question, this chapter
argues that the IAEA, given its own safeguarding
criteria, remains unable to safeguard effectively
a broad range of sensitive nuclear materials,
technologies, and activities. In particular, the Agency
cannot provide—even in principle—timely warning of
a non-nuclear-weapon state’s diversion of weaponsready nuclear materials from civilian applications
to nuclear weapons or unknown purposes; it must
tolerate, under its current accounting methods, large
amounts of unaccounted nuclear material at facilities
that handle such material in bulk form before even
beginning to suspect a diversion; and it appears to lack
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adequate financial resources to carry out many of its
safeguarding activities effectively.
With respect to the second question, this chapter
argues that—in conformity with the generally accepted
principles of treaty interpretation that the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties codifies—the NPT, at
a minimum, can be interpreted as not recognizing the
“inalienable right” of signatories to nuclear materials,
technologies, and activities that the IAEA cannot
effectively safeguard. The NPT’s Article IV appears to
establish three legally-binding qualifications that clarify
the scope of the “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”
to which signatories have a “right” to develop and use—a
key qualification being the effective safeguardability
of civilian application of nuclear technology and
related nuclear materials. But while the NPT may
be understood as prohibiting non-nuclear-weapon
signatories from unsafeguardable nuclear materials,
technologies, and activities, the treaty also provides
for mechanisms by which nuclear-weapon signatories
can provide, individually or through multilateral
frameworks, non-nuclear-weapon signatories with
the benefits of proscribed, unsafeguardable peaceful
applications of nuclear technology in an economicallysound, nondiscriminatory manner. In short, though
some governments continue to insist on reading the
NPT as implying the per se right—and now in Iran’s
case, the unqualified per se right—of signatories to
nuclear fuel-making, Article IV need not be interpreted
as providing de jure cover for the de facto status of a
virtual nuclear-weapon state. Indeed, the NPT can be
read in a more sustainable way.14
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in three
sections. The first section revisits key IAEA safeguards
documents in order to unpack the Agency’s goals
for effective safeguarding, and analyzes the extent to
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which the Agency actually can meet these goals when
it administers safeguards. The second section uses the
generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation,
as codified by the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, to explore the extent to which the NPT
recognizes the “inalienable right” of signatories to, and
prohibits signatories from, sensitive nuclear materials,
technologies, and activities—especially those that
the IAEA cannot effectively safeguard. Finally, the
conclusion considers what the chapter’s analysis on
the NPT and IAEA safeguards system implies for
national and multilateral policies to limit and manage
the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA
SAFEGUARDS
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s preamble
stresses not only the importance of “the principle of
safeguarding effectively [emphasis added] the flow of
source and special fissionable materials by use of
instruments and other techniques at certain strategic
points,” but also the need for “research, development,
and other efforts to further the [principle’s] application,
within the framework of the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards system . . . .”15 The extent
to which the IAEA today can actually administer
effective safeguards on nuclear materials—especially
weapons-ready nuclear materials involved in civilian
applications of nuclear technology—remains unclear,
however.
In accordance with the NPT preamble’s principle of
effective safeguarding, Article III requires that each nonnuclear-weapon signatory conclude a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA “for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of [the
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signatory’s] obligations assumed under this Treaty with
a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices.”16 In 1972, 2 years after the
NPT entered into force, the IAEA released The Structure
and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“Model Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement” or “INFCIRC/153”), which
defines the technical objective of safeguards as “the
timely detection of diversion of significant quantities
of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other
nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown,
and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early
detection” (emphasis in the original).17 To meet this
objective, the Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
identifies the IAEA’s means as “the use of material
accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental
importance, with containment and surveillance as
important complementary measures.”18
When the Agency released INFCIRC/153, it had
not yet determined the specific methods and metrics
to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards. In the midto-late 1970s, however, the IAEA’s Standing Advisory
Group on Safeguards Implementation (“SAGSI”)
used the numerical estimates of four terms from
INFCIRC/153—namely, significant quantity, timely
detection, risk of detection, and probability of raising a false
alarm—to define precisely the Agency’s “detection
goals” (emphasis added).19 In theory, these detection
goals provide the IAEA with ways to measure the extent
to which it is obtaining INFCIRC/153’s safeguards
objective, and verifying the fulfillment of NPTsignatory obligations. In practice, though, the Agency
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cannot meet these goals with respect to a wide range of
nuclear materials and civilian applications of nuclear
fuel-making technology. Although it is far beyond the
scope of this chapter to describe in exhaustive detail
every difficulty that the IAEA faces in attempting to
safeguard effectively, the sections below summarize
representative examples of these difficulties.
Abrupt Diversion of Nuclear Materials: Conversion
Time vs. Timely Warning.
When the IAEA administers safeguards, it aims to
account for and inspect declared nuclear materials in
civilian applications of nuclear technology frequently
enough to detect the diversion of a significant quantity
(“SQ”) of nuclear material before it has been—or can
be—converted into a bomb. A significant quantity is
defined by the Agency as “the approximate amount
of nuclear material for which the possibility of
manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be
excluded.”20 Table 1 gives the SQ values that the IAEA
currently uses. Here, it is worth noting that some
analysts have concluded that the IAEA’s current SQ
values are inadequate. For example, in October 2005
Thomas Cochran of the National Resources Defense
Council argued that “the IAEA’s SQ values for direct
use materials are not technically valid or defensible,”
and that, in some circumstances, “the SQ values for
direct use plutonium and high enriched uranium (HEU)
[should] be reduced by a factor of about eight.”21
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Direct-Use Material

SQ

Plutonium (containing < 80%
238
Pu)

8 kg Pu

Uranium-233

8 kg 233U

High Enriched Uranium
(235U ≥ 20%)

25 kg 235U

Indirect-Use Material

SQ

Uranium ( U < 20%)

75 kg 235U
(or 10 t natural U
or 20 t depleted U)

Thorium

20 t Th

235

a

a. Including low enriched, natural and depleted uranium.
Data Source: IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Ed., International Nuclear
Verification Series No. 3, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, June 2002, sec. 3, para. 13,
Table II.

Table 1. IAEA’s Estimated Values for Significant
Quantities.
To express quantitatively the extent to which a
non-nuclear-weapon state in possession of at least
one SQ of diverted nuclear material could pose an
immediate proliferation threat, the IAEA uses a metric
known as conversion time, defined as “the time required
to convert different forms of nuclear material to the
metallic components of a nuclear explosive device.”22
In order to provide timely warning of a non-nuclearweapon state’s diversion of nuclear material “from
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices
or for purposes unknown” so that governments can
organize diplomatic and other forms of pressure on
the diverting state, the numerical value of the IAEA’s
timeliness detection goal for a given category of nuclear
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material should be, in principle, much less than the
value of its estimated conversion time for that category
of nuclear material.23
Even in principle, though, this is not always the
case. Table 2 compares the IAEA’s estimated conversion
time for special and source nuclear materials with its
corresponding timeliness detection goals in states where
either the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (a voluntary
agreement which grants the Agency greater inspection
authority) has not entered into force; or the Agency
has not concluded the absence of undeclared nuclear
material or activities, and thus has not verified the
completeness of the state’s declarations.
Type Nuclear Material

Est. Conversion Time

Timeliness Detection
Goal

Unirradiated Direct-Use (Metallic Form)a

7 – 10 days

1 month

Unirradiated Direct-Use (Chemical
Compounds/ Mixtures)b

7 – 21 days

1 month

Irradiated Direct-Usec

1 – 3 months

3 months

Indirect Use

3 – 12 months

12 months

d

a. Pu, HEU or 233U metal.
b. PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure Pu compounds; HEU or 233U oxide or other pure U
compounds; MOX or other non-irradiated pure mixtures containing Pu, U (233U + 235U ≥
20%); Pu, HEU and/or 233U in scrap or other miscellaneous impure compounds.
c. Pu, HEU or 233U in irradiated fuel.
d. U containing <20% 233U and/or 235U; Th.
Data Source: IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Ed., International Nuclear Verification Series
No. 3, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, June 2002, sec. 3, paras. 13 and 20.

Table 2. IAEA’s Estimated Conversion
Time vs. Timeliness Detection Goal.
To take the most time-sensitive proliferation
scenario, if a non-nuclear-weapon state has acquired at
least one SQ of highly enriched uranium, uranium-233,
or separated plutonium in metallic form, then the IAEA
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estimates that this state requires roughly seven-toten days to prepare its unirradiated, direct-use fissile
material for insertion into a nuclear weapon.24 Yet
in terms of detecting a non-nuclear-weapon state’s
diversion of such material, the IAEA sets its timeliness
detection goal as one month.25
Other plausible proliferation scenarios raise
alarms because they illustrate just how easily nonnuclear-weapon states, through the possession of
overt or covert nuclear fuel-making technologies,
can clandestinely acquire weapons-ready nuclear
material long before the IAEA is able to detect the
acquisition. For example, reprocessing experts from
Oak Ridge National Laboratory showed in an August
1977 technical brief how a non-nuclear-weapon state—
which possesses irradiated direct-use materials, such
as the sort of plutonium-laden spent nuclear fuel
generated by light water reactors (LWRs)—could build,
using simple industrial tools and a compact facility,
a concealed “quick and dirty” reprocessing plant.26
To take another example, former Nuclear Regulatory
Commissioner Victor Gilinsky, MIT professor Marvin
Miller, and former weapons-lab physicist Harmon
Hubbard described in a 2004 report the relative ease
and rapidity with which a state that possesses declared
or clandestine centrifuge enrichment capability as
well as nuclear fuel containing low enriched uranium
(LEU), an “indirect-use” material used in LWRs,
could enrich without detection this LEU to weaponsusable HEW.27 “It is now generally appreciated that
gas centrifuge plants for LEU can fairly easily be
turned into plants for HEU,” Gilinsky and company
explained. “It is less appreciated that LEU at, say, 4
percent enrichment, is about 80 percent of the way to
HEU. It takes comparatively little additional ‘separative
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work’ to upgrade LEU to HEU. It would be difficult for
the IAEA to keep close enough track of all the LEU to
stay ahead of any such conversion.”28
Nuclear Facilities: Detecting Abrupt and Protracted
Diversions.
When administering safeguards on nuclear
material at facilities, the Agency has further translated
its detection goals into what it now terms the IAEA
inspection goal, defined as “[p]erformance targets
specified for IAEA verification activities at a given
facility as required to implement the facility safeguards
approach.”29 To determine the IAEA inspection goal,
the Agency uses the concept of a “material balance
period”—that is, the amount of time between inventory
accounts of declared nuclear materials at a given
facility30—to clarify the two sorts of diversions-overtime that can occur at facilities: abrupt diversions, which
occur when “the amount diverted is 1 SQ or more of
nuclear material in a short time (i.e., within a period
that is less than the material balance period)”; and
protracted diversions, which occur when “the diversion
of 1 SQ or more occurs gradually over a material
balance period, with only small amounts removed at
any one time.”31 The IAEA inspection goal at facilities
thus consists of two corresponding components: the
timeliness component, which “relates to the periodic
activities that are necessary for the IAEA to be able
to draw the conclusion that there has been no abrupt
diversion of 1 SQ or more at a facility during a calendar
year”;32 and the quantity component, which “relates to
the scope of the inspection activities at a facility that
are necessary for the IAEA to be able to draw the
conclusion that there has been no [protracted] diversion
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of 1 SQ or more of nuclear material over a material
balance period and that there has been no undeclared
production or separation of direct use material at the
facility over that period.”33
However, when the Agency administers safeguards
on nuclear material at so-called “bulk-handling”
facilities—such as “plants for conversion, enrichment
(or isotope separation), fuel fabrication and spent fuel
reprocessing, and storage facilities for bulk material,”34
it sometimes faces difficulties in meeting the IAEA
inspection goal. In using materials accountancy to
establish the timeliness and quantity components
of the IAEA inspection goal at facilities, the Agency
generally assumes a “detection probability” of 95
percent, a corresponding “false alarm probability” of
5 percent, and a measurement error of ± 1 percent. The
false alarm probability, which the IAEA defines as “[t]he
probability . . . that statistical analysis of accountancy
verification data would indicate that an amount of
nuclear material is missing when, in fact, no diversion
has occurred,”35 depends on both the estimated total
amount of nuclear material going through the facility
during an interval of time, and the threshold amount
of the facility’s nuclear material that the Agency must
measure as missing during this time interval before it
will begin suspecting a diversion.
The serious risks raised by abrupt diversion were
outlined in the section discussing the gap between the
conversion times of various nuclear materials and the
respective IAEA’s timeliness detection goal metrics for
such materials. With respect to protracted diversions at
facilities, the Agency faces even more serious difficulties
in determining whether or not the “measured” missing
nuclear material is explained by simply a measurement
error or, since the quantity diverted from the facility
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at any one time over the material balance period need
only be small compared to the absolute amount of
material accounted for during the period, by an actual
protracted diversion.
In a 1990 essay, MIT professor Marvin Miller offers
an example in which a state operates a commercialsized plutonium reprocessing plant through which
800 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel passes annually.
To arrive at a false alarm probability of no more than
five percent and a corresponding detection probability
of 95 percent at such a plant over a 1-year material
balance period, Miller calculates that the IAEA would
have tolerate annually as much as 246 kilograms of
“measured” missing plutonium—an amount equivalent
to over 30 significant quantities (or nuclear weapons-worth)
of plutonium!36
Yet, even if the IAEA should detect a sufficiently
large discrepancy pointing potentially to protracted
diversion at a nuclear fuel-making facility, resolution
of this discrepancy would be far from timely. “If a large
discrepancy is detected, the Agency will have to spend
months working with the plant operator to figure
out the technical reason for the discrepancy, prior to
officially declaring the discrepancy an anomaly that
needs to be resolved,” observed Paul Leventhal in a
1994 essay. “The process of resolving an anomaly to
the point of determining whether a suspected diversion
should be reported to the IAEA Board of Governors
could take months more, as could the process of the
Board determining whether the matter needs to be
referred back to the [IAEA] inspectors for further
resolution or is of a magnitude to be referred to the UN
Security Council.”37 With good reason, then, did Dr.
Pierre Goldschmidt, the former IAEA Deputy Director
General for Safeguards and Verification, concede
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after leaving the Agency that “there are still problems
inherent in ensuring that, in ‘bulk facilities,’ even small
amounts of nuclear material—a few kilograms among
tons—are not diverted without timely warning.”38
Moreover, as Union of Concerned Scientists’
Edwin Lyman, one of many analysts today arguing
for the IAEA to accept higher false alarm probabilities,
recently noted, “The Agency’s reluctance to pursue
higher confidence levels for detection of diversion, at
the expense of higher false alarm rates, would seem
to be a lesser concern in the context of the heightened
security levels that have become standard operating
practice around the world since the 9/11 [September
11, 2001] attacks.” He added:
Today, most people are willing to tolerate a level of
sensitivity for security screening at airports and critical
facilities that would not have been acceptable in the past
because of a common appreciation that the occasional
false alarm is an appropriate price to pay to ensure
that policy of as close to zero-tolerance as possible for
the prevention of another 9/11-scale terrorist attack.
Similarly, the standards for assurance that safeguards
on plutonium used in the civil sector will be stringent
enough to ensure an extremely high level of deterrence
against diversion or theft should likewise be increased
today, yet it has not been (emphasis added).

“On the contrary,” Lyman lamented, “a growing
appreciation of the inability of current measures to meet
quantitative detection goals have led to a retreat from
the notion that such goals should even be considered
as standards for future achievement.”39 He explained:
Although society may tolerate small leaks from a
chemical plant to the environment if the hazards are
limited, when the material in question can be used to
build nuclear weapons, there is no acceptable level of
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leakage into the hands of hostile states or terrorists. The
consequences of a single nuclear weapon falling into the
wrong hands would be so catastrophic that there must
be a zero-tolerance policy for diversion.40

If the very standards which the IAEA has established
for safeguarding nuclear fuel-making cannot be met,
then claims that the entire nuclear fuel-cycle can be
effectively safeguarded deserve to be not merely
questioned, but also directly challenged.
Sufficiency of IAEA Resources.
The extent to which the IAEA actually possesses
sufficient financial resources to perform its mission
remains unclear. In turn, this uncertainty points to
the larger issue of whether the Agency can effectively
safeguard nuclear activities, and thus verify the
fulfillment of NPT obligations by signatories.41
In September 2006, Henry Sokolski, executive
director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, warned of the growing gap between IAEA
resources and safeguarding responsibilities when he
testified before the U.S. House of Representatives’
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations. Table 3, which the author
assisted Sokolski in preparing, gives the figures on
the IAEA’s safeguards budget obligation in constant
dollars, and amounts of unirradiated direct-use nuclear
materials for the years 1984 and 2004.42
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As of 1984

As of 2004

$45.7 million

$104.9 million

7.7 tonnes

89.0 tonnes

High Enriched Uranium (HEU)

11.8 tonnes

32.0 tonnes

Total IAEA Safeguarded
Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials

19.5 tonnes

121.0 tonnes

IAEA Safeguards Budget Obligation
(In Constant Fiscal Year 2004 U.S.
Dollars)
Separated Plutonium (Pu)
Outside Reactor Cores

Data Sources: For data on the IAEA’s safeguards budget obligation in
current—not constant—U.S. dollars, see The Agency’s Accounts for 1984,
GC(XXIX)/749, p. 26; and The Agency’s Accounts for 2004, GC(49)/7, p. 47.
For data on the amount of nuclear material safeguarded by the IAEA, see
Annual Report for 1984, GC(XXIX)/748, p. 63; and Annual Report for 2004,
GC(49)/5, Annex, Table A19, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1985.

Table 3. IAEA Safeguards Budget, and Safeguarded
Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials in Non-NuclearWeapon Signatories of the NPT.
Over a 20-year period, the IAEA’s safeguards and
verification budget only roughly doubled in constant
dollars, while civilian stockpiles of plutonium and
highly-enriched uranium in non-nuclear-weapon
States—unirradiated weapons-ready nuclear materials
for which the Agency must account—increased by a
factor of six.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the IAEA’s
safeguards budget obligation in constant fiscal year
2000 U.S. dollars from 1970, the year when the NPT
entered into force, to 2005. As the graph shows,
after 1995 the IAEA safeguards budget obligation
did not just experience zero real growth, but rather
contracted significantly, and began only within
238

Data Sources: For data on the IAEA’s safeguards budget obligation in current—not constant—U.S. dollars,
see The Agency’s Accounts for 1970, GC(XV)/459, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1971, p. 12; The Agency’s Accounts
for 1971, GC(XVI)/484, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1972, p. 16; The Agency’s Accounts for 1972, GC(XVII)/504,
Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 1973, p. 16; The Agency’s Accounts for 1973, GC(XVIII)/527, Vienna, Austria:
IAEA, August 1974, p. 16; The Agency’s Accounts for 1974, GC(XIX)/549, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August
1975, p. 13; The Agency’s Accounts for 1975, Draft, GOV/1781, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, April 1976, p. 11; The
Agency’s Accounts for 1976, GC(XXI)/581, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, June 1977, p. 13; The Agency’s Accounts for
1977, GC(XXII)/598, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1978, p. 13; The Agency’s Accounts for 1978, GC(XXIII)/611,
Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 1979, p. 16; The Agency’s Accounts for 1979, GC(XXIV)/629, Vienna, Austria:
IAEA, July 1980, p. 18; The Agency’s Accounts for 1980, GC(XXV)/645, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1981, p.
18; The Agency’s Accounts for 1981, GC(XXVI)/665, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1982, p. 20; The Agency’s
Accounts for 1982, GC(XXVII)/685, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 1983, p. 20; The Agency’s Accounts for 1983,
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GC(XXXIV)/916, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, July 1990, p. 44; The Agency’s Accounts for 1990, GC(XXXV)/954,
Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 1991, p. 52; The Agency’s Accounts for 1991, GC(XXXVI)/1005, Vienna, Austria:
IAEA, August 1992, p. 68; The Agency’s Accounts for 1992, GC(XXXVII)/1061, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August
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Figure 1. IAEA Safeguard Budget Obligations,
1970-2005.
(Estimated Constant FY2000 $USD Millions)
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recent years to return to mid-1990s spending levels.
Such trends in IAEA funding have led nonproliferation
experts like Sokolski to call for drastic revisions to the
IAEA’s budget and the system by which the Agency
assess governments for annual funding. “If we are
serious about safeguarding against the spread of nuclear
weapons and preventing nuclear theft or terrorism,”
Sokolski told the House subcommittee, “these trends
[of under-funding the IAEA] must change.” In fact,
in October 2006 IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei himself argued emphatically for more
Agency resources:
Our [safeguards] budget is only 130 million dollars.
That’s the budget with which we’re supposed to verify
the nuclear activities of the entire world . . . . Our budget,
as I have said before, is comparable with the budget of
the police department in Vienna. So we don’t have the
required resources in many ways to be independent,
to buy our own satellite monitoring imagery, or crucial
instrumentation for our inspections. We still do not have
our laboratories here in Vienna equipped for state-of
the-art analysis of environmental samples.43

At a minimum, ElBaradei’s argument suggests the
need for more transparent discussion of the extent to
which the IAEA, given its limitations in financial and
other resources, is capable of administering effective
safeguards worldwide.
In sum, the analysis of this section suggests
that the IAEA, given its own safeguarding goals,
remains unable to safeguard effectively a broad
range of sensitive nuclear materials and activities.
In particular, the Agency cannot provide—even in
principle!—timely warning of a non-nuclear-weapon
state’s abrupt diversion of the most weapons-ready
nuclear materials (i.e., highly enriched uranium
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and plutonium) from civilian applications to nuclear
weapons or purposes unknown. Moreover, under
current accounting methods dictating a false alarm rate
of at most five percent, the IAEA must tolerate many
significant quantities of unaccounted nuclear material
at bulk-handling facilities before even suspecting a
protracted diversion. Finally, the Agency appears to
lack adequate financial resources to carry out many of
its safeguarding activities effectively.
Taken together, these findings raise important
questions:
• Does the NPT’s Article IV affirm the right of
signatories to nuclear materials and activities
that the IAEA cannot effectively safeguard?
• More broadly, does Article IV affirm the right of
signatories to peaceful nuclear energy without
any qualifications whatsoever?
These questions go to the heart of debates over the
precise meaning of the “research, production, and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and
II [of the NPT],” and the “fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials, and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,”
to which treaty signatories have a right under Article
IV. Answers to these questions require a sustained
analysis and interpretation of the NPT itself.
CLARIFYING THE SCOPE AND LIMITS
OF THE NPT’S ARTICLE IV
Treaties demand careful interpretation, and the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is no exception.
Careful interpretation is demanded because treaties
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sometimes contain ambiguous language and, as Fred C.
Iklé noted in his important 1964 study on negotiation,
treaty language that lacks specificity can lead parties to
“have an honest misunderstanding about implications
that the agreement fails to spell out”; or one party, “while
knowing what its opponent expected of the bargain,” to
“pretend that it had a different understanding of it (i.e.,
the ambiguities are exploited to cover up a deliberate
violation.)”44 Careful interpretation is also demanded
because treaties may sometimes contain equivocal
language. According to Iklé, such equivocality occurs
when:
the parties to the agreement know that the ambiguous
terms mean different things to each of them . . . .
Equivocal language is used to cover up disagreement
on issues which must be included for some reason in a
larger settlement or which must be dealt with as if there
was agreement. An equivocal agreement is similar to a
partial agreement that leaves certain undecided issues for
future negotiation, with the difference that the equivocal
terms serve to cover up differences rather than mark
them for future resolution (emphasis in the original).45

When governments interpret treaties to deal with
issues of ambiguity and equivocality, they generally
adhere to a set of internationally-accepted principles
that Section Three of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT) seeks to codify.46 Article 31 of the
VCLT identifies the primary means of interpretation
as the close reading of a treaty “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”47 In addition, the
VCLT’s Article 32 endorses the use of “supplementary
means of interpretation,” such as a treaty’s negotiation
history and other travaux préparatoires (preparatory
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materials), in order to confirm an Article 31-derived
interpretation, or to determine a treaty’s meaning
when such an interpretation “leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”48 To the extent that
governments advocating a per se right or unqualified
per se right interpretation of the NPT’s Article IV have
arrived at this reading using the means of interpretation
codified by the VCLT, the VCLT’s Article 32 provides a
warrant for recourse to the NPT’s negotiation history,
at the very least, to confirm whether or not this history
supports this reading.
Negotiating and Concluding the NPT.
The multilateral negotiations that led eventually to
the NPT’s conclusion took place during the mid-to-late
1960s in several contexts.49 Among the most important
of these was the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC).50 Formed in late 1961, the ENDC
consisted of five states from the West: Britain, Canada,
France, Italy, and the United States; five states from
the Soviet bloc: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR); and eight nonaligned states: Brazil, Burma,
Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the
United Arab Republic.51 (France, however, declined to
participate in the ENDC.)
When the ENDC began meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland, in March 1962, it initially set out to
negotiate and conclude an agreement on “general and
complete disarmament under effective international
control.”52 Over the next few years, though, negotiations
stalled as American and Soviet delegates continually
found themselves at loggerheads. But after the People’s
Republic of China’s surprise detonation of a nuclear
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explosive device in October 1964, ENDC delegates
changed the focus of their negotiations to concluding a
nuclear nonproliferation treaty.53
Prior to August 24, 1967, no draft nuclear
nonproliferation treaty submitted to the ENDC contained
any language whatsoever viewing peaceful uses of
nuclear energy through the prism of “legal rights.”
The idea for treaty language affirming the “rights” of
signatories to peaceful nuclear energy apparently came
from the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),
Article 17 of which states “Nothing in the provisions of
this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting
Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their
economic development and social progress.”54 The
negotiations for the Treaty of Tlatelolco took place
in the mid-to-late 1960s within the context of the
Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of
Latin America (known also by its Spanish acronym,
COPREDAL). According to a confidential telegram
from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico to the Department
of State, the Peruvian delegation first proposed to
COPREDAL the idea of including an article on nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes.55
Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s
negotiations in mid-February 1967, Latin American
delegations to the ENDC began proposing that the
draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty include language
similar to Tlatelolco’s Article 17. The following month,
American and Soviet negotiators began privately
discussing possible language to deal with the issue
of nuclear rights. As a mid-April 1967 memorandum
suggests, originally the United States proposed to
the USSR that language dealing with nuclear rights
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appear in the preamble, and later proposed placing
such language at the end of Article III, the provision on
international control and IAEA safeguards. Throughout
these private bilateral consultations, though, U.S.origin draft language did not propose to treat nuclearrights language in terms of “inalienable rights.”56
According to an internal, now-declassified negotiation
history from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, it was the Soviets who first proposed using
the phrase “inalienable right” in Article IV:
While we originally preferred to leave the question of
specific treaty language to nonaligned initiative during
later negotiations, we agreed in May [1967] to a brief
Soviet draft article:
Article IV
Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right of all the Parties to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II of this treaty, as well as the right of the
Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation
with other States to, the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.57

In late August 1967, the American and Soviet
delegations, after months of consultations with each
other and with officials from other governments, tabled
in the ENDC identical nonproliferation treaty drafts.
These drafts contained this first, and a much shorter,
version of Article IV that is quoted above.58
Over the next year, ENDC delegates struggled to
refine (among other things) the language of the NPT’s
Article IV. At each turn, though, they collectively
rejected several proposals to insert language into
the treaty that would have expressly and explicitly
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recognized the per se right of signatories to the supply
of enrichment, reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear
fuel-making technologies—and, in certain cases, to the
acquisition of so-called nuclear explosive devices for
civilian purposes. Several proposals stand out:
• In September 1967, Mexican delegate Jorge
Castañeda proposed to the ENDC that Article
IV includes a second paragraph establishing
“the duty” (or express legal obligation) of “[t]
hose parties that are in a position to do so . . .
to contribute, according to their ability, alone or
in cooperation with other States or international
organizations, to the further development of the
production, industries, and other applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially
in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
States.”59
• In mid-October 1967, the Romanian delegation
to the ENDC submitted a working paper
suggesting the inclusion of language in the
preamble recognizing the right of signatories
to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as an
“absolute right,” which is to say, an unqualified
right.60
• In late October 1967, the Brazilian delegation
to the ENDC offered its own working paper
proposing that Article IV expressly recognize the
“inalienable right” of signatories to develop not
only “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” but
all nuclear technologies (presumably including
nuclear fuel-making) up to “nuclear explosive
devices for civil uses.”61
• In early November 1967, the Nigerian delegation
(in what appears to be an elaboration and
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extension of the obligatory “duty” language
found in Mexico’s September 1967 working
paper) proposed that Article IV add several
paragraphs that would legally oblige transfers
of nuclear material and technology.62
• In early February 1968, the Spanish government,
which was not a member of the ENDC, submitted
a memorandum to the committee calling for
Article IV’s second paragraph to refer expressly
to nuclear fuel-making technologies:
The measures in the new draft concerning
the right to participate as fully as possible
in scientific and technical information for
the peaceful uses of atomic energy are
sound, and can have important effects on
the development of non-nuclear countries.
Nevertheless, the Spanish Government takes
the view that this information should refer
specifically to the entire technology of reactor and
fuels [emphasis added].63

• In mid-February 1968, the Brazilian delegation
once again proposed that Article IV’s first
paragraph affirm the right of all signatories to
develop not only “nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes,” but also all nuclear technology up to
so-called peaceful nuclear explosive devices.64
• And in late February 1968, the Italian delegation
proposed that Article IV’s second paragraph be
revised to contain instead the following negative
declaration:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted
as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the supply of source and special
fissionable materials or equipment for the use
of source and special fissionable materials for
peaceful purposes.65
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All of these proposals were rejected by the ENDC.
Indeed, the final text of the NPT contained no language
explicitly referring to enrichment, reprocessing, and
other nuclear fuel-making activities, or so-called nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes—let alone
expressly recognizing the per se right of signatories to
nuclear fuel-making.66
That said, the NPT’s Article III contains language
that, at the very least, appears to contemplate that both
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon signatories
might produce, access, and use even the most weaponsready nuclear materials in civilian applications of
nuclear technology. Article III’s first paragraph states:
Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article
shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced,
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or
is outside any such facility. The safeguards required
by this Article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction,
or carried out under its control anywhere.67

Paragraph two adds:
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)
equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable
material shall be subject to the safeguards required by
this Article.68

Yet, though these provisions describe the scope of
responsibility for IAEA safeguards, they do not
explicitly address the range of nuclear activities
that are prohibited or permitted. Rather, the key to
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harmonizing these provisions with the NPT’s larger
prohibitions against proliferation in Articles I and
II lies in Article III’s third paragraph, which states:
“The safeguards required by this Article shall be
implemented in a manner designed to comply with
Article IV of this Treaty . . .”69 If Article IV is read broadly
and permissively to permit any nuclear activity short
of inserting fissile material into a nuclear explosive,
then the IAEA safeguards required by Article III will
play, at best, a formalistic role, and the importance
of the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of IAEA
safeguards will be of little consequence. In contrast,
if Article IV—as well as Articles I and II, the NPT
provisions to which Article IV itself shall conform—are
read carefully and less permissively, then the actual
effectiveness of IAEA safeguards will play a crucial
role in determining whether or not certain types of
nuclear materials, technologies and activities should
enjoy protection under Article IV.
The Three Qualifications of Article IV’s “Inalienable
Right.”
To be sure, Article IV of the NPT recognizes the
“inalienable right” of signatories to peaceful nuclear
energy. However, it also explicitly imposes two
qualifications on the “nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes” to which NPT signatories have an
“inalienable right.” Signatories shall develop “research,
production, and use” of peaceful nuclear energy (1)
“without discrimination,” and (2) “in conformity with
articles I and II of this Treaty.”70 Moreover, when the
NPT’s Article III defines the purpose of comprehensive
safeguards by the IAEA as the “verification of the fulfillment
of [signatory] obligations assumed under this Treaty with
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a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices,”71 it effectively establishes
(3) “conformity with Article III” as a third qualification.
These three qualifications, when understood in relation
to the treaty’s preamble and main text, not only narrow
the scope of “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” to
which signatories have an “inalienable right,” but also
establish criteria that signatories must meet in order to
exercise this right.
To begin with, paragraph seven of the NPT’s
preamble lays out the principle that addresses the
special meaning of Article IV’s first qualification,
“without discrimination,” within the context of the
treaty.72 That paragraph affirms:
the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications
of nuclear technology, including any technological byproducts which may be derived by nuclear-weapon
States from the development of nuclear explosive
devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all
Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or nonnuclear weapon States (emphasis added).73

To be clear, neither this principle (which hereinafter
I refer to as the “benefits-without-discrimination”
principle), nor any other part of the NPT, ever expressly
requires that any specific nuclear technology, or any
specific peaceful application of nuclear technology, be
made available to all signatories, but rather that
only that the benefits of a given nuclear technology’s
peaceful application be made available somehow. In
essence, this principle recognizes that some nuclear
technologies and some peaceful applications of nuclear
technology—to take an extreme example, so-called
“nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes” in civilian
mining, excavation, or canal-digging operations—
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may be too uneconomical, too proliferative, and too
unsafeguardable to permit non-nuclear-weapon states
to acquire and use them. Thus, when Article IV’s first
qualification applies this principle to peaceful nuclear
energy, it appears to permit, in principle, the denial
of a given nuclear technology or a given nuclear
technology’s peaceful application to a signatory as
long as the benefits of the denied nuclear technology’s
peaceful application are made available somehow.
Article IV’s second qualification requires that the
development of “research, production, and use” of
peaceful nuclear energy be “in conformity with articles
I and II” of the NPT. These two articles articulate the
NPT’s main prohibitions against the direct and indirect
proliferation of nuclear weapons by treaty signatories.
Article I prohibits nuclear-weapon signatories from
giving nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such devices, to “any recipient
whatsoever,” and also forbids them from “assist[ing],
encourage[ing], or induc[ing]” any non-nuclearweapon state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire”
nuclear explosive devices.74 Article II correspondingly
prohibits non-nuclear-weapon signatories from
receiving nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such devices, and also forbids them from building
or acquiring in any way nuclear explosive devices,
and from receiving or seeking “any assistance in the
manufacture” of such devices.75 Article IV’s second
qualification therefore effectively narrows the scope
of “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” to which
signatories have an “inalienable right” under Article
IV, for peaceful nuclear energy “in conformity with
articles I and II” excludes not only nuclear explosive
technology for peaceful or nonpeaceful purposes, but
also other nuclear technology and assistance that could
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“assist, encourage, or induce” non-nuclear-weapon
states “to manufacture or otherwise acquire” nuclear
explosive technology.76
Furthermore, the NPT’s Article III requires each nonnuclear-weapon signatory to conclude a comprehensive
safeguard agreement with the IAEA “for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing the
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices”
(emphasis added).77 By requiring non-nuclear-weapon
signatories to submit to full-scope IAEA safeguards in
order to verify the fulfillment of their obligations under
Articles I and II, as well as other parts of the NPT,
Article III effectively establishes a third legally-binding
qualification on the “nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes” to which signatories have an “inalienable
right” under Article IV. That is, to develop “research,
production, and use” of peaceful nuclear energy “in
conformity with articles I and II” necessarily implies
full “conformity with article III.”78 Thus, Article
IV’s third qualification appears to recognize the
“inalienable right” of a signatory to peaceful nuclear
energy only when the signatory’s nuclear activities are
effectively safeguardable by the IAEA, and the signatory
complies fully with its obligations under Article III of
the NPT and related IAEA comprehensive safeguards
agreements.79
Article IV’s Three Qualifications and Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.
With respect to “nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes,” the majority of the NPT negotiators
understood that, at the time of their negotiations and
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for the foreseeable future, nuclear explosive technology
in civilian projects not only lacked clear and immediate
economic benefits, especially when compared to nonnuclear alternatives; but also possessed an unacceptable
risk of nuclear proliferation since such technology
could not be effectively safeguarded by the IAEA. Hence,
the final text of the NPT denies non-nuclear-weapon
signatories access both to nuclear explosive technology
and its peaceful applications.
In conformity with the preamble’s “benefitswithout-discrimination” principle, though, the NPT’s
Article V outlines the framework by which non-nuclearweapon signatories could avail themselves of “the
potential benefits” of nuclear explosive technology’s
peaceful application, if such economic benefits should
ever materialize. The relevant part of Article V reads:
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate
measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty,
under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits
from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that
the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used
will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for
research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits,
pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body
with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon
States . . . (emphasis added).80

As the NPT’s negotiation history reveals, many of the
non-nuclear-weapon states represented at the ENDC
did not view either the denial of nuclear explosive
technology and its peaceful applications, or Article
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V’s framework for providing the “potential benefits”
of the denied nuclear explosive technology’s peaceful
applications, as discriminatory per se.81 For example, in
late January 1968 Polish delegate Mieczyslaw Blusztajn
remarked to the ENDC:
I should like once again to stress that the right of all
countries to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions is not at
stake. The only matter to be settled is the procedure and
the conditions to be observed so that countries which
forgo the manufacture of nuclear devices shall not be
deprived of the benefits that may be derived from the use
of nuclear explosives (emphasis added).82

Bulgarian delegate Kroum Christov echoed the Polish
delegate’s sentiments:
[I]t seems to us quite clearly impossible to admit and
to include in the non-proliferation treaty the right to
manufacture nuclear devices and to carry out nuclear
explosions. There is no question in this case of denying a
right; nor should the prohibition of all activity of this nature be
regarded as an infraction of that right. Account is taken of a
state of facts which, for reasons which cannot be refuted
and which have been explained here at length, renders
the manufacture of nuclear devices incompatible with a
non-proliferation treaty (emphasis added).83

In retrospect, the efforts of NPT negotiators to
limit the spread of nuclear explosive technology
for peaceful purposes proved to be well-founded.
Indeed, the “potential benefits” of so-called peaceful
nuclear explosives (PNEs) never materialized as nonnuclear explosive alternatives for mining, excavation,
and canal-digging operations emerged as safer and
more economical choices.84 In fact, in May 1995
the quadrennial NPT review conference made the
following conclusions about PNEs:
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The Conference records that the potential benefits of the
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions envisaged in
article V of the Treaty have not materialized. In this context,
the Conference notes that the potential benefits of the
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not
been demonstrated and that serious concerns have been
expressed as to the environmental consequences that
could result from the release of radioactivity from such
applications and on the risk of possible proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, no requests for services
related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
have been received by IAEA since the Treaty entered into
force. The Conference further notes that no State party
has an active programme for the peaceful application of
nuclear explosions (emphasis added).85

Moreover, though the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty has not entered into force, it has nonetheless
helped to support an international norm against the
use of nuclear explosions, whether for nonpeaceful or
allegedly peaceful purposes.86
By prohibiting non-nuclear-weapon states from
developing, accessing, and using so-called peaceful
nuclear explosive devices, the NPT reinforces the
importance of the following principle: When the IAEA
cannot effectively safeguard the nuclear material
involved in an allegedly-peaceful application of nuclear
technology, then the NPT does not protect the right of
states to develop, access or use that allegedly-peaceful
application of nuclear technology.
Article IV’s Three Qualifications and Nuclear
Energy for Peaceful Purposes.
In conformity with Article IV’s three qualifications,
then, both (a) the “benefits-without-discrimination”
principle of the NPT’s preamble, and (b) the framework
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by which Article V allows non-nuclear-weapon
signatories to avail themselves of the “potential
benefits” of nuclear explosive technology’s peaceful
applications without providing them actual access
to the technology or its peaceful application, can
be applied to enrichment, reprocessing, and other
sensitive nuclear fuel-making activities. It is both
plausible and consistent for governments to interpret
Article IV as affirming the “inalienable right” of nuclear
signatories to develop “research, production, and use”
of nuclear fuel making only to the extent that such
nuclear fuel-making activities: (1) are economically
beneficial in accordance with the treaty’s preamble
(Article IV’s first qualification); (2) possess a low risk
of proliferation in accordance with Articles I and II
(Article IV’s second qualification); and (3) are effectively
safeguardable and undertaken in full compliance with
NPT and IAEA safeguard obligations in accordance
with Article III (Article IV’s third qualification).87
Moreover, it is both plausible and consistent with the
treaty to deny signatories from developing, acquiring,
and using nuclear fuel-making technologies (especially
those which are related to nuclear materials that the
IAEA cannot effectively safeguard) that can assist
them in manufacturing nuclear weapons under some
circumstances—at the very least, when they fail to
comply with their obligations under the NPT’s Article
III and related IAEA safeguards agreements—as
long as the benefits of peaceful applications of such
nuclear fuel-making technologies are made available
to them.88
As the NPT’s negotiation history reveals, ENDC
delegations from both nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states viewed nuclear fuel-making in
a manner similar to nuclear explosives for peaceful
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purposes: that is, as potentially aiding and even
constituting the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
For example, in September 1962 British delegate Sir
Michael Wright told the ENDC:
The thing which is unique to a nuclear weapon is its
warhead. And what is there in a nuclear warhead that is
found in no other weapons? . . . It is the fissile material in
the warhead; that is to say, the plutonium and uranium235, the two fissile materials now most commonly used
in nuclear weapons.
If we are to deal effectively with nuclear weapons we must
concentrate on the fissile material which every nuclear weapon
has and which no other weapon has [emphasis added].89

To take another example, in February 1966 Swedish
delegate Alva Myrdal argued before the ENDC:
We could, of course, all agree that it is important to
block the road to nuclear-weapon development as
early as possible. But we must be aware that what we
are facing is a long ladder with many rungs, and the
practical question is: on which of these is it reasonable
and feasible to introduce the international blocking? . . .
To prohibit just the final act of “manufacture” would seem to
come late in these long chains of decisions [emphasis added].
. . Could a middle link be found on which the prohibitory
regulation should most definitely be focused?90

A month later, during a speech to the ENDC, Burmese
delegate U. Maung Maung Gyi answered Myrdal’s
question:
An undertaking on the part of the non-nuclear weapon Powers
not to manufacture nuclear weapons would in effect mean
forgoing the production of fissionable material [emphasis
added] . . . and such production is the first essential step
for the manufacture of these weapons and constitutes
an important dividing line between restraint from and
pursuit of the nuclear path.91
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Proponents of the per se right or unqualified per
se right reading of Article IV might counter the above
reading by claiming that Article IV’s second paragraph
necessarily obliges signatories to transfer any and
all nuclear technology, materials, and assistance—
including nuclear fuel making—in an unqualified and
unfettered manner. The relevant part of that paragraph
states: “All the Parties of the Treaty undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials,
and scientific and technological for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy.”92 It is important to note, though,
that this paragraph is carefully worded to call not for
“the fullest exchange,” but rather for only “the fullest
possible exchange,” and thus actually encourages NPT
signatories to exchange nuclear technology, materials,
and know-how with great care, caution, and restraint.93
In May 2005, during a speech to the quadrennial NPT
review conference, Christopher Ford (at the time
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification, Compliance and Implementation)
elaborated this point:
The use of the term “fullest possible” is an
acknowledgement that cooperation may be limited.
Parties are not compelled by Article IV to engage in
nuclear cooperation with any given state—or to provide
any particular form of nuclear assistance to any other
state. The NPT does not require any specific sharing of
nuclear technology between particular States Party, nor
does it oblige technology-possessors to share any specific
materials or technology with non-possessors.94

“[T]o conform both to the overall objective of the
NPT—strengthening security by halting nuclear proliferation and to any Article I and III obligations,” Ford
added, “supplier states must consider whether certain
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types of assistance, or assistance to certain countries,
are consistent with the nonproliferation purposes and
obligations of the NPT, other international obligations,
and their own national requirements.” NPT signatories,
Ford concluded, “should withhold assistance if they
believe that a specific form of cooperation would
encourage or facilitate proliferation, or if they believe
that a state is pursuing a nuclear weapons program in
violation of Article II, is not in full compliance with
its safeguards obligations, or is in violation of Article
I.”95 Moreover, by establishing no per se obligation or
duty of nuclear exporters to give any specific nuclear
technology, material, or assistance, Article IV’s second
paragraph suggests that nuclear importers, at the
same time, have no reciprocal per se right to receive
or otherwise acquire any specific nuclear technology,
material or assistance.96
In sum, the analysis of this section suggests that
the NPT does not affirm the “inalienable right” of
signatories to nuclear materials and activities that
the IAEA cannot effectively safeguard. In fact, this
explains why the treaty prohibits non-nuclear-weapon
signatories from developing, accessing, or using socalled “nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,” the
most military-relevant of civilian applications of nuclear
technology. Instead, the NPT appears to establish
three qualifications on Article IV which condition the
extent to which signatories have an “inalienable right”
to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy—key
qualifications being a signatory’s full compliance with
its obligations under the NPT and IAEA comprehensive
safeguards agreements and the actual ability of the
IAEA to administer effective safeguards on nuclear
materials in a given civilian application of nuclear
technology. But while the NPT may be understood
as prohibiting non-nuclear-weapon signatories from
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unsafeguardable nuclear materials and activities,
the treaty also provides for mechanisms by which
nuclear-weapon signatories can provide, individually
or through multilateral frameworks, the benefits of
proscribed, unsafeguardable peaceful applications of
nuclear technology in a nondiscriminatory manner to
non-nuclear-weapon signatories in full compliance.
MOVING AWAY FROM A CROWD OF VIRTUAL
NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
On the morning of October 9, 2006, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea exploded a nuclear
weapon.97 Having long subscribed to the unqualified
per se right reading of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, North Korea became the first ever non-nuclearweapon state to use the treaty as cover for the overt and
covert production of weapons-usable fissile material,
and then to quit the treaty, and later build and detonate
a nuclear explosive device.98
If governments continue to interpret the NPT as
recognizing the per se right or, worse, the unqualified
per se right of signatories to enrichment, reprocessing,
and other sensitive nuclear activities, then this will
all but guarantee the emergence of more nuclear
fuel-making states—of what IAEA Director General
Mohammed ElBaradei now chillingly describes as
virtual nuclear-weapon states. The world will move
towards a nuclear-armed crowd.
As we have seen, though, the NPT need not be read
this way. Governments can—and should—interpret
the treaty in a pragmatic and sustainable way that
rejects not only claims of an unqualified per se right,
but also of a per se right, of signatories to nuclear fuel
making.
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The Role of IAEA Candor.
A necessary condition for more pragmatic and
sustainable readings of the NPT, however, will be
IAEA candor with respect to what it can and cannot
effectively safeguard. In the past, the Agency avoided
discussion of this issue, but such avoidance served
only to promote widely the mistaken belief that IAEA
safeguards are always effective, even when applied
to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing,
and other sensitive nuclear activities. In turn, this
mistaken belief lent support to interpretations of the
NPT’s Article IV recognizing the per se right—and, in
Iran’s case, even the unqualified per se right—of NPT
signatories to nuclear fuel-making.
The IAEA is certainly capable of candor. When the
Persian Gulf War’s aftermath exposed the extent to
which the Agency could not verify the completeness
of a state’s declaration, the IAEA moved to clarify its
legal inspection authority99 and improve its technical
capabilities.100 To meet the dangers posed by the
emergence of ever more virtual nuclear-weapon states,
though, the Agency will have to do much more. In
particular, the IAEA—given its inability at times to
meet, in practice, key safeguarding goals, as well as
its budgetary limitations—will need to admit the
dangerous nuclear materials (e.g., direct-use materials,
such as highly enriched uranium, mixed-oxide fuels,
and separated plutonium) and activities (e.g., nuclear
fuel-making, especially at bulk-handling facilities) for
which it cannot provide timely warning of diversion,
and thus cannot effectively safeguard. Moreover,
the Agency should make a point of describing and
identifying its accountancy, inspection, containment,
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and surveillance of these still unsafeguardable activities
and materials as, at best, “monitoring” rather than
“safeguarding.”101
In short, with greater candor and clarity about the
IAEA’s safeguarding shortfalls, the Agency can help
governments to clarify the line between effectively
safeguardable, and therefore truly “safe,” nuclear
materials, technologies, and activities; and those which
are not currently safeguardable and thus not merely
“sensitive,” but also inherently “dangerous.”102
The Role of Legal Clarity by Governments.
Within the last few years, Iran’s nuclear
intransigence and North Korea’s nuclear detonation
have created a greater sense of urgency among
governments seeking to curb nuclear proliferation. For
example, in an attempt to clarify further the extent to
which nuclear technology, materials, and know-how
should be exchanged, the French Republic went so
far as to propose a set of criteria during the lead-up to
the 2005 quadrennial NPT review conference, criteria
which importing states would need to meet in order to
receive nuclear goods. “The export of such materials,
facilities, equipment, or related technologies,” France
suggested in a May 2004 working paper, “should
only be envisaged in the light of the existence of a set
of conditions relevant to the global nonproliferation
regime and NPT objectives”—conditions such as:
• an alleged energy need in the [importing]
country;
• a credible nuclear power generation program
and related fuel cycle needs;
• an economically rational plan for developing
such projects;
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• an Additional Protocol [granting the IAEA
greater legal authority to inspect for undeclared
nuclear materials and activities] brought into
force and implemented before any physical
transfer or transfer of know-how;
• the highest standard of nonproliferation
commitments;
• the effective and efficient implementation of an
export control system with adequate sanctions;
• the highest standard of nuclear security and
safety;
•	an analysis of the stability of the country and
the region concerned.103
Within recent months, moreover, the U.S. Government
has again signaled its support of proposals in the
French working paper.104
That said, the United States and like-minded
governments have yet to counter directly readings of
the NPT’s Article IV recognizing the per se right, or the
unqualified per se right, to nuclear fuel-making. One
can think of Article IV as international law’s equivalent
of a Rorschach Test: What a government claims to see
in this treaty provision—either de jure cover for its
approach to de facto status as virtual nuclear-weapon
state, or clear criteria limiting the scope of “nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes” to which signatories
have an “inalienable right”—certainly reveals a great
deal about how it views the NPT’s fundamental and
overriding goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
Certainly, the clarity or confusion with which
governments seeking to curb nuclear proliferation
interpret Article IV will substantially impact the
decisions of other NPT signatories in the not-too-distant
future. Although a consistent and sustainable reading
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of the NPT, by itself, cannot prevent the emergence
of future proliferation problems, it can provide
governments with a clear and legal foundation for
effective policies which, at the very least, delegitimize
unqualified per se readings of Article IV, and thus
strongly discourage other NPT signatories from
imitating, or even improving upon, the North Korean
and Iranian examples. In contrast, a confused and
muddled answer—or, equally as bad, no response
at all—will have precisely the opposite effect. It will
encourage ever more signatories to believe, and act on
the belief, that they have a right under all circumstances,
even non-compliance with NPT and IAEA obligations,
to any nuclear activity short of inserting fissile material
into a nuclear weapon.
In such a world, signatories in full compliance with
their NPT and IAEA obligations would face, to borrow
key phrases from Article 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the “manifestly absurd” and
“unreasonable” outcome of ever more virtual nuclearweapon states like Iran, and ever more actual nucleararmed states like North Korea.
*****
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CHAPTER 9
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME:
AVOIDING THE VOID
Pierre Goldschmidt
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59) stated: “In politics
what is often most difficult to understand and
appraise is what is taking place under our eyes.” De
Tocqueville’s insight suggests that it would be wise
for the international community to stand back and
to reflect on the lessons that should be learned from
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
experience in implementing safeguards over the
last decade, particularly in North Korea and Iran.
Such review and reflection will readily suggest that,
ironically, just when the safeguards are getting better,
the political will to use them effectively seems to be
waning. Unless the IAEA is given the authority and
tools to implement safeguards effectively and soon, the
future of a rules-based approach for managing nuclear
technology will dwindle and the prospects for sharing
more widely the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy
with developing countries may drop dramatically.
This chapter will explore how safeguards have gotten
better, what lessons can be gleaned from the IAEA’s
experience over the last decade, and what solutions
to the problems presented can be implemented by the
international community.
I. SAFEGUARDS ARE GETTING BETTER
The IAEA safeguards system is being implemented
more effectively and efficiently than ever before.
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Traditionally, the IAEA focused on accounting for
nuclear materials in a state facility-by-facility. This
work was done only at declared facilities and was
largely an audit. Since 1998, however, the IAEA has
developed a global analytical approach that asks not
simply whether the declared numbers add up, but
also, “What’s going on in this state’s nuclear program?
Is everything really consistent?”
At the heart of this approach is the production
and periodic update of state evaluation reports (SERs)
and of a corresponding action plan. SERs combine the
results of inspections in the field and environmental
swipes with analysis of all relevant information
from open sources, including satellite imagery. State
evaluation reports analyze the history of all anomalies
and inconsistencies recorded during previous
inspections. They examine whether a state’s research
and development program is internally consistent,
corresponds with stated purposes, and points to a
commitment to use nuclear technology exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The SERs analyze export and import
notifications regarding relevant nuclear material and
equipment, and other information available to the
IAEA. Every SER also includes a section that examines
the most likely diversion scenarios, on the assumption
that the state under review intends to divert nuclear
material for military purposes.
Parallel with these developments, the IAEA has
replaced almost all analog video cameras with digital
surveillance cameras. Implementation of remote
monitoring has increased from 14 systems in 2000
to 86 multicamera systems in 2004, and this trend is
continuing. Progress is also being made in using more
advanced equipment such as ground penetration radar
to improve the IAEA’s ability to verify that highly
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complex nuclear facilities conform to their official
design. The IAEA has also established a new research
and development (R&D) project to explore, with the
support of member states, the potential use of advanced
technologies in detecting undeclared nuclear material
and activities.
In addition, in response to the discovery in 2004 of
an extensive covert supply network of sensitive nuclear
technology that came to light as a result of Libya’s
disclosure of its clandestine nuclear weapons program,
the IAEA Department of Safeguards has established a
new unit focused on documenting, investigating, and
analyzing nuclear trade activities worldwide, with the
aim of uncovering the existence of undeclared nuclear
activities.
This more rigorous and resourceful approach to
safeguards has led one knowledgeable commentator
(Richard Hooper, IAEA Bulletin, June 2003) to assert
in 2003 that “changes in structure and practices of the
Safeguards Department have been accompanied by
a change in culture that is more of a revolution than
evolution.” This “radical departure from the past
practice” has also been acknowledged in the U.S.
Government Accountability Office report of October
2005 on nuclear nonproliferation.
To be sure, there are still problems inherent in
ensuring that, in “bulk facilities,” even small amounts
of nuclear material—a few kilograms among tons—are
not diverted without timely warning, but the trend
in the capacity of the safeguards system is clearly
positive.
Unfortunately, the international community has
failed to strengthen the authority of the IAEA to exercise
its improved capacity in precisely the situations where
it is most necessary: when a state has been found to be
in non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings.
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II. THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA
A. Summary of the IAEA’s Experience with North
Korea.
Soon after North Korea, formally the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), concluded a
comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the
IAEA in 1992, the IAEA found the country to be in
non-compliance. In 1993 North Korea gave notice of its
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as permitted under Article
X. Negotiations between the United States and North
Korea concluded in October 1994 with an “Agreed
Framework,” which averted a looming military-security
crisis by inducing North Korea to freeze activity of its
graphite-moderated reactors and related fuel cycle
facilities in exchange for a U.S. commitment to deliver
two 1,000-megawatt light water reactors (LWRs) and,
in the meantime, to supply annually 500,000 tons of oil
to meet heating and industrial needs. As part of this
deal, North Korea remained a party to the NPT and the
IAEA maintained a permanent presence monitoring
the agreed freeze on nuclear activities.
The Agreed Framework, however, contained
two provisions that sowed the seeds of the present
potentially dangerous stalemate. First, it contained a
clause that was interpreted by North Korea as limiting
the IAEA’s inspection rights under the CSA until such
time as a significant portion of the LWR project was
completed. Only then would the IAEA be allowed
to take all the steps deemed necessary to verify “the
accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report
on all nuclear material in the DPRK.” Such limitation
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was clearly inconsistent with the lessons learned in
Iraq that demonstrated that the IAEA needed greater
access rights than those under the CSA and not the
fewer rights embodied in the Agreed Framework.
The second flaw of the Agreed Framework was
that it allowed North Korea to retain in storage all of
its spent fuel containing weapons-grade plutonium
and to maintain a reprocessing facility in a state of
readiness so that North Korea could restart operations
at any time. Only after completion of the LWR project
would these facilities have to be dismantled. The U.S.
negotiators and others recognized this flaw but could
not persuade North Korea to remove it.
Because of the limitations in its inspection rights,
the IAEA was unable to confirm that North Korea’s
initial declaration under its CSA was correct and
complete. Therefore, every year for 10 years, North
Korea was declared by the IAEA Board of Governors to
be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
However, no additional penalties were imposed
by the international community as a result of these
declarations of non-compliance.
In 2002, the United States claimed to have
discovered evidence that North Korea was developing
an undeclared uranium enrichment program and,
as a consequence, suspended the delivery of fuel oil
under the Agreed Framework. In retaliation, North
Korea expelled the IAEA’s inspectors at the end of
2002 and withdrew from the NPT in January 2003.
North Korea then reprocessed 8,000 (or more) spent
fuel assemblies, and in 2004 declared that it possessed
nuclear weapons.
Still, there have been no tangible consequences
for these actions by North Korea beyond the isolation
the country already experienced. China delivered
substitute fuel oil to North Korea and threatened to
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veto any resolution of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) adverse to North Korea. The six
parties’ talks initiated in 2003 have so far been chaotic
and unproductive. As a result, 3 years after the IAEA
inspectors were expelled from North Korea, they are
still not allowed to return, and North Korea most likely
has nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the international
community has not decided whether, from a procedural
and legal point of view, North Korea has withdrawn
from the NPT. This may sound like the discussion
among religious scholars in 1453 on the sex of the
angels while the Byzantine Empire was falling apart
around them, but in actuality, knowing whether North
Korea has or has not withdrawn from the NPT is more
than an academic question.
If North Korea’s withdrawal is acknowledged,
then the IAEA should implement a limited safeguards
agreement (INFCIRC/252) signed in July 1977 to
verify a five megawatt thermal (MWth) research
reactor delivered by the Soviet Union. This safeguards
agreement, unlike a CSA, does not terminate when a
state withdraws from the NPT. What could be verified
there would, of course, be very limited, but it would
be a matter of principle with potentially important
consequences. If implemented, it would maintain at
least a formal channel of communication between the
IAEA and North Korea.
B. The Lessons Learned.
The three main lessons learned from the experience
with North Korea are:
1. If a state withdraws from the NPT, any
comprehensive safeguards agreement automatically
terminates, and all nuclear materials and facilities are
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no longer under safeguards and can be used freely and
legally for a nuclear weapons program.
2. The threat of any permanent member of UNSC to
use its veto right can block (for political, circumstantial
reasons) any resolution adverse to a state withdrawing
from the NPT.
3. A “voluntary, not legally binding freeze” of
nuclear facilities gives no long-term guarantee that a
state will not use them in the future.
C. What Are the Remedies?
The right to withdraw from the NPT remains a
sovereign right. However, in order to minimize the
consequences of such a withdrawal, the UNSC should
adopt a generic resolution stating that, as a matter
of principle, if a state is found by the IAEA to be in
non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings and
withdraws from the NPT before the IAEA has concluded
(1) that its declarations are correct and complete; and
(2) that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and
activities in that state; such a withdrawal constitutes
a threat to international peace and security under
Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations.
This generic resolution should also decide under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter that any materials and
equipment made available to such a state, or resulting
from the assistance provided to that state, under a
comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153Corrected), will be removed from that state under IAEA
supervision within 60 days of any notice of withdrawal
from the NPT given by that State under Article X.1 of
the NPT, and will remain under IAEA safeguards.
A withdrawing state should not be entitled to the
benefits acquired while it was a party to the NPT and
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subject to comprehensive safeguards. This principle is
not new. It is already contained in the IAEA Statute
adopted in 1957, 13 years before the NPT came into force.
Article XII.A.7 of the Statute states that “With respect
to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the
Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply
Safeguards, the Agency shall have the right . . . in the
event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient
State . . . to take requested corrective steps within a
reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance
and withdraw any materials and equipment made
available by the Agency or a member in furtherance of
the project” (emphasis added).
All nuclear-supplier states should also, in their
bilateral nuclear supply agreements, reserve the
right to require the return of all nuclear material
and equipment previously supplied, in the event the
recipient state withdraws from the NPT. One should
bear in mind that withdrawing from the NPT is an
option that Iraq has never threatened to use but that
has been considered at the highest level of the Iranian
leadership. The international community should not
wait for the next crisis to happen before taking the
appropriate preventive measures.
III. THE CASE OF IRAN
A. The Lessons Learned.
Without attempting to summarize here the
findings of the IAEA with regard to Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear activities contained in nine Reports
to the Board of Governors and additional statements
by the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards
(DDG-SG), suffice it to say that from these reports as
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well as eight Board Resolutions, one can draw three
lessons: the need to avoid delaying tactics, the need to
look beyond nuclear material, and the need to enforce
transparency, each of which are more fully elaborated
below.
1. The need to avoid delaying tactics.
In November 2003, Iran was found to be “in breach
of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its
safeguards agreement.” This is synonymous to “noncompliance” and should have been reported to the
UNSC as foreseen in Article XII.C. of the IAEA Statute.
It was not reported mainly for two reasons. On the
one hand, because of the fear of many member states
that if the issue got out of the IAEA’s hands and was
reported to the Security Council, it would inevitably
mean sanctions against Iran and that sanctions would
lead nowhere except to another Iraq-like crisis which
might well be a worse one. On the other hand, some
member states feared that Russia and China could veto
any resolution of the UNSC adverse to Iran. The worse
would be for the IAEA to report Iran to UNSC only to
have the issue blocked there, as was the case for North
Korea, with no concrete outcome.
In October 2003, one month before the meeting of the
IAEA Board of Governors, in order not to be referred
to the Security Council, Iran agreed in Tehran with the
EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) to
sign the Additional Protocol,1 to implement it pending
its ratification, and “to suspend all uranium enrichment
and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”
However, less than 7 months later, on June 18, 2004,
the Board of Governors adopted a resolution in which
it deplored the fact that “as indicated by the Director
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General’s written and oral reports, Iran’s cooperation
had not been as full, timely and proactive as it should
have been.” And on September 18, 2004, the Board of
Governors deeply regretted “that the implementation
of Iranian voluntary decisions to suspend enrichmentrelated and reprocessing activities . . . fell significantly
short of the Agency’s understanding of those
commitments and also that Iran has since reversed
some of those decisions.”
In November 2004, once more to avoid being
reported to the UNSC and to gain time, Iran signed an
agreement with the EU-3 in Paris, by which it decided,
on a voluntary, not legally binding basis, to extend
its suspension “to include all enrichment related and
reprocessing activities” and “all tests or production
at any uranium conversion installation.” It was
further stated that “the suspension will be sustained
while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable
agreement on long-term arrangements.” However,
on August 1, 2005, one day before receiving the EU-3
proposal, Iran announced its decision to resume
uranium conversion activities.
So what is the situation today? Three years after the
IAEA February 2003 visit to Natanz and the discovery
of Iran’s extensive undeclared nuclear program, there
are still a number of outstanding questions due in
large part to Iran’s delaying tactics in providing access
to locations, individuals and documents. As a result of
these delaying tactics since the discovery of the Arak
and Natanz sites in August 2002 and notwithstanding
the Tehran and Paris suspension agreements with the
EU-3:
• Iran has completed its conversion facility at
Esfahan and produced a large quantity of
uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
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• Iran has introduced UF6 in the pilot enrichment
plant at Natanz in June 2003, installed a 164machine cascade by October 2003, manufactured
more centrifuge components (1,274 assembled
rotors at Natanz by October 2004), carried
out work for the installation of the large
underground enrichment facility at Natanz, and
recently announced that it was resuming R&Drelated enrichment activities.
• Iran is pursuing at full speed the construction
of its heavy water research reactor, ignoring
repeated requests by the IAEA Board of
Governors to suspend it. This is of particular
concern because the spent fuel of such a reactor
will contain weapons grade plutonium.
On July 31, 2005, Dr. Hassan Rowhani, at the time
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council,
presented his “performance report” to outgoing
President Khatami. Referring to the Paris agreement
of November 2004, he stated: “Since Iran had at that
juncture completed its structural capabilities in the fuel
cycle sector, it was possible to suspend the enrichment
for a period of several months without making any
fundamental damages to the fuel production project.”
There could be no clearer admission of the on and off
strategy being followed by Iran.
2. The need to look beyond nuclear material.
		 The Director General’s November 2004 report
stated: “It should be noted that the focus of Agency
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
is nuclear material, and that, absent some nexus to
nuclear material, the Agency’s legal authority to pursue
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the verification of possible nuclear weapons related
activity is limited.” The limitation of the IAEA’s focus
on nuclear material is a major issue that has not been
properly addressed by the international community.
Much more than nuclear material is needed to build
a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weaponization activities
not involving nuclear material can be numerous and
detectable.
Under a narrow legal interpretation of the IAEA’s
mandate and authority expressed by the language
quoted above, effectively requiring proof that
undeclared nuclear material and activities are related
to a nuclear weapons program, the IAEA would have to
find at least traces of nuclear material at an undeclared
facility that can clearly be linked to equipment,
material, or activities that could only be relevant to
manufacturing nuclear weapons or other explosive
devices. Such a narrow interpretation establishes a
sleuthing standard that IAEA inspectors could hardly
ever meet, and if such an interpretation prevails, the
international community will be made ever more
vulnerable to proliferation. A broader interpretation,
certainly justified under the Agency’s mandate to
verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which
sees the Agency as having the authority to look beyond
nuclear material itself, is the only interpretation under
which the Agency can fulfil its mandate effectively.
Consider the limitations under the narrow
interpretation. The sensitive equipment, material,
and activities involved in a nonexclusively peaceful
nuclear program would most likely be located at secret
military sites. Yet, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
the IAEA to access such sites in a timely manner under
the standard CSA and even the Additional Protocol.
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Experience has demonstrated that so many limitations
can be imposed on IAEA inspectors when they get to
such sites, that it is extremely unlikely that they would
be able to prove that nuclear materials have been
diverted to the manufacture of a nuclear explosive
device. Even if such a conclusion could be drawn, it
would likely be so late in the process of manufacturing
nuclear weapons that it would be too late to deter the
state from withdrawing from the NPT.
It is therefore essential for the IAEA to be understood
to have the mandate and the authority to look for any
indication that a non-nuclear-weapon state may be
undertaking activities that could signal the existence of
a nuclear weapons program, and to report such findings
to the IAEA Board of Governors. It is encouraging to
note that the IAEA Secretariat is progressively heading
in that direction.
If a state intends to develop a nuclear-weapons
capability it will need:
• to produce or acquire highly enriched uranium
and/or weapons grade plutonium,
• to master all the necessary weaponization
techniques, and
• to manufacture or acquire the required means
of delivery.
There are indications that Iran is progressing on all
three fronts. The following is known about Iran’s
weaponization activities and delivery-means, which
go beyond its nuclear fuel cycle activities.
With respect to weaponization activities, the
Director General’s report to the IAEA Board of
Governors dated November 18, 2005 (GOV/2005/87)
indicates that among the documents received by
Iran from intermediaries in 1987 was one related to
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“the casting and machining of enriched . . . uranium
metal into hemispherical forms.” Such a process has
no peaceful application and therefore represents a
substantial indication that Iran has been (and may
still be) interested in developing a nuclear weapons
capability. The DDG-SG also reported on January 31,
2006, that the Agency had information about tests related
to high explosives that could have a military nuclear
dimension. In addition, efforts by the Physics Research
Center (an organization related to the Iranian Ministry
of Defense that was located until 1998 at the now razed
Lavizan-Shian site) to acquire dual use materials and
equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment
and conversion activities, is another relevant indication.
Interestingly, a commentary published on February
12, 2006, in the conservative Iranian daily Keyhan
argues that “benefiting from the knowledge of and
ability to manufacture nuclear weapons is something
different from the triple issues of producing, storing,
and using such weapons. However if necessary . . .
then the ground will be paved for moving toward the
subsequent phases.”
With respect to delivery means, it should be noted
that aside from the five nuclear weapons states and
the three non-NPT states, only three countries: North
Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, are known to possess
medium to long-range ballistic missiles capable of
carrying a payload of 1,000kg or more, sufficient for
a nuclear warhead. In his briefing dated January 31,
2006, to the IAEA Board of Governors, the DDGSG indicated that Iran rejected a request to discuss
information available to the Agency about “the design
of a missile re-entry vehicle . . . which could have a
military nuclear dimension.”
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3. The need to enforce transparency.
		 Not only must the IAEA’s evidentiary lens be
widened, the transparency measures for which it calls
must be made enforceable. The Director General in
his report of September 2, 2005 to the IAEA Board of
Governors states:
In view of the fact that the Agency is not yet in a
position to clarify some important outstanding issues
after two and a half years of intensive inspections and
investigation, Iran’s full transparency is indispensable
and overdue. Given Iran’s past concealment efforts over
many years, such transparency measures should extend
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards
Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access
to individuals, documentation related to procurement,
dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops
and research and development locations. Without
such transparency measures, the Agency’s ability to
reconstruct, in particular, the chronology of enrichment
research and development, which is essential for the
Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the
statements made by Iran, will be restricted (emphasis
added).

Since 2003 the IAEA Board of Governors has
adopted a half dozen resolutions calling on Iran to be
more transparent and cooperative. In its last resolution
of September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors
“urges Iran to implement transparency measures, as
requested by the Director General in his report.”
Unfortunately, such requests by the Board of Governors
have no legal force and effect and do not allow IAEA
inspectors to obtain broader access to individuals,
documents, or locations.
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B. What Are the Remedies?
The single most effective and feasible way to establish
the necessary measures is for the UNSC to adopt a
generic and binding resolution stating that if the IAEA
finds a State in non-compliance and requests increased
verification authority, the UNSC would automatically
adopt a specific resolution (under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter) providing this additional authority until
the IAEA has concluded that there is no undeclared
nuclear material and activity in that State and that its
declarations are correct and complete. If such a generic
resolution existed in November 2003, it may well be
that the IAEA Board of Governors would not have been
afraid to declare Iran in non-compliance and would
have reported Iran to the UNSC for the sole purpose of
requesting such broader verification authority, which
clearly has nothing to do with sanctions.
Such a generic resolution should also request the
non-compliant state to suspend all sensitive nuclear fuel
cycle activities at least until the Agency has been able
to draw the above mentioned conclusion, or, possibly,
for automatically renewable periods of 10 years unless
otherwise decided by the UNSC. This would be what
Dr. ElBaradei has called a “rehabilitation period” or a
“probation period, to build confidence again, before
you can exercise your full rights.” (cf. interview with
Newsweek- January 23, 2006)
Independently, the Nuclear Supplier Group could
adopt a rule whereby nuclear material and equipment
would only be exported if the facilities where they are to
be stored or used are covered by both a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and an INFCIRC/66-type
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safeguards agreement. This requirement would block
a recipient state from withdrawing from the NPT and
claiming the right to do whatever it wants with the
items previously delivered or the materials derived
therefrom.2
IV. CONCLUSION
The IAEA Statement at Main Committee II of the
NPT Review Conference in May 2005, states:
As underlined by the Director General in his opening
statement, our verification efforts must be backed
by an effective mechanism for dealing with cases of
non-compliance with Safeguards Agreement or of
withdrawal from the NPT. For this, both the NPT and
the IAEA Statute make clear our reliance on the Security
Council to promptly consider the implications of such
cases for international peace and security and to take
appropriate measures.

As suggested in this chapter, concrete measures can
readily be taken within the IAEA and UN framework
to improve the assurance that all nuclear material
and activities in a non-nuclear-weapon-state found
to be in non-compliance are and remain exclusively
for peaceful purposes. The UNSC can take these vital
generic measures without eroding state sovereignty
or development. The measures proposed here would
apply only when the highly representative IAEA
has found a state to be in non-compliance with its
safeguards obligations. None of these measures would
impede a state’s right or capacity to enjoy the peaceful
uses of atomic energy. On the contrary, these measures
would quicken the international community’s capacity
to regain confidence that a state that may have
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wandered off the peaceful nuclear path had corrected
its course and would once again be a reliable neighbour
and business partner.
Without UNSC action of this sort, the future of a
rules-based approach for managing nuclear technology
will dwindle, and the prospects for sharing the
benefits of peaceful nuclear energy more widely with
developing countries may drop dramatically. Inaction
is playing against the credibility of the NPT regime.
As Cardinal de Richelieu once said: “Politics is the
art of making possible what is necessary.”
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. The Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (corrected)
approved by the IAEA in March 1997 provides for increased
reporting by a state on its nuclear fuel cycle related capabilities
and activities and expanded short notice IAEA access to nuclearrelated locations.
2. A CSA remains in force only for so long as the state remains
party to the NPT, whereas under a INFCIRC/66-type agreement,
all nuclear material supplied or produced under that agreement
would remain under safeguards even if the state withdraws
from the NPT until such time the IAEA has determined that such
material is no longer subject to safeguards.
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CHAPTER 10
THE U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR
COOPERATION INITIATIVE:
THE QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDS
Quentin Michel
Since the public of announcement in 2004 by Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President
George W. Bush of a civil nuclear cooperation initiative,
the question of potential cooperation with India has
been heavily debated. It has acted as an incentive for
other major supplier states1—essentially the nuclear
weapons holders—to conclude or announce their
intention to complete similar agreements.2
Voices from others suppliers have also declared that
such cooperation will breach most of the international
commitments they have contracted. In both cases, we
have to admit that the U.S.-India agreement is not just
a bilateral question but has become a multilateral one,
and its impact on international export control regimes
will have a major significance. This discussion will not
be devoted to the content of the agreement itself but
more on how an exception for India could be possible
without breaching international export control
regime(s). Furthermore, we will focus only on the
conditions of supply and in particular on International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as required
by international export control regimes—mostly the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It should be noted
that other safeguards mechanisms could be imposed
on the recipient state. We could mention safeguards
required by bilateral safeguards agreements between
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suppliers and end users similar to the one offered by
U.S. authorities in the early 1950s in the implementation
of the Atoms for Peace plan. Secondly, there is the
possibility that the IAEA could assume safeguards
implementation on behalf of a bilateral agreement as
defined by Article 12 of IAEA statutes. Finally, we have
several potential bilateral fallback agreements in case
of breach of the initial IAEA safeguards agreement.3
NPT Conditions of Supply for Nuclear Items.
The conditions of supply of nuclear items to nonNPT states are established by Article III.2 which states
that: “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material,
or (b) equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production
of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclearweapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this article.”
Since the entry into force of the NPT, states have
always argued on the category of safeguards to request
of the recipient state before transferring the items.
If it was clear from the reading of Article III.1 that it
should be organised within the framework of the
IAEA safeguard system, the content, and in particular
its field of implementation, was not clearly defined, so
for a majority of nuclear supplier states, safeguards
requirements should only apply to transferred
nuclear material and to nuclear material used by the
transferred nuclear items (equipment or technology).
Such safeguard requirements were in the line of the
guidelines of the Zangger Committee, which was
considered by a majority of NPT states as their informal
interpretation body.4
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Nevertheless, this approach was rather anachronistic
considering that safeguards required from non-NPT
state parties were less comprehensive than the one
required from states that were parties to the NPT. The
NPT ratification required that a non-nuclear-weapons
state conclude with the IAEA a full scope safeguards
agreement, which would apply to all its nuclear
material use in all its peaceful activities and not only to
the nuclear items transferred.5 This safeguards system
is also known as the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement (CSA).
This discriminatory approach has had a
counterproductive effect due to the fact that it granted
indirectly a privileged treatment to non-NPT states by
conceding them less severe verification requirements.
So in 1995, the NPT Review Conference has
reviewed this interpretation of Article III.2 to align it to
safeguards applied to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.
In the document Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, it is affirmed that
New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or
special fissionable material or equipment or equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable
material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require,
as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s
full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding
commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.6

Therefore, with this interpretation of Article III.2,
transfers of nuclear material and equipment to a nonNPT state party like India will be ruled by a CSA
agreement into force before the transfer could take
place. So if before 1995, transfers to India could have
occurred with a dedicated safeguards mechanism
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defined by INFCIRC/66, presently a transfer to India
could only be possible if India concludes a CSA
agreement with the IAEA. Considering the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, a CSA agreement
as defined by the INFCIR/153 could not be possible
due to the fact that Indian nuclear activities submitted
to IAEA safeguards will be defined in a list of civilian
facilities established by the Indian authorities. Such
a mechanism appears to be similar to the voluntary
safeguards agreement taken by an NPT nuclear
weapons state where the list of peaceful facilities
submitted to IAEA safeguards is provided by the
state.7 The objective to submit nuclear-weapons states
to a verification mechanism is more to avoid the risk
of unfair competition and balancing the administrative
and commercial burden that non-nuclear-weapons
states have to face rather than to control the risk of
diversion of peaceful nuclear facilities. Therefore,
such a voluntary mechanism could not be applied to
India unless it were to consist of informally granting
the status of an NPT nuclear weapons state. In this
regard, the provision of Article IX of the NPT leaves
no room for interpretation: only states which have
manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon prior
to January 1, 1967, can hold such a status.
To conclude, the implementation of the U.S.India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will not be
possible without breaching safeguards requirements
established by Article III.2 of the NPT as highlighted by
NPT review conferences and the Zangger Committee.
Nuclear Suppliers Group Conditions of Supply for
Nuclear Items.
The most important informal instrument regarding
the control of nuclear trade is the Nuclear Suppliers
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Group (NSG).8 Contrary to the Zangger Committee,
the NSG is not informally linked to the NPT. The NSG
does not establish an international nuclear export
control regime, its main objective is in the definition of
a common understanding of export control principles
that each participating state will introduce in its
national export control regime.
The NSG has adopted two groups of guidelines.
The first set of guidelines (the trigger list)9 governs the
export of items that are especially designed or prepared
for nuclear use, and the second governs the export of
nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies, that
is, items that can make a major contribution to an
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive
activity, but which also have non-nuclear uses, in
the chemical industry for instance.10 Concerning
potential transfers to India as defined by the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, only the NSG
guidelines governing the transfer of nuclear items (the
trigger list) will apply.
In conformity with paragraph 4 of the NSG trigger
list guidelines, the supplier state should, before
granting the export authorization, verify if the state
end-user fulfils the different export conditions defined
by the NSG guidelines. One of the main conditions
of supply concerns the obligation of the end-user to
have brought into force a CSA agreement with the
IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all
sources and special fissionable material in its current
and future peaceful activities.11 It should also be noted
that if the NSG considers “that the provisions of the
IAEA model Additional Protocol12 will strengthen the
nuclear safeguards regime and facilitate the exchange
of nuclear and nuclear related material in peaceful
nuclear cooperation,”13 it does not require it yet as a
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condition of supply. Although this question has been
analyzed systematically by the subsequent plenary
meetings, no consensus has been obtained between
participating states. To resolve this ever-lasting
discussion, an approach to bring about the potential
entry into force of such a condition of supply has been
proposed to the participating states, but the necessary
consensus has not yet been reached.
The NSG trigger list Guidelines establish two
exceptions to its CSA requirement for transfers of
nuclear items to a non-nuclear-weapon state. The first
is a classical “Grandfather” clause,14 which authorizes
NSG supplier states not to require a CSA to agreements
or contracts drawn up before their date of adherence.
The second is the so-called “safety clause,” which
authorizes NSG supplier states to transfer nuclear
trigger list items to a non-nuclear-weapon state only in
exceptional cases and if they are deemed essential for
the safe operation of existing facilities and if dedicated
safeguards are applied to those facilities. Moreover,
before granting such authorization, suppliers should
inform and, if appropriate, consult with the other
NSG participating states in the event that they intend
to authorize or to deny such transfers.
This exception has been used only twice by Russia to
supply fissile material for a nuclear power plant to India
in 2000 and 2006. For the first Russian fuel shipment to
India, most of NSG members states expressed concern
that such an exception could only be used when the
assistance by an NSG member state is essential to
prevent or correct an imminent radiological hazard that
poses a significant danger to public health and safety.
Such conditions were, for them, obviously not met in the
export of Russian fuel to India. Therefore, a process was
initiated to strengthen and obtain a commonly-agreed
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interpretation of the safety clause and in particular on
the terms “exceptional cases.” However, the NSG did
not succeed in adopting a common interpretation. In
2006, when Russia announced its intention to again
use the safety clause to export nuclear fuel to India,
NSG member states appeared less concerned by the
transfer. This rather consensual reaction could only be
explained by the new NSG-India relationship initiated
by the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
and other similar declarations made by other nuclear
weapons states.
Nevertheless, paragraph 4 of the NSG trigger list
guidelines and, therefore the CSA condition, does
not apply to transfer of nuclear items to nuclearweapon states. The guidelines did not contain specific
provisions on the category of guidelines to be required
by the supplier when it intends to export trigger items
to a nuclear-weapon state. Consequently, it is up to the
supplier state to define the safeguards requirements
it intends to impose on the recipient. For transfers to
NPT nuclear weapons states, the situation is rather
simple so long as all of them have signed a voluntary
safeguards agreement with the IAEA including specific
provisions implementing the additional protocol.
Considering that NSG Guidelines for Nuclear
Transfers contain no reference to the NPT15 and,
therefore, no reference to the NPT definition of a
nuclear-weapons state, how does the NSG define a
nuclear-weapons state? In other words, could it be
possible that the NSG definition of a nuclear-weapons
state will be broader than that of the NPT?
The absence of any reference to the NPT in the NSG
guidelines is mostly due to historical reasons. In 1978,
when the NSG was created, France was not a NPT
member and set as a condition of its adherence to the
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NSG that its guidelines contain no explicit reference to
the NPT. Nevertheless, the lack of reference to the NPT
has not been completed by a definition of non-nuclear
and nuclear-weapons states in the guidelines. Moreover,
nothing in the guidelines prohibited NSG participating
states from adopting a definition of a nuclear-weapons
state that could include India, Pakistan, or Israel. If we
approve this assumption, what will be the safeguards
required by the supplier to transfer nuclear items to
a nuclear-weapons state? As in the case of the NPT
nuclear-weapons states, the safeguards requirement
will be defined on a national basis by the authorities
of the supplier state. Nevertheless, if nuclear transfers
to non-NPT nuclear-weapons states could in theory
be envisaged, the current practice of the NSG does
not work with such an interpretation. Most of the
NSG participating states export authorization denials
concern non-NPT nuclear-weapons states.
Finally, all NSG participating states are presently
parties to the NPT, and nuclear transfers to nonNPT nuclear-weapons states like India could not be
authorized, considering the different commitments
they have taken with their NPT ratification.
Conclusion.
Considering the safeguards condition of supply of
the two main formal and informal international nuclear
export control instruments, we do not see how the
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative will be
implemented by the supplier state without breaching
their safeguards commitments. Even if the cooperation
is submitted to the entry into force of an India-specific
safeguards agreement negotiated with the IAEA that
will control all civilian nuclear facilities in perpetuity,
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it does appear that such a specific agreement will never
conform to the CSA required by both international
export control regimes. The Indian commitment to
adhere to and sign an additional protocol does not
change the situation because, once more, it will concern
only Indian civilian facilities as listed by India.
It should be recalled that if the NSG could in
the medium term, by its absence of reference in its
guidelines to the NPT, adopt an exception to allow
nuclear transfer to India, its participating states will find
it difficult to individually implement such exceptions
due to their legally binding NPT commitment.
It remains to be seen if nuclear supplier states are
ready to embark in this new nuclear nonproliferation
approach initiated by the U.S.-India agreement based
on the political cooperation strengthening between
suppliers, even if it will induce the infringement of
their NPT commitment.
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from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/
AR2007012500182.html.
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3. See for example the new formulation of Articles 4 (a) and 16
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With regard to the implementation of article III,
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for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports
of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not
party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209/
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to the condition established by those States, of an
undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said
requirements.
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by IAEA under the reference INFCIRC/153.
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Annex).
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9. The list contains the following categories: nuclear material;
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for reactors; plant and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment,
and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and
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under the reference INFCIRC/254Part.1.
10. The list of concerned items has been divided into six
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plant related equipment, test and measurement equipment for the
development of nuclear explosive devices, and components for
nuclear explosive devices. The guidelines have been published by
the IAEA under the reference INFCIRC/254Part.2.
11. Paragraph 4(a).
12. See INFCIRC/540.
13. See Press Statement of NSG Plenary Meeting, Paris, June
22-23, 2000, available from www.nsg-online.org/PRESS/2000-Press.
pdf.
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15. The second group of guidelines dedicated to the export of
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CHAPTER 11
FINANCING IAEA VERIFICATION
OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY
Thomas E. Shea
Introduction.
Nations spend billions on defense, but the
amount the international community spends to
finance International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) in all states is only $120M/year.1 The provisions
for financing IAEA programs are set out in the Statute
of the Agency, and that arrangement has proven to
provide adequate funds to sustain the program and to
bring the effectiveness of the safeguards system to its
current capabilities.
The IAEA enjoys enormous international prestige
and is held up within the United Nations (UN)
family as a model of efficient operation. Now that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has
carried out a nuclear test, is there an opportunity to
reconsider whether the Agency should be asked to do
more, and whether added investments in it would help
to bolster the nonproliferation regime?
There may be a number of areas where the Agency
might take on additional capabilities or improve its
current performance if the Agency had additional
money, and in some cases, additional authority. DPRK
provides a clear justification for the types of activities
mentioned, and I am optimistic that should the Director
General ask for significant safeguards expansions and
upgrades, the funding will be forthcoming. To my
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mind, the Director General should convene a council of
wise men to assist in determining how best to respond
in this matter.
In addition to the areas addressed earlier
today, the Agency needs to replace its Safeguards
Analytical Laboratory and wishes to accelerate the
turnaround time for environmental samples. It needs
to implement advanced data visualization systems
to analyze and evaluate the streams of data arising
from open source information analysis and other
modern safeguards methods. It should also bolster
the NPT regime by: (1) strengthening international
norms against proliferation; (2) assuring the human
capital needed to carry out the myriad tasks associated
with implementing the nonproliferation regime; (3)
facilitating or even stimulating the global expansion of
nuclear power while providing compelling advantages
to states to refrain from acquiring sensitive nuclear
technologies; (4) developing and deploying nuclear
power systems tailored to the needs and challenges
of the developing areas of the world—where future
problems are most likely to emerge; and (5) beginning
constructive steps in relation to the disarmament
commitments of the nuclear-weapons states parties to
the NPT, and extending that enterprise to include all
states possessing nuclear weapons.
These roles could have fundamental and significant
impacts on international security; they would cost from
tens of millions to billions of dollars or Euros per year
to realize.
Financing IAEA Safeguards: Existing Practice.
Under paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153, the Agency
is obligated to ensure that safeguards will be applied
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in accordance with the terms of the safeguards
agreements. Safeguards in non-nuclear-weapons states
concluded pursuant to INFCIRC/153 must be applied;
member states must pay the fees assessed under the
provisions of the IAEA Statute2 as part of the regular
budget to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its
obligations. All other IAEA programs are voluntary in
nature and depend upon the availability of adequate
resources to be carried out.
The existing financial system provides a reliable
funding stream for the regular budget assessments
once established; the challenges arise in:
• defining just what safeguards are actually
necessary to meet these obligations, and,
• the difficulty in achieving increases in the
regular budget when additional activities, staff
or equipment are considered necessary.
During the long lean years, the Safeguards Department
lived on zero real growth, coping by introducing technical
innovations that improved verification coverage and
quality—equipping inspectors and inspection systems
with computers and getting facility operators to make
their declarations on computer media that can be
read by inspector-computers at the facilities during
inspections. The Safeguards Department also gained
efficiencies by deploying its inspectors increasingly
through regional offices as a way to increase the days
an inspector can actually spend inspecting, by reducing
or cutting out inspection activities that are optional
(such as in nuclear-weapons states) and by changing
the safeguards rules and procedures to either reduce
the requirements or to find alternative means to secure
the assurances needed. Pierre Goldschmidt managed to
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secure a substantial increase in the regular safeguards
budget, but it took years before the Board was finally
convinced.
The regular budget for financing the IAEA is
governed by the provisions set out in the Agency’s
Statute, which each member state accepts. Each year, as
safeguards is a mandatory program, budget estimates
of what it will cost to meet the required verification
activities are prepared, based on guidance from the
director general and a sense conveyed informally from
the Geneva Group.3 Sometimes the guidance comes
first, sometimes it is a reaction representing what the
director general senses the traffic will bear. Following
internal consultations and adding the required shares
to support the management activities and other costs,
the director general presents the budget to the Program
and Budget Committee of the Board in May of each
year. When the Committee is satisfied, it recommends
the budget to the Board, and when it is satisfied, the
Board submits the recommended budget to the General
Conference for its approval.
Budget increases are resisted for a host of reasons.
National treasuries always have competing demands.
In addition to resisting expenditures simply due to
competing demands, IAEA member states are normally
not seeking to expand the power of international
organizations, as sooner or later the power and
influence they achieve might be exercised against a
state’s national interests. Preventing mission creep
remains an active concern. Also, achieving an increase
in the regular IAEA safeguards budget also involves
maintaining some sort of balance with contributions
to technical cooperation. Moreover, when cuts in other
programs have been proposed as a means to provide
additional money for safeguards, the director general
has refused.
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There are ways to mobilize a consensus to
demonstrate that additional capabilities are needed.
The director general convenes wise-men meetings
from time to time; there are internal and external audit
requirements (financial and programmatic) to assure
that the ship remains on course. The U.S. General
Accounting Office carries out independent program
reviews to determine for the U.S. Congress that its
appropriations are providing the capabilities it seeks.
All things considered, the Agency’s verification
capabilities are today vastly superior to where they
stood when the NPT came into force, or when Iraq
and the DPRK first violated their nonproliferation
undertakings.
Extrabudgetary Contributions.
In addition to the regular budget, the IAEA relies
on extrabudgetary contributions from its member
states. In 2005, member states provided extrabudgetary
contributions in the amount of $130,863,115 to the
Agency in cash and in kind.4 Most of this is for the
Technical Cooperation Fund, but some of it goes
to the Safeguards Department—not for mandatory
inspections, but for equipment or inspections in
nuclear-weapons states, for example. The U.S.
voluntary contribution to the IAEA in 2006 was $49.5
million; $19.1 million of that was for safeguards and
$14.2 million was for the U.S. Program of Technical
Assistance to Agency Safeguards (POTAS). Counting
POTAS, there are about 18 member state support
programs that provide money and talent for the
Safeguards Department to improve its capabilities and
performance.
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Extrabudgetary contributions are also provided
by other UN organizations and other international
organizations, in the amount of $6.8M in 2005.
This included a contribution by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI).5 At the special event that took place
during the 2006 IAEA General Conference, former
Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman of NTI, announced a
contribution of $50M to be used by the IAEA, together
with other contributions, to establish a nuclear reactor
fuel bank that would provide assurances of supply to
states adopting nuclear power. NTI represents a new
departure for the IAEA, a philanthropic institution
investing in the IAEA to accomplish activities related
to nuclear security and nonproliferation issues.
The Agency has a policy in place to accommodate
contributions from virtually any source, assuring that
the Agency’s policymaking organs will determine how
such funds are managed and spent.6 Note that it is not
common for the IAEA to solicit funds for activities that
are not supported by existing mechanisms. However,
the Board, acting on a request by the director general,
did establish a special fund for the receipt of the Nobel
Peace Prize, the “IAEA Nobel Cancer and Nutrition
Fund.” In establishing the fund, “the director general
also encourages member states and other donors to
contribute to the special fund by making available
additional resources both in cash and in kind, to be
used to maximize the Agency’s ability to build capacity
and transfer the needed know-how to developing
countries.”7 Thus, a precedent—albeit limited—has
been established in which the Agency has gone beyond
the normal financial means available to it to encourage
donations from unspecified parties.

328

Expanding the Nonproliferation Regime
on a Different Financial Basis.
Increasing contributions from national treasuries
could be significant if there is a proliferation event—
such as the DPRK nuclear test—or if a new treaty
comes into force that carries financial obligations
with it. Short of that, further increases are likely to be
sporadic, driven when a consensus eventually emerges
demanding improvement.
However, there is another way. Suppose that the
nonproliferation regime provided a steady stream of
significant income so that the decision shifted from how
to raise money to how to spend it. The whole notion
of creative steps to strengthen the nonproliferation
system would then appear in a different light.
Here are five ways in which such a condition could
be created.
1. Endowment: A “Nonproliferation Endowment”
could be chartered to improve the IAEA’s ability
to verify the NPT and to stimulate peaceful nuclear
programs designed for economic development and
a stable peace. Such an endowment could be funded
by substantial donations from wealthy individuals
or foundations. Such an effort would actively solicit
contributions from the public, the nuclear industry,
the alumni of the nonproliferation work force,
and governments as well. Note that the Harvard
endowment, which includes some 10,000 contributions,
is now valued at approximately $26B.
2. Surcharge: In the United states, “customers who
use nuclear power pay for the disposal of spent fuel.
The federal government collects a fee of one mil (onetenth of a cent) per kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated
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electricity from utilities. This money goes into the
Nuclear Waste Fund. In addition, Congress makes an
annual appropriation from the General Fund of the
Treasury to pay for disposal of defense-related highlevel radioactive waste.”8 Of course, any country could
establish a surcharge system for any reason, like spent
fuel management, or for nonproliferation purposes.
Today, there are approximately 449 nuclear power
plants in operation;9 if that were the case when the
IAEA was created, it is possible that the Statute might
make different arrangements. The Agency’s Statute
could be revised, possibly to make a surcharge on all
plants constructed after a specified date.
		 A surcharge arrangement might fit best into
a new legal framework, as a basis for transparencyrelated measures under a fissile material cut-off
treaty, for example, or under a future framework for
expanding global nuclear power as a means to stimulate
nuclear power in the developing areas of the world. In
the latter case, such a funding stream might be used
to start-up new nuclear projects under a scheme that
allowed delayed repayment such that the nuclear plant
could begin to bring about economic development for
several years before repayments would commence.
		 A surcharge should be levied as a fixed
percentage of some commodity price. That way, the rate
is the same for all states or exporters, and the amounts
of money would follow inflation in a natural way
without the need for periodic negotiated adjustments
with all the drama that such steps would entail. For
example, a surcharge of 1 percent on nuclear generating
costs collected from nuclear utilities would provide an
funding stream of $700M/year from the United States
alone.10 One percent may be too much or too little; only
by considering the aims for such a framework could a
defensible figure be set.
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3. Selling services: The IAEA could be asked to
organize nuclear operations under extra-territorial
agreements with host countries. These might include
nuclear power plants for regional power sharing
in the developing areas of the world, multinational
uranium enrichment centers, spent fuel reception
centers, multinational spent fuel recycle centers and
nuclear waste repositories. The Agency’s role in such
cases would be to provide the political framework
and to secure competent commercial organizations to
actually operate the respective facilities. In such cases,
it would be reasonable for the Agency to collect fees
for the services it provides.
4. Financial Institutions: A financial institution (like
the World Bank) could be empowered to engage in
financing appropriate peaceful nuclear projects under
a delayed payback arrangement. The World Bank itself
does not currently finance nuclear projects; it did once
in Italy,11 and today the World Bank is carrying out an
investigation to determine whether or not to re-enter
this field.12
		 Whether the World Bank or one or more other
financial institutions, such an arrangement would
depend upon the capitalization provided and timedependent returns. The delayed repayment scheme
identified above would be appropriate, but in addition,
consideration might be given to having the financial
institutions actually purchase and own the power
plants, transferring ownership upon repayment. Such
an arrangement would ensure that vendors would
receive payments, that prices would be fair, that users
would have a measure of assurance of supply, and
that vendors could be provided with some degree of
indemnification against spurious litigation. Investments
made by the financial institution might also carry an
accompanying contribution to the IAEA to cover its
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expenses as necessary to ensure that the project serves
the intended purposes and that the quality of goods
and services provided is consistent with international
standards.
5. Market Mechanisms: The fourth possibility would
somehow engage the investment community through
the issuance of tax-exempt nonproliferation bonds,
which would yield interest on revenues collected
down-stream by financing projects under the delayed
pay-back arrangements described above. This scheme
might connect with one of the earlier mechanisms and
would require government investment and oversight
to be stable and to avoid suspicions that it might be a
ponzi scheme.
6. Industry Share: This proposal goes directly to
provide the IAEA with enhanced technical capabilities
by engaging the exporters of nuclear facilities. Under
current practice, if a state imports a reactor or fuel
manufacturing plant or any other type of fuel cycle
facility, the importer is required to submit the facility
for IAEA safeguards. The facility operator and the
Agency bear costs as necessary for safeguards to be
applied; sometimes the state bills the Agency for the
installation of safeguards equipment, sometimes
not. The facility operator may pass the costs along as
business expenses to its customers.
		 Under such an arrangement, for plants to be
exported, the vendor and the future facility operator
would work with the Agency to develop a safeguards
approach, including the inspection equipment to
be used by the Agency and the procedures for its
maintenance and operation. The vendor would then
be responsible for providing such equipment that
would become part of the sales price. To the extent
that the vendor remains engaged for the maintenance
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or operation of any plant systems, the vendor would
remain responsible for assuring that the safeguards
equipment continues to meet IAEA needs, including
maintenance and upgrades as appropriate. Just as for
plant safety systems, the safeguards systems should be
integrated into the plant operational systems such that
continued operation would be prevented in the event
of anomalous indications from the installed safeguards
systems.
Conclusions.
The premise of my remarks has been that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens national
and international security, and that, as the renaissance
of nuclear power stimulates its global expansion, the
international community needs to reconsider how
to prevent disaster while increasing our reliance
and stimulating the expansion to the far corners of
the globe. In part, that can be accomplished through
technological means or through other mechanisms
that contain proliferation while permitting growth and
stability.
Proliferation is a global concern. The IAEA somehow
magically stands before us in this challenging era: no
other international organization is held in such high
regard, and assuring its continued viability is critical
for future peace. Expanding its missions can provide
greater assurance of peace and security in the future,
provided those roles are considered carefully and
implemented under arrangements that promote
success.
Money will always be at the core of what the Agency
can or should do in the future. While today the Agency
relies almost exclusively on assessed contributions
333

from national treasuries and from extrabudgetary
contributions, most of which come from those same
treasuries. Diversifying the financing arrangements
can provide for growth, dropping the grueling
debates on how growth could be financed to how the
finance already attained can be best directed to secure
sustainable economic development and international
security.

While IAEA safeguards are a critical part of this
enterprise, it is, in fact, one with a rather small price
tag. The other areas are in similar need, and the
amounts needed may be substantially greater than
what the IAEA could gainfully commit to enhanced
verification.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11
1. For the year ending December 31, 2005, the total amount
expended on Nuclear Verification was $121,094,383.00, which
includes disbursements and unliquidated obligations. For 2005,
the assessed contributions for the IAEA totaled $316,473,124.
GC(50)/8, The Agency’s Accounts for 2005, p.54, p.112.
2. See Article XIV of the IAEA Statute.
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3. The Geneva Group comprises the States that pay the bulk
of the IAEA regular budget.
4. See GC(50)/8, The Agency’s Accounts for 2005, p.112.
5. Ibid., p. 113.
6. See INFCIRC/370, “Rules
Contributions to the Agency.”

Regarding

Voluntary

7. GOV/2005/86, IAEA Special Fund—Nobel Peace Prize for
2005, para. 6.
8.
shtml.

Available

from

www.ocrwm.doe.gov/about/budget/index.

9. Information from IAEA Power Reactor Information System,
http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/
10. Energy Information Administration input.
11. On September 16, 1959, the World Bank made a loan
equivalent to $40 million for the construction of a 150MWe
[megawatt electric] GE BWR [boiling water reactor] at a site on the
Garigliano River in Italy (Loan 0235). This was Italy’s first nuclear
power plant, and the Bank’s loan financed almost two-thirds of
the cost of construction. The plant began operation in 1964. In
August 1978, it was shut down due to damage to one of the two
secondary steam generators. In March 1982, the Italian Electricity
Generating Board declared the plant to be out of service. Available
from web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXT
ARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20125474~pagePK:36726~piPK.
12. Available from psdblog.worldbank.org/psdblog/2006/04/go_
nuclear_for_.html.
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